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SUMMARY
Performance monitoring is commonly portrayed as providing a uniquely objective, rational
foundation for decisions, based on a single-stranded feedback loop between setting objectives
and measuring results. In this thesis, I investigate whether this portrayal is accurate. I analyse
whether the linear model underlying performance monitoring provides an adequate basis for
understanding decisions about access to rural water supply in Ethiopia. My examination
focuses primarily on the politics of knowledge production from three angles.
First, I examine whether the assumptions underlying the definition of ‘access’ to rural water
used in performance monitoring in Ethiopia, adequately represent the divergent notions of
access among the relevant actors. My findings show that formal framings of access, codified in
national and international guidelines and benchmarks, focus on technical aspects of the water
supply infrastructure. I bring to light that the goal of performance monitoring in relation to
achieving ‘access’ is driven by the methods used to measure it, mainly the parameters of
infrastructure, volume, distance and quality, suggesting a circularity between framings of the
inputs to and objectives of appraisal. In this self-referential process, a particular image of the
world determines the meaning of performance, which is used as a yardstick. The power of this
dynamic is apparent in Ethiopian stakeholders’ characterisations of access, which, even when
critical, revolve narrowly around these dominant parameters. This one-dimensional and
technical framing of access, constantly reproduced in self-referential monitoring circles,
contrasts starkly with the multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of the water access
experiences of local residents in Ethiopia.
Second, I test whether, in reality, monitoring processes conform to the linearity assumed by
the feed-back function of performance monitoring. The process tracing method used to
illuminate the political and power dynamics of monitoring processes, shows that sector
government actors at different administrative levels, with different rationales, provide
different stories of ‘access’. Viewed from this perspective, performance monitoring can be
seen not, as conventionally asserted, as a uniquely rational appraisal of performance, but
rather as being about ‘performing monitoring’ – the playing out on a management stage of
certain politically-necessary performances. At the same time, I find that numerous less
formalised monitoring practices proceed in parallel with the formal PM process, which,
together, form a body of largely ‘tacit’ knowledge that informs sector stakeholders’ daily work.
It is this wider body of knowledge, rather than only formalised PM results, that informs
decisions.
iii
Third, I investigate the mechanisms that led to the formulation of specific decisions associated
with rural water access and the role in these of performance monitoring. I find that particular
decisions, such as repairs to rural water schemes, have multiple causes, among which
performance monitoring is a contributory and necessary, but not sufficient factor. My
investigation of criteria affecting budget allocations highlights that sector offices’ limited
control over them contributes to making strategic planning a rubber stamping exercise whose
processes can be characterised as ‘muddling through’ as opposed to adhering to the linear
model suggested by Results-based Management.
My findings highlight the need to break the self-referential cycle of narrowly framed
performance monitoring exercises. They suggest greater attention to the ‘tacit’ monitoring
practices in local settings, and a focus on the process of monitoring and the power relations
within it, to complement the dominant focus on monitoring targets and indicators.
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11 Introduction
It is 6 am in Mole, and the sun has yet to rise. Meselich is already in a queue - at the only one
of the two water points in the local motorised scheme that produces good tasting water near
her home. The day before she had sent her daughter to fetch water in the morning, but the girl
had come back empty-handed because the borehole reservoir had run dry before it came to
her turn in the queue. Today, she wants to make sure to get two jerry cans of water for her
family of six, because she has almost run out of water for drinking and cooking. Although
Meselich is irritated that collecting water from the borehole continues daily to be a gamble,
she is grateful that the scheme has been repaired. The month before, the family was obliged to
pay local traders, who were transporting water from the next town by donkey cart, ten times
the fee she currently pays to the tap attendant. Although the situation has improved, she does
not trust the water committee who failed to operate the water scheme on several occasions in
the previous weeks on the grounds that there was no fuel to feed the pump to get the water
into the reservoir. There are constant rumours of funds being misused by the committee; and
every day she faces the worry of whether her turn in the queue will arrive before the water
runs out. What she wants is a household connection, something that her husband and others
raise repeatedly at meetings with government officials.
Meselich is not the name of a real woman. I have adopted it to present a tale, common in the
densely populated lowland settlements in my fieldwork location in the Southern Region1 of
Ethiopia. Despite Meselich’s story being a common experience, this reality does not feature in
the official data on access to rural water supply of my fieldwork kebele, the lowest
administrative unit with salaried staff in Ethiopia, covering an area that officially counts 5,800
dwellers. According to the federal Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) calculations for the
1 The region’s full name is Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional National State;
throughout this thesis I use the term Southern Region.
2same kebele in 2010, 70% of the population had access to water supply. Ministerial rural water
access figures for the country as a whole were reported as 65.8% in 2010 (MoWE, 2010), while,
according to the global Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) on water and sanitation (2012b),
rural water access reached 34% in the same year. The divergence in the perceptions and
figures for access to water supply in the kebele and in the country is puzzling. It is also
disconcerting given that, in Ethiopia’s rural water sub-sector reform processes, great attention
has been paid to improving monitoring since 2006, on the underlying assumption that
performance monitoring (PM), ultimately, will translate into better access to rural water
supply. The emphasis on PM in Ethiopia is upheld by the global aid architecture and
represented globally in the striving to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
PM refers to measurement of ‘results’ as opposed to the inputs and activities related to an
intervention (OECD, 2010). PM is part of Results-based Management (RBM), a public
management model that focuses on the achievement of measurable results. Measuring results
is key to public sector reforms aimed at ‘reinventing government’, the title of a book by David
Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992) published in the early 1990s. In their book, Osborne and
Gaebler (1992: 146) circumscribe the value of measuring results using the following logic:
If you do not measure results, you cannot tell success from failure.
If you cannot see success, you cannot reward it.
If you cannot reward success, you are probably rewarding failure.
If you cannot see success, you cannot learn from it.
If you cannot recognize failure, you cannot correct it.
If you can demonstrate results, you can win public support.
According to this logic, measuring results serves as an objective means to demonstrate the
success (or not) of an intervention. PM is presented as a rational means for informing robust
policy decisions and, based on that, for increasing public accountability. However, this
common presentation of PM is at odds with the situation I have described above, which relates
3to a specific development result, access to rural water supply, in a local setting. In this setting,
my fieldwork kebele, the figure of 70% to describe the development result of rural water
‘access’ does not capture the reality that Meselich faces in her daily effort to obtain water –
the long queuing times, the uncertainty as to whether she will return home with a full jerry can
of water, and her mistrust in the capacity of the local committee to operate the scheme
effectively. Furthermore, the Federal Ministry and the global monitoring programme, the JMP,
present different water ‘access’ figures for Ethiopia. It is this puzzle that is at the heart of my
thesis. How can we explain these divergent interpretations of access to water supply in my
fieldwork kebele and Ethiopia as a whole? What does this divergence mean for the robustness
and credibility of PM processes and their results? Is PM the uniquely rational, objective
process that it is claimed to be? Do monitoring results inform decisions on rural water access
in Ethiopia? In this thesis, I critically examine these questions.
1.1 Why focus on performance monitoring?
Why focus on PM in the first place? Could it be that the situation I described above is a one-off
example that does not represent current trends in development cooperation? My personal
observations when working on issues related to governance of water and sanitation across
Sub-Saharan Africa prior to embarking on this thesis research do not confirm this. My
observations point to increased attention to PM in the water and sanitation sub-sectors. For
example, in 2009, there were 11 parallel monitoring initiatives, of different scope and with
different foci, based on information management related to Water Supply, Sanitation and
Hygiene (WASH) in the Southern Region of Ethiopia, the region where my case study is based
(Butterworth et al., 2009).
This large number of monitoring activities at the operational level mirrors national and
international level trends in development cooperation. Elements of PM have been part of
4delivering aid since the introduction in the 1970s of the ‘logical framework’ approach (Rebien,
1996, Cracknell, 2000, Hailey and Sorgenfrei, 2004). The global declaration of MDGs in 2000
promoted the measurement of results to a new level, making it pervasive on the political
agenda. Tracking performance was further reinforced under the banner of ‘Aid Effectiveness’,
which determines donor-recipient relationships, particularly in highly aid-dependent countries,
such as Ethiopia (OECD, 2005). One of the five pillars identified as increasing the effectiveness
of aid is “managing resources and improving decision-making for results” (OECD, 2005: 7). This
reflects the logic in the quote from Osborne and Gaebler (1992) that the introduction of
results-based monitoring enables policy makers to measure and reward success, which
ultimately increases the effectiveness of aid, and its accountability. The related global target
for drinking water, to “halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to
safe drinking water” (UNSD, 2008) is represented in the MDG 7c.
As a consequence of the global aid effectiveness agenda, performance measurement has
become crucial for all water supply, sanitation and hygiene interventions in countries heavily
dependent on aid. This is apparent at various levels. At the national level, many of these
countries have embarked on sector reform processes that entail the establishment of PM
systems as a key element of reform. An early example of this is the set of ‘golden indicators’ of
performance, developed in Uganda in the early 2000s by the then Ministry of Water, Lands
and Environment (Pinfold, 2006). Also, a review by the World Bank’s (WB) Water and
Sanitation Programme on progress in monitoring performance in the rural water supply sub-
sector across 33 Sub-Saharan African countries, found that, between 2006 and 2010, 15
countries had reviewed their performance and set new undertakings, 10 countries had
reviewed their progress, but not set new targets, and 8 countries had not undertaken any PM
of their rural water supply (WSP, 2011: 78). Ethiopia is included in the second set of countries:
setting up a Monitoring Information System for WASH has been a key sector reform
undertaking discussed in sector multi-stakeholder forums since 2006 (MoWR and EUWI, 2006).
5While figures on access are presented regularly at these forums, until 2010, during the time of
my fieldwork in Ethiopia, they were not used as a basis for strategic review of sector activities.
PM is high on the United Kingdom’s (UK) agenda for aid allocated to WASH. For instance, in
April 2011, Alan Duncan MP, the then Minister of State for International Development,
emphasised the importance of measuring the results of the sector interventions of his
department, in a keynote address to the 6th Annual WASH Forum addressing UK non-
governmental stakeholders (ODI, 2011). The importance put on performance measurement in
the UK is apparent also in an internal WASH portfolio review, which focuses on measuring
results, cost effectiveness, and value for money in relation to the Department for International
Development’s (DFID) interventions in the sector (DFID, 2012b) and in the Department’s
results framework established in 2011 to monitor and manage its progress (DFID, 2012a).
As mentioned above, international PM of development results is represented by the MDGs.
The JMP of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), cited above, has a mandate to measure progress towards MDG 7c, related to water
supply and sanitation (WHO and UNICEF, 2010). At this level, the focus is shifting to ‘post-MDG’
monitoring. To this end, the JMP recently launched a consultative process to develop ‘post-
MDG’ indicators (WHO and UNICEF, 2012e). I discuss these developments in more detail in
Chapter 3, where I trace the history and theoretical underpinnings related to PM, and return to
this discussion in Chapter 9, where I reflect on my findings in light of current developments in
global sector monitoring.
The importance of PM related to water supply is apparent not only in efforts to introduce such
frameworks at the national and international levels but also in the manifold technical
innovations to improve monitoring. In the rural water supply sub-sector, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and research institutions are at the forefront in trialling new tools to
improve information on the distribution and sustainability of rural water supply schemes. For
6instance, the NGO WaterAid has developed the Water Point Mapper software, an Excel-based
tool that maps the spatial distribution of water supply schemes, their functionality status, and
various other parameters (WaterAid, 2011). Complementing this, the NGO Water for People is
testing a methodology called Field Level Operation Watch, which is a hand-held mobile device
intended to project data on the functionality of water supply schemes, onto Google Earth
maps, via android mobile phones (Water for People, 2012). A similar initiative called
‘M4W’(Mobile Telephones for Improved Safe Water Access) is currently being piloted in
Uganda by IRC2 in collaboration with Makerere University and other stakeholders (IRC, 2012).
The Geography Department at Oxford University is experimenting with the design of smart
hand-pumps in Kenya. Equipped with data transmitters via a technology that is similar to
mobile phones, these devices alert technicians about pumps experiencing problems
(University of Oxford, 2012).
Together, the enhanced efforts to improve results-based monitoring by aid recipient
governments, donors, the global monitoring programme JMP, and among NGOs and academic
institutions, and current discussions around post-MDG monitoring are a clear indication of the
strong interest in increasing the evidence base on the performance of rural water supply.
1.2 The nature and contribution of my investigation
There is no doubt that, in principle, PM has an important role to play in the assessment of both
public and private sector programmes. Proponents of PM point out that the use of results-
based frameworks allows implementers to focus their interventions on specific goals (Hailey
and Sorgenfrei, 2004). An example for this is global monitoring towards the eradication of
2 IRC stands for International Water and Sanitation Centre
7guinea-worm, a water-related disease.3 The WHO’s monitoring of reported guinea-worm
infections in relation with a global programme to eradicate the disease shows that cases of
transmission in 2012 are confined to 4 rather than the 20 countries in 1990 (WHO, 2012a).
Results-based monitoring has the potential to highlight issues for policy and practice that
might otherwise remain hidden. For instance, displaying the spatial distribution of rural water
supply access across a district potentially can uncover inequitable distribution of services
(Welle, 2007a). However, given the emphasis on PM in development cooperation in general,
and in rural water supply in particular, as outlined above, surprisingly few voices critically
engage with the concept of PM. Generally, discussion stops with the criticism of a particular
indicator, or the effectiveness of a technology or method for improving PM (Hailey and
Sorgenfrei, 2004). An exception is the development policy analyst David Booth, who, in a
recent draft working paper on the political economy of aid effectiveness, postulated that “the
‘results agenda’ is wide open to the accusation that it is just about manufacturing fig leaves to
cover the embarrassing bits of public expenditure on international development” (Booth, 2011:
8).
A key contribution of my thesis is that it opens a space for critical engagement with PM, and
particularly the common assumption that it provides a uniquely rational means for informing
robust policy decisions, by making the politics of knowledge production the centre of the
investigation. My investigation starts with the apparent mismatch between Meselich’s story
and official performance-related figures for rural water access in her locality, and for Ethiopia.
My strategy for opening a discussion space is based on the connotations of the word
‘performance’. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the definition of ‘performance’ has
two meanings: First, performance is described as “the process of performing a task or
3 Guinea-worm is transmitted to humans exclusively by stagnant water contaminated with tiny water
fleas that carry the infective guinea-worm larvae. Inside the body, the larvae mature into worms that
can grow to up to 1 metre in length.
8function … i.e. in terms of how successfully it is performed”. Second, it is “the act of
presenting a play” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2010). In the first meaning of the word, ‘performance’
is about the success with which a particular task is executed; in its second meaning,
‘performance’ is the act of showcasing something, an act of stage management. While in the
first case, reality is seen as measurable in an objective manner based on performance
indicators, in the second case, reality is a subjective act of performance that is presented to an
audience. In the first meaning, the assumption is that we can objectively measure an
achievement, represented by aggregate figures on rural water access. However, the gap
between Meselich’s experience of access to rural water and the two, in themselves different,
interpretations represented by the official percentages describing the same access situation,
cast doubt on the objectivity and linearity of PM. At the core of my thesis research is a
question that rests on these two meanings of ‘performance’: is it entirely what it seems to be –
about objectively monitoring performance – or, are we also presented with the act of
performing monitoring, in the sense of the theatre metaphor? It is this question that is
reflected in the title of my thesis: “Monitoring performance or performing monitoring?”
1.3 Situating my thesis in the field of water studies
The way societies engage with water has changed over time as have the perspectives of
scholars who study the water-society nexus. In the past, water related knowledge
predominantly was influenced by the technical and natural sciences (Molle et al., 2008). During
much of the 19th and 20th centuries, a key paradigm was the notion of the ‘hydraulic mission’
(Allan, 1999, Swyngedouw, 1999, Molle et al., 2009), the taming and domination of nature
through the expansion of infrastructure. Marc Reisner (1986), for instance, documents this
approach in relation to the history of dam construction in the American West, and Erik
Swyngedouw (1999) discusses the role of water engineering in Spain’s modernisation process.
While the paradigm of the ‘hydraulic mission’ has since been challenged by alternative views
9on the interrelation between water and society (see below), it is worth noticing that a focus on
technical and engineering aspects is still apparent today, including in global monitoring of
water access under MDG 7c, an issue that I discuss in Chapter 6, on water access framings.
As indicated above, meanwhile, various authors have proposed alternative views on technical
solutions to water issues. Leif Ohlsson (1999, cited in Turton, 1999: 7) and Anthony Turton
(1999), for instance, draw attention to the aspect of societal ‘adaptive capacity’ to overcome
environmental, or what is often called ‘first-order’ water scarcity. Tony Allan (2003) argues
that, starting from the 1980s, environmental and economic concerns entered the water
discourse and since the turn of the 20th century, increased attention was given to the political
and institutional dimensions related to the management of water resources. Other authors
draw attention to social equity and distributional concerns, and highlight that the discursive
nature of ‘water scarcity’ neglects factors that mediate access, such as power relations, gender,
caste, class and feudal legacies (Mehta, 2006).
In line with Tony Allan’s observation, a growing body of literature in water studies makes
reference to water governance. The idea of ‘effective water governance’ entered the water
sector mainly via the concept of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) (Rogers
and Hall, 2003). IWRM, which takes the hydrological unit as a starting point for integrating
environmental and societal needs in water resources management, has been widely embraced
for offering a normative approach that invites multiple actors to reach a consensus on
sustainable resource use (Saravanan et al., 2009). However, critics have argued that the IWRM
‘toolbox’ (GWP, 2008) relies on a rather technocratic and managerial understanding of
governance for guidance on how to overcome governance failures. The discourse around
IWRM has been characterised as a “narrowly instrumental debate” (Cleaver and Franks, 2008:
161) and criticised for reinforcing the established worldviews of incumbent actors rather than
critically engaging with the politics and power relations inherent in water management (Molle,
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2008). Others regard IWRM as a “vague and fuzzy concept” that is difficult to implement in
practice (Biswas, 2004 cited in Mehta et al., 2007: 23).
Other scholars engage explicitly with the political and power dimensions of water governance.
Janelle Plummer and Tom Slaymaker (2007) draw on different political economy-related
conceptual frameworks to analyse the governance of rural water services. David Edelmann
(2009) reviews political economy concepts from the perspective of sector reform processes,
while Frances Cleaver and Tom Franks (2005, 2008) developed alternative analytical
framework to study the concrete outcomes of water governance on poor peoples’ access to
this resource. Among journals in the water studies field, the open-access online journal Water
Alternatives, launched in 2008, focuses explicitly on questions related to power and political
economy in the field, by “opening up the black-box of governance” and “unpacking discourses
and their expression of particular configurations of power” (Molle et al., 2008: 4). The journal
intends to foster a scholarship focusing on the ‘political sociology of water resources
management’ whereby ‘political’ refers to “the contested nature of water resources
management” and ‘sociology’ means the “study of social behaviour and interaction and of
social structure” (Mollinga, 2008: 11). The journal’s focus is shared by the STEPS4 Centre’s
water domain, which, in its first working paper, calls for “knowledge politics, issues concerning
a wider political economy and politics of framing” (Mehta et al., 2007: 32) to be at the centre
of water and sanitation governance debates. It is in this body of research in the field of water
studies that my thesis is situated: the study of the politics of knowledge production with a view
to explicitly addressing the power relations and political dimensions related to water supply
and water resources management.
In natural resources management, political ecologists have a tradition of addressing resource
struggles as struggles over access and struggles over meaning (Peet and Watts, 1996 cited in
4 STEPS stands for ‘social, ecological and environmental pathways to sustainability’
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Mehta et al., 2007: 8). The authors Jesse Ribot and Nancy Peluso (2003: 154) conceptualise
‘access’ to natural resources as an analysis of “who actually benefits from things and through
what processes they are able to do so”. Their analysis focuses on the material, cultural and
political-economic manifestations of power relations that govern natural resource access.
Various political ecologists have challenged the established knowledge-power configurations
concerning environmental management and change. Well-known topics include questioning
the fuel-wood crisis phenomenon, hitherto perceived as a main cause of deforestation in
Africa (Leach and Mearns, 1996, Fairhead and Leach, 1998), and challenging predominant
narratives related to agricultural science, the model of increasing output and productivity, and
of agricultural policy as a ‘main engine of economic growth’ with alternative perspectives
based on principles of agro-ecology and participation (Thompson et al., 2007).
In the field of water studies, scholars, inter alia, have challenged common perceptions such as
Malthusian concerns over future water wars contained in the idea of water scarcity-induced
armed conflicts (Allan, 1998), water pricing, and markets as a precondition for efficient water
allocation and management (Molle, 2008, Boelens and Vos, 2012), unpacked political concepts
such as the aforementioned ‘hydraulic mission’ as a symbol for nation building and a tool to
legitimise state power (Molle et al., 2009), and brought to light ‘discursive framings’ underlying
agricultural water management projects and policies (Venot and Krishnan, 2011).
Within the body of work on the knowledge-power configuration in water studies, my entry
point is the topic of appraisal –“how knowledge about water and sanitation is gathered to
inform decision making and wider institutional arrangements” (Mehta et al., 2007: 3). I start
from the proposition in the STEPS Centre’s Working Paper on Liquid Dynamics (Mehta et al.,
2007) that an important entry point for critically assessing the politics related to water issues is
to increase the reflexivity of how problems are framed and appraised, whose views they
represent, and whose concerns are left out. When analysing past appraisals related to water,
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Lyla Mehta and colleagues (2007) observe that, for instance, with regard to large dams,
assessments have focused on designs that primarily draw on economic and monetary
dimensions, such as cost-benefit analysis, at the expense of social and environmental concerns.
They highlight also that appraisal designs, such as cost-benefit analyses, foster a one-
dimensional and polarised view of policy options – either for or against the construction of a
specific dam – rather than considering a range of alternative technological and policy pathways.
Such appraisal designs rest on an ostensibly unitary and single view of technological progress
and fall short of questioning which directions of progress are desirable for society (Stirling,
2009).
A notably positive development in relation to the appraisal of large dams is the World
Commission on Dams (2000), a multi-stakeholder dialogue that was set up to examine
different social, economic and environmental impacts of past dam projects, and to devise
guidelines for future decision making processes related to water and energy needs. However,
there are indications from a recent revisit of the dam debate in the literature (Moore et al.,
2010), and, from Ethiopia, that the appraisal of large dam projects currently underway, do not
take account of this analysis or make use of the decision-making principles suggested by the
Commission (Bosshard, 2012).
Several authors concur that appraisal designs, including sector monitoring information systems,
are predominantly geared to the information needs of political and administrative elites. De
Kadt (1994), based on an analysis of the use of information for public policy decision making in
Chile and Brazil, observed that such information systems reflect the views of those at the top
of the hierarchy who determine the design, collection, analysis and use of information.
Findings from a National WASH Inventory that was carried out between 2010 and 2011 in
Ethiopia, confirm that the information needs of actors at the lower level of the hierarchy such
as local government water and sanitation staffs remain an afterthought in the design and
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implementation of large-scale sector surveys (Welle et al., 2012). At the same time, designs
that explicitly attend to the voices of poor and marginalised groups such as participatory
forums, can equally raise questions of representation and may fail to reframe existing debates
(Scoones and Thompson, 2003).
Others draw attention to the related politics inherent in appraisal processes, for instance,
defining of the subject matter and determining related parameters such as indicators. Jessica
Budds (2009) explores the politics inherent in scientific appraisal processes related to water
resources management based on a hydrological assessment of a small river basin in Chile. She
finds that the scientific appraisal she studied drew exclusively on physical parameters to assess
a socio-political situation, thereby reinforcing established, unequal patterns of resource use.
Another example, which I discuss further throughout the thesis, is the indicator for ‘access to
drinking water’ in the MDGs. The indicator for measuring sustainable access to safe water
refers to using an ‘improved’ source, begging the question of who this definition represents
and how such global standards are arrived at. According to Mehta (2005), the notion of an
‘improved’ source is contentious based on her findings for Western India where local villagers
prefer water from local ‘unimproved’ wells to ostensibly ‘improved’ water supply schemes
provided by government. More generally, Francois Molle and Peter Mollinga (2003: 534), in a
review of water poverty indicators, point out that indicators are in danger of becoming ‘black
boxes’ that conceal problems such as poor data quality, loss of meaning in the process of
aggregation and arbitrariness of weighting. Importantly, the authors conclude their review
with the proposition that the use and impact of indicators on policy making “remain[s] a
subject on which little is known and which deserves further investigation” (Molle and Mollinga,
2003: 543).
My thesis is one such investigation. As stated above, this thesis critically examines the
common assumption that PM provides a uniquely rational means for informing robust policy
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decisions, drawing on the case of rural water access in Ethiopia by asking: what role does
performance monitoring play in shaping policy decisions on rural water access in Ethiopia?
I investigate the dynamics related to PM from three angles: first, I test whether PM, as
practised in Ethiopia’s rural water sector, reflects the ways in which different people
understand and experience rural water ‘access’, through the question: What are the specific
ways in which key actors (those affected and those implementing) at different levels
(individual, kebele, woreda, zone, region, federal and international) frame access to rural water?
My main enquiry here relates to whether ‘access’, as framed within PM, responds to the
concerns of water users and implementers.
Second, I investigate in depth specific PM processes to understand the political and power
dynamics that result in some framings of ‘access’ being suppressed and others coming to the
forefront, embedded in the question: Which actors’ framings are represented in monitoring
exercises and results concerning rural water access?
Third, I test the relationship between monitoring results and the decisions taken about access
to rural water supply by asking: What is the explanatory power of PM in decisions taken on
rural water access?
The above short and, necessarily, incomplete exposé of the literature in the field of water
studies makes it clear that my analysis does not start from a blank sheet. As illustrated by
contributions from political ecology more generally and from the field of water studies in
particular, many scholars already critically engage with the politics of knowledge production.
The unique entry point of my study within this wider body of work is its focus on PM
(performance monitoring) and its setting within the wider aid effectiveness agenda. My
theoretical approach, which I explain in depth in Chapter 5, is primarily informed by scholars
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who analyse ‘performance’ from the perspective of the politics of knowledge production and
on work in the field of science and technology studies. My theoretical framework is based on
the STEPS Centre’s approach to ‘social appraisal’. My thesis refines and elaborates some of its
related conceptual aspects.
Below, I explain the scope and limitations of my study. I outline key debates related to rural
water access that inform my thesis but whose in depth examination is beyond the scope of this
thesis. I explain my focus on rural water supply and the choice of Ethiopia as a case study.
Finally, I provide some clarification regarding my understanding and use of the term
‘performance’ in this thesis.
1.4 Scope and limitations of my investigation
Water is a life-sustaining source which has many facets: it is key to the functioning of the
earth’s ecosystems as well as those of the human body; it plays a crucial role in subsistence
and market-based livelihoods; it is important as a source of spirituality and is crucial for human
health, recreation and well-being (Mehta, 2006, Molle et al., 2008). In the ‘water’ sector,
people often draw an arbitrary line between ‘water for life’, relating to the supply of water,
the removal of wastewater and the provision of sanitation, and ‘water for livelihoods’, which
refers to water for productive purposes (UNDP, 2006, Mehta et al., 2007). However, as the
multi-faceted nature of water outlined above indicates, the distinction between domestic and
productive uses is a mainly bureaucratic one that does not match peoples’ daily lived
experience. Since the subject of this thesis – PM – is situated in the public sector I need to
follow the existing fault-lines. The scope of this thesis research is a sub-aspect of the water
domain, PM of basic access to rural water supply, which refers to the use of water for
domestic purposes. According to the WHO, the most basic level of access covers drinking
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water, and water for food preparation and basic hygiene (Howard and Bartram, 2003).5 The
scope of my analysis of PM processes is thus limited to monitoring of rural water access; it
does not include monitoring of sanitation and hygiene and monitoring of access to water in
urban areas.
From a historical perspective, debates on access to water tend to mirror wider debates in the
water domain. From the 1950s to the 1970s, provision of water supply was centralised and
driven largely by hardware issues (Wallace and Coles, 2005). Supply management of drinking
water infrastructure was seen as the main approach to advancing human development in the
countries of the southern hemisphere. These technologies were provided by engineers via
stand-alone infrastructure projects focusing on the technical dimensions of provision (Harvey
and Reed, 2004). In the 1980s, there was a growing realisation that Southern governments
were not in a position to operate and maintain the infrastructure that had been put in place.
Two paradigms led to the promotion of community management of water supply
infrastructure via water user committees.
The notion of ‘small is beautiful’ (Schumacher, 1973), prevalent in the voluntary/NGO sector,
suggests that management of infrastructure is more sustainable if devolved to the local level.
This wider notion was complemented by a growing movement towards ‘community-based
5 Water supply is one of the group of basic services that includes health and education. There are
various interdependencies between these sectors for achieving development outcomes. For instance,
there is evidence that school attendance drops because girls and boys may need to spend time
collecting water, because sanitation facilities are inadequate, or because of sickness due to water-
related diseases. At the same time, school curriculae often include hygiene education. Also, the health
benefits for users of improved water sources are very dependent on improved sanitation and hygiene
practices (Curtis 2003; Bartram and Cairncross 2010), which are promoted by health extension staff. This
results in water supply interventions often being lumped together with sanitation and hygiene activities
in many aid dependent countries (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene = WASH). At the same time, household
sanitation and hygiene are generally policy areas within the health sectors of aid recipient countries.
This is the case in Ethiopia, where the promotion of sanitation and hygiene is part of the country’s
health extension programme (MoH 2006), managed by the health sector. During my fieldwork in
2009/10, water supply, sanitation and hygiene activities were monitored by separate ministries based
on different systems, processes and personnel, although ongoing sector reform processes were
intended to bring them together under a common WASH monitoring system. Therefore, while being
mindful of the overlaps among basic services, my focus on PM is on rural water supply.
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natural resources management’, which emphasises the participation and centre stage of local
communities in natural resources management (Mollinga, 2010b: 420-1, citing Menon, 2007) .
At the same time, economic notions of efficiency promoted under the Structural Adjustment
Programmes of the Bretton Woods Institutions favoured a leaner state achieved through
decentralisation and privatisation, and the commoditisation of resources (Finger and Allouche,
2002). Such economically induced rationales took hold in the water sector via the Dublin
Principles. Agreed upon at a conference leading up to the 1992 Earth Summit (UN, 1992), this
major shift in doctrine refers to the fourth principle, which makes explicit reference to the
economic value of water (Nicol et al., 2012).
In rural water supply, one of the consequences of the above ideological shifts towards
economic and market-driven approaches and towards community management has led to the
outsourcing of infrastructure Operation and Maintenance (O&M) from state to local water
user committees (Wallace and Coles, 2005). This same paradigm shift led also to the
introduction of water demand management, which requires communities to express their
keenness for water supply projects by contributing to the capital costs of the infrastructure
provided. According to this logic, expressing ‘demand’ via a monetary contribution increases
local ownership and the sustainability of water supply projects (Dongier et al., 2002). Despite
substantive criticisms, which are outlined in Chapter 2, and reports of low rates of
sustainability in water schemes, the model of Community-based Management (CBM) continue
to prevail in 2012. Non-functionality of rural water schemes across Sub-Saharan African
countries, for instance, was judged to range from 30% to 65%, based on estimates and studies
conducted between 2003 and 2009 (RWSN, 2009). Wider political and institutional
shortcomings related to the operationalisation of CBM affect the functionality of rural water
schemes across the world. An issue related to PM is that sector actors see improved
monitoring as a panacea that will increase performance in real terms, while, in reality, the
sustainability of water schemes is strongly dependent on the wider institutional and political
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factors embedded in the sector. An in-depth discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of
this thesis, but I make reference to these issues in various chapters.
In very general terms, since 2000, governance factors have been widely recognised in global
water assessments as affecting access to water (UNDP, 2006, UNESCO, 2006). An indication of
this is that, in 2010, access to water was recognised as a human right (UN, 2010). The human
right to water, which I discuss in the context of ‘access’ framings in Chapter 6, led to increased
attention on issues such as equity, distribution and sustainability.6 At the same time, a broader
paradigm shift in the aid sector from ‘getting the prices right’ to ‘getting the institutions right’
fostered a generation of public sector reforms to increase the effectiveness of aid, which is still
underway in 2012 (Hyden, 2005). The rise of performance monitoring of public sector
programmes is one of the consequences of the current attention to these governance and
institutional issues.
An important reason for choosing Ethiopia as a case study was the country’s exposure to these
latest developments in the aid sector. Ethiopia has a long history of development assistance
going back to the famine relief efforts in the 1970s. It receives large amounts of external
assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors, and from NGOs, and is in the group of highly
indebted poor countries. Ethiopia exhibits complexities typical of development assistance
related to large volumes of aid, questions of ownership, and parallel systems and procedures,
precisely the issues that the aid effectiveness agenda intends to tackle via increased attention
to PM. In addition, Ethiopia’s population of over 80 million makes it the second most populous
country in Sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria.
6 Despite these reforms, sector analysts comment that the water sector “is still to a great extent [ ]
driven by investments in technological innovations and development of infrastructure to increase water
supply” (Tropp, 2007: 20).
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As cited above, according to the Ministry of Water and Energy, Ethiopia’s access to rural water
supply stood at 65.8% in 2010. According to the global monitoring programme JMP, rural
water access reached 34% in the same year. Linked to the discrepancy between the access
figures provided by different sources, official access figures are a highly contested area in the
sector, with critical voices coming from within the sector administration itself and from actors
outside the administration, namely sector NGOs and donors. Consequently, a key undertaking
in the current sector reform processes is improved monitoring with the intention of bringing
together water, sanitation and hygiene-related monitoring processes, in the water, health and
education sectors, under a common WASH monitoring system.
The wider complexities of aid delivery in Ethiopia are also evident in the country’s rural water
supply sub-sector. External assistance to the sub-sector exceeds internal funding for rural
water supply. A mixture of bilateral and multilateral donors and NGOs directly support the
rural water supply sub-sector, while there are also multi-sector multi-donor programmes in
which water supply is one of several basic services. Consequently, decisions to improve access
to water supply are subject to pressure from various stakeholders; the policy process is messy
and there are real gaps in financial and human resources which limit the implementation of
monitoring and follow up on its results in practice.
Ethiopia is often referred to as an authoritarian state (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003, Abbink,
2006b, Clapham, 2009). This may provoke the question whether studying PM in such a political
context is appropriate, since public debates related to policy processes, of which PM forms
part, may be confined mainly to contestations within the state apparatus (Mollinga, 2010a)? I
argue that studying PM in Ethiopia is appropriate, because PM dynamics go beyond internal
state dynamics; they are part of a wider aid effectiveness context to which Ethiopia is subject.
In addition, my analysis focuses primarily on how PM is practised, and less on the setting
(country-context) in which these processes unfold. Finally, my findings provide evidence of
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contestations over rural water supply implementation from within and beyond the state
structure, which highlights that PM-related debates are not entirely ‘closed’ in Ethiopia.
The thesis draws on insights across all administrative levels of Ethiopia. Below the national
level, my case study material is based on research in the Southern Region based on prolonged
field work periods at the regional capital, Hawassa, and in two woredas. Throughout the thesis,
I make reference to interviews and focus group discussions via numbers that are linked to
confidential annexes 3 and 4 (only made available to the thesis examiners).
My study has various limitations. As discussed above, I only deal with a sub-aspect of the water
domain – rural water supply – at the expense of other water-related aspects. Although ‘access’
is in the title of this thesis, my analysis makes reference to, but does not focus on the, already
well researched, access debates per se. Yet, via its focus on the politics of knowledge
production related to rural water access, my thesis builds on Ribot and Peluso’s (2003: 154)
above cited conceptualisation of ‘natural resources access’ as mediated by “bundles” and
“webs” of power. The lens of this thesis is on PM (performance monitoring) and therefore
neglects other important types of appraisal activities during the project cycle such as baseline
studies and supervision. Furthermore, I analyse mainly government monitoring activities,
because these are most relevant to the aid effectiveness agenda, which is at the expense of
donor, NGO and community-based monitoring practices. Furthermore, my insights in the
political dynamics of water access monitoring in Ethiopia are mediated by language and
cultural barriers, which I have, as much as possible, addressed as explained in Chapter 5.
Finally, in this chapter I want to provide some clarification on how I approach PM in this thesis.
PM does not specify a particular set of methods or indicators for measuring results. The
situation could be assessed in different ways leading to divergent results, highlighted by
Meselich’s story of access to water supply presented at the beginning of this chapter.
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In referring to PM, I mean any monitoring practice aimed at measuring results. This
understanding of PM is based on the definition in the OECD Glossary of key terms in Evaluation
and Results-based Management already introduced. In Ethiopia, the government, bilateral and
multilateral donors and NGOs all monitor the results of their rural water interventions
although not all make explicit use of the term ‘performance’. In order to retain a clear focus in
this investigation, I draw mainly on examples of sector government PM practices, because
these are the most relevant to and representative of PM in the sector as a whole. In the
different rural water supply sub-sectors that I encountered in Sub-Saharan Africa, monitoring
of access happens via routine reports published by sector offices that occasionally are verified
and updated based on scheme inventories. In addition to PM processes that are codified in
various ways, such as in reporting formats, standard reporting and inventory procedures, and
dedicated budgets, I understand PM as also encompassing less formalised practices that
contribute to the body of knowledge on rural water access. In the understanding in this thesis,
PM comprises a range of monitoring practices with varying degrees of formality that focus on
monitoring results.
1.5 Outline of my argument
The starting point of this thesis is the contrast between Meselich’s daily quest for water and
official access figures for her location. This contrast between a real-world situation and
aggregate figures on ‘performance’ is the puzzle I intend to investigate in this study. The
following ‘lay’ (as opposed to research) questions informed my research. How can we explain
the divergent interpretations of the access to water supply in the fieldwork kebele? What do
these different interpretations mean for the robustness and credibility of PM processes and
their results? Is PM the uniquely-rational, objective process that it is described as being? Do
monitoring results inform decisions on rural water access in Ethiopia?
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In Chapters 2 to 5 I set the scene and develop my line of investigation.
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to Ethiopia, to the country and sector context chosen to
investigate PM of access to rural water supply. I start by outlining the broad political, socio-
economic and cultural factors and explain their repercussions for the governance of the water
sector. I sketch some broad patterns of water availability and households’ daily water needs,
the types of technology that support the delivery of rural water services and other factors
affecting the rural water access situation in Ethiopia. This is followed by a short overview of
the Ethiopian rural water sector and its actors, including sector government and external
stakeholders.
Chapter 3 discusses PM and explains what it is commonly perceived to represent: a uniquely
objective, rational means to inform robust decisions, through the measurement of progress
towards desired results. I explain the major definitions and concepts used by the OECD to
describe PM, and the related RBM (Results-Based Management) model. I discuss how PM
entered the public sector and development cooperation, and trace the development of target-
setting and results monitoring, across the world and in Ethiopia’s water sector. At the same
time, I critically reflect on the role of PM in the public sector. I trace the historic roots of PM to
the industrial revolution when ‘scientific methods’ were introduced to increase the
performance of factory outputs, and I highlight some criticisms of the model, including one of
its main promises – to increase accountability for citizens.
In Chapter 4, I introduce the theoretical underpinnings of my investigation. The STEPS Centre’s
understanding of ‘social appraisal’ allows me to examine different appraisal designs, with
particular attention to how power relations affect appraisal exercises. The first aspect I focus
on is the role of actors’ framings as a more indirect form of power that shapes inputs into
knowledge production processes. An important insight for my analysis is that actors’ rationales
can differ from officially stated appraisal goal. An actor may have an instrumental rationale to
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achieve a particular appraisal result and manipulate knowledge production processes
accordingly. This manipulation allows the actors to justify decisions that may have been based
on other reasons, for instance an external constraint or personal preference. Viewed from this
perspective, PM can be seen as managing a performance on stage. A third theoretical insight
that informs my study is that monitoring results and the associated decisions may stem from
different appraisal processes, of various degrees of formality, and from other ontological
aspects. From this it follows that monitoring may be just one among many factors that inform
rural water access decisions.
Chapter 5 presents the research methodology. This thesis is based on a qualitative research
design. I use a case study approach to study some examples of PM processes and associated
decisions in depth. My data comprise document reviews, participant observation and semi-
structured interviews. To analyse these data, I use the process tracing method, a research
methodology that traces the micro-steps and links that lead to a specific outcome, and may be
likened to the work of a detective.
In the three empirical chapters – Chapters 6 to 8 – I pursue the three separate lines of
investigation presented above. First, I test whether PM as practised in Ethiopia’s rural water
sector, reflects the ways in which different people understand and experience rural water
‘access’. My main enquiry here relates to whether ‘access’, as defined and measured by PM,
responds to the concerns of water users and implementers. Second, I investigate specific PM
processes in depth, to understand the political and power dynamics by which some framings of
‘access’ are suppressed while others come to the fore. Third, I test the relationship between
monitoring results and decisions taken on access to rural water supply.
The focus in Chapter 6 is on framings of rural water access that concern Ethiopia. I capture
framings at different administrative levels – from international to local – and related to
different types of actors – government, donors, and NGO representatives – and of women,
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men and children who experience rural water access as part of their daily lives. My intention in
this chapter is to capture the diversity of different rural water access framings and to establish
to what extent official framings used as yardsticks for ‘access’, represent the diverse notions of
access put forward by the different stakeholders.
In Chapter 7, I examine the political and power dynamics involved in monitoring access to rural
water supply. Specifically, I explore actors’ rationales behind monitoring access to rural water
supply and how these rationales explain the framings discussed in Chapter 6. Tracing the
process of calculating access under the 2008 regional Water Resources Inventory (WRI) in the
Southern Region of Ethiopia, I explain how actors exercise power to influence monitoring
processes in favour of their rationales. I complement insights from the regional level with
monitoring practices at the woreda - or district - level in Ethiopia. Here, I highlight the
importance of informal monitoring processes for increasing knowledge on rural water access.
In Chapter 8, I address the third angle of my investigation, namely the explanatory power of
PM results for decisions taken in relation to rural water ‘access’ in Ethiopia. Of course,
decisions related to rural water access includes a wide range of possibilities. Given that the
logic of PM within RBM assumes that PM informs sector planning and budgeting, I investigate
these two aspects in the first two sections of this chapter. In the third section, I focus on two
specific decisions - at woreda level, and related to a particular rural water scheme, namely the
repair of the borehole in the lowland kebele where Meselich queued to fetch water.
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by drawing together the main findings based on the three lines
of investigation informed by my theoretical framework. My research confirms existing claims
that global framings of rural water ‘access’ are indeed not representative of local users’
concerns. My findings highlight that by drawing on these dominant framings, PM perpetuates
the status quo. At the same time, paradoxically, PM is only one among many factors that
influence concrete decisions about access. I find also that PM can be seen as an act of stage
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management exploited by different actors - incumbent and subordinate - to uphold their
particular rationales.
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2 Ethiopia
Chapter outline
This chapter introduces the reader to Ethiopia’s wider country and sector context, which
provides the background to a discussion of PM of rural water. Section 2.1 discusses the political,
socio-economic and cultural factors that have repercussions for water sector governance.
Where these aspects differ between regions, I focus on the situation in Ethiopia’s Southern
Region, where my case study is based. In Section 2.2, I focus on rural water supply, explaining
the broad patterns of water availability and water needs in rural Ethiopia, and the types of
technology used to access the resource. Section 2.3 provides a brief historic outline of the rural
water sector, explaining its organisation and introducing the typical project cycle for delivering
infrastructure and the service delivery models of ‘CBM’ (community-based management) and
‘self-supply’. This is followed by a short excursion to explore common criticisms of the
dominant CBM model, a short discussion of government roles and responsibilities related to
rural water service delivery, including monitoring, and a description of the role of Ethiopia’s
main development partners in rural water supply. Section 2.4 summarises the contextual issues
discussed in the chapter that have a bearing on PM of rural water access in Ethiopia.
Ethiopia is a country of great diversity. Its geography includes very hot and harsh environments,
such as the Danakil Desert in the North East of the country, an area below the sea level (Morell,
2005), lush and green environments in the Rift Valley, which cuts across the country from
North East to South West, to high mountainous areas in the centre and North West of Ethiopia.
The highest peak, Mount Dashen, reaches an altitude of more than 4,600 m above sea level,
and temperatures below zero degrees.
Ethiopia has a longstanding religious diversity. According to Ethiopian legend, the Kebra
Negast, the introduction of Judaism dates back to a visit by the Queen of Sheba to King
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Solomon during Old Testament times. Orthodox Christianity has been present in Ethiopia since
the 4th century AD (Marcus, 2002: 7), and Islam since the 7th century AD (Last et al., 2012: 22).
In 2012, according to official records, 43.5% of Ethiopians are Orthodox Christians, 33.9% are
Muslims, 18.6% are Protestants, while Catholicism and traditional beliefs account for just
under 4% (PCS, 2008: 17).
Ethiopia’s culture is also rich in terms of ethnicity and language. The 2007 Population and
Housing Census records more than 80 ethnic groups, 10 of which have populations of over 1
million (PCS, 2008). The greatest ethnic diversity is found in my field location, the Southern
Region, which includes 56 ethnic groups (BoFED, 2011). Linked to ethnicity are linguistic
threads. There are four different main language groups in Ethiopia and many more individual
languages (Pankhurst, 1990). Amharic, a Semitic language spoken by one of the largest ethnic
groups, the Amhara, is the administrative language of Ethiopia.
Ethiopia uses a calendar based on the birth of Jesus Christ being approximately seven years
and eight months later than the Western calendar; Ethiopian New Year is on 11th September
(Last et al., 2012: 67). Dates in Ethiopian documents show these differences. For example,
2010 in the Gregorian calendar is referred to in Ethiopia as 2002/3, depending on the exact
month within the year. For consistency, in the text of this thesis, I have converted Ethiopian
dates according to the Western Gregorian Calendar, but I reference Ethiopian government
documents according to their Ethiopian Calendar dates.
Spatially, and from a European reference point, the area of Ethiopia is approximately the size
of France and Spain combined. It is a landlocked country situated in the Horn of Africa (see the
map in Figure 2.1). According to population projections based on the 2007 census, in 2010,
Ethiopia had a total population of close to 80 million (author's calculation using CSA and PCS,
2008). In 2007, 83.9% of the population lived in a rural area (CSA and PCS, 2008).
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2.1 Politics, ethnicity, gender and rural livelihoods in Ethiopia
2.1.1 Recent political history of Ethiopia
Ethiopia has witnessed a succession of different civilisations from ancient to modern times. For
many centuries, and until 1974, Ethiopia was a monarchy, organised along feudal relations.
The last emperor, Haile Selassie, during his reign, built up a strong hierarchical bureaucracy
based on an ethnically defined ruling class, the Amhara (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003: 82,
Abbink, 2006a: 180, Kapuscinski, 2006). In contrast to other Sub-Saharan African countries,
Ethiopia has been subject to colonial rule only briefly – during the short spell of Italian
occupation between 1936 and 1941 (Markakis and Ayele, 2006: 40). Haile Selassie was
eventually toppled by a popular movement in 1974. In the aftermath of this revolution, the
Derg, a military junta, established a military dictatorship in the name of “revolutionary
socialism” (Markakis and Ayele, 2006: 22). The Derg radically changed the social structure of
Ethiopia by nationalising land and introducing peasant associations, the predecessor of today’s
kebeles or sub-districts, as the basic unit to control access to land and other resources,
including water (Markakis and Ayele, 2006, Clapham, 2009: 182). In 1991, the Derg regime was
overthrown by a coalition of ethno-nationalist liberation fronts united under the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF was led by the liberation front in
one of Ethiopia’s peripheral regions, Tigray.
The EPRDF’s philosophy is based on “’revolutionary’ democracy” (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003:
15), which is linked to the party’s Maoist-inspired and guerrilla background, and follows
socialist principles of a centrally organised state (Clapham, 2009: 183). The idea of
‘revolutionary democracy’ emphasises “communal collective participation, and
representations based on consensus” (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003: 117, emphasis in original).
In reality, this means that policy directions are decided by the centre within the EPRDF party
structure, and ‘cascade down’, sometimes via political campaigns. However, there are also
instances of new policy directions starting at the regional level, such as the political campaign
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to build basic latrines in the Southern Region, which led to an increase in the official sanitation
access figures for the region from 13% in 2003 to 88% in 2006 (Bibby, 2007, Terefe and Welle,
2008).7
2.1.2 Political-administrative organisation in Ethiopia
Administratively, Ethiopia has a decentralised governance structure; it is a multi-cultural
federation of nine ethnic-based and ethno-linguistic national regional states and two city
administrations, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (Zewde and Pausewang, 2002: 11, Vaughan and
Tronvoll, 2003: 4), see map in Figure 2.1). The increased attention given to different ethnic
groups since 1991 is exemplified in the Southern Region, the context for my case study. As its
full name – the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State – indicates, the
region is a federation of different ethno-political entities. I discuss ethnicity and its
repercussions for the political-administration of the Southern Region in more detail in Section
2.1.4 below.
Because the main criterion for the regional divisions is ethnicity, the regions differ greatly in
size, but they differ also in their administrative capacities. The Southern Region is one of four
core regions considered to have strong capacity to govern their territories (Gebre-Egziabher
and Berhanu, 2007: 20). Ethiopia’s decentralised governance structure, in principle, means
that the regional national states are semi-autonomous entities. However, in practice, regions
still depend heavily on transfers and subsidies from federal government (Gebre-Egziabher,
2007: 1). Because of the strong fiscal influence of the federal level on the regions, their actual
autonomy, in particular in relation to making budgetary decisions, is regarded as weak (Abbink,
2006b: 392, Tesfaye, 2000 cited in Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu, 2007: 21). In this thesis, the
7 However, the official figures were strongly contested in Ethiopian sector forums I attended. A key issue
related to the official portrayal of access is the definition of what constitutes an ‘improved’ basic latrine
–a ‘hole in the ground’ or fulfilling criteria such as inclusion of a superstructure and door, evidence of
use and cleanliness, and an operational handwashing facility (ref MoH sanitation protocol).
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question of decision-making autonomy surfaces with regard to the interpretation of a regional
water resources inventory, a point I discuss in Chapter 7.
Figure 2.1 Map showing regional boundaries in Ethiopia
Source: International Development Partnerships (2012)
There are five layers of government in Ethiopia: federal, regional, zonal, woreda (district) and
kebele (sub-district). In the Southern Region, all these layers, including the zones, are
democratically constituted (Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu, 2007: 15). Executive power at each
administrative level rests with the head of administration and the council, which includes the
heads of sector offices as well as elected representatives (Arsano et al., 2010: 6). The heads of
sector offices are political appointments made by the head of administration, which results in
close links between the EPRDF party at all levels in the Ethiopian administration.
The decentralised structure of the Ethiopian state means that regional level sector offices,
referred to as ‘Bureau’ in Ethiopia, are executive bodies responsible for the implementation of
federal policies, strategies and action plans (Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu, 2007: 14). Since a
second wave of decentralisation in the early 2000s, woredas, the local governments in Ethiopia,
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gained higher standing and greater capacity, mainly through the instrument of the woreda
block grants and an increased number of personnel, which enables the woreda to execute
planning and budgeting (Assefa and Gebre-Egziabher, 2007). Annual and strategic five-year
planning is based on a bottom-up planning process originating in the lowest administrative tier
of government, the kebele level, but with no direct participation of citizens (Gebre-Egziabher
and Berhanu, 2007: 15-16). I explain the roles and responsibilities of the water sector
government agencies at these different administrative levels in more detail in Section 2.3.3.
Of importance in the context of this thesis is that, in 2004, the Ethiopian government
embarked on a Business Process Reengineering (BPR) process intended to strengthen results-
based performance management in the Ethiopian Civil Service (Debela, 2009, Debela and
Hagos, 2011).8 This reform process is an indication of the increasing importance of PM in the
Ethiopian context. During my fieldwork, water sector staff were being trained, and sector
agencies were being restructured into business processes, but the reform had yet to have
direct repercussions on existing monitoring processes in the sector. I therefore do not refer to
it directly in the empirical chapters.
2.1.3 Political culture in Ethiopia
Despite the decentralised structure of the Ethiopian government, many analysts characterise
the country as hierarchical and authoritarian (Abbink, 2006b, Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009,
Clapham, 2009: 181). This is related to the strong position in the country of the ruling EPRDF
party9 and its predominance in the political party landscape, the ruling party’s strong ties with
the bureaucracy (ICG, 2009: 17), and the relative absence of other loci of power outside the
EPRDF party system (Clapham, 2009). Below, I discuss each of these points in turn.
8 In informal conversations with sector staff members I learned that the BPR was used by the
government to further increase linkages between the bureaucracy and the ruling part, by way of
augmenting the number of politically appointed positions in the civil service, a point I discuss in section
2.1.3. This is an indication that the Ethiopian government took the BPR process serious at the time of my
fieldwork. However, at the time of field work, it was not possible to evaluate whether the restructuring
of the civil service into business processes had direct repercussions for sector monitoring.
9 In some of Ethiopia’s regions, the EPRDF is represented by its ethnic affiliates - in the Southern Region,
the South Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement.
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In Ethiopia, political party politics is dominated by the ruling party, the EPRDF, which came to
power in 1991 as a coalition of parties representing different parts of Ethiopia (Abbink, 2006b:
398). In practice, Ethiopia can be characterised as a one-party democracy. Ethiopian opposition
parties are said to be fragmented and not capable of providing a serious alternative to the
EPRDF, particularly after the violent clampdown on protestors and opposition parties in the
aftermath of the 2005 general elections, during which more than 200 people died and over
10,000 were arrested, including the leadership and many members of one of the opposition
parties (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009: 196-7). Since the last general elections in 2010, the ruling
party holds 499 out of 547 of seats in the House of Representatives (NEBE, 2010).10
An important link between the ruling party and state bureaucracy is the political appointment
of people who are loyal to the EPRDF (Abbink, 2006a: 177). Many senior positions in the civil
service, including the heads of sector offices, are political appointees. Heads of sector offices
make up the members of the cabinet, where decisions over budget allocations are taken. As a
result, party members have a strong influence over important development related decisions
at woreda level. In practice, therefore, important issues may be discussed in party meetings
that precede government meetings, thereby foreclosing decisions (Markakis and Ayele, 2006:
52). The pressure exercised by the ruling party on sector office employees to adhere to the
party line was apparent in my fieldwork location, where, at woreda level, government
employees were strongly encouraged to join the EPRDF, and career advancement depended
partly on party membership (Interview #179). The EPRDF and its affiliated parties also have a
strong presence at grassroots level, in the kebele and sub-kebele structures, which provide
them with information on and allow influence over day-to-day activities related to rural life,
including water supply access (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009: 198). In my case study woreda, heads
10 In August 2012, Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia’s then Prime Minister, died suddenly. Despite speculation in
Western media that the Prime Minister’s death would lead to instability in the country (Guardian, 2012,
The Telegraph, 2012), the succession process has been smooth and the country has remained stable.
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of sector offices who were also party members, regularly visited kebeles to hold political
campaign meetings and to discuss development activities in those locations.
In addition, the freedom of action and political voice of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in
Ethiopia is limited. Indigenous CSOs in Ethiopia are mainly traditional associations such as idir
(self-help organisations), equb (credit associations), and ethnic-based development
associations and a few rights-based advocacy organisations (Zewde and Pausewang, 2002: 12).
Since the 1970s, NGOs of external origin or that receive substantial external funding, have
mushroomed in Ethiopia. NGOs mainly engage in welfare and service delivery programmes,
rather than promoting empowerment (Berhanu, 2002: 126). The Charities and Societies
Proclamation, introduced in 2009, inter alia prohibits any charity with more than 10% foreign
income from working on issues related to human rights, justice, promotion of equality, gender
and conflict resolution (FDRE, 2009). This new legislation contributed further to the apolitical
character of these organisations. In the water sector, the 2010 annual joint CSO report on
Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene notes that “the law does not seem to have significantly
altered the way WASH CSOs operate in Ethiopia” (CCRDA, 2010: 13). This may be because
WASH NGOs primarily focus on delivering services rather than on actively promoting rights. At
the same time, informal conversations with NGO representatives indicate that NGOs self-
sanction activities that may be seen as provocative by the Ethiopian Government.
While, overall, the political climate in Ethiopia does not encourage open and free debate, the
extent to which the political space for discussion is closed depends on the subject matter. On
the topic of rural water supply, the government has welcomed NGOs in their role to support
government’s monitoring efforts in its effort to roll out a National WASH Inventory, and has
encouraged their participation in sector forums and discussions convened on the topic. My
research findings show also that there is an active internal debate on monitoring processes
and results among sector government stakeholders.
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2.1.4 Ethnicity and gender
There are, as mentioned above, over 80 ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Of those, 56 ethnic and
national groups with their own languages, cultures, and social identities live in the Southern
Region (BoFED, 2008). Based on the principle of ethnic-federalism, the Ethiopian
administrative boundaries are divided along ethnic lines. This applies to regional boundaries
and also zones and woredas. In the Southern Region, in particular, ethnic identities have been
reinforced through the creation of ethnic-based zones and special woredas that report directly
to the region. In these administrative areas, ethnic groups self-govern through representation
by members of their communities in the administration and political institutions. They also are
allowed use their own languages in primary education and for official purposes (Abbink, 2006b:
395).
While ethnic-based federalism has been recognised as an important achievement in increasing
the visibility of minority groups in Ethiopia, some report that there are also signs that division
along ethnic lines has constructed ethnicity as a fault-line in conflicts over resources. Conflicts
arise mainly over government funding, and over land, which includes disputes over access to
water resources (Abbink, 2006b: 395-6). In my fieldwork locations, there were local disputes
over irrigation water (Interview #37, #179), but I could not discern that a particular issue was
related to ethnicity. At the regional level, however, the distribution of financial resources
across different ethnic groups is a sensitive issue in the Southern Region (Interview #89) and,
as such, is an important factor impacting on rural water supply in the form, for instance, of
capital budget allocations for infrastructure across the region, a point I discuss in Chapter 9.
There is also limited documentation of specific water management practices by one ethnic
group in the Southern Region. The Borena, who are pastoralists across the border between
Oromiya and Southern Region, have customary rules for managing and maintaining hand-dug
ponds and wells that are an integral part of the social organisation of their society. These rules
apply to domestic uses, and define rota for watering animals, the main livelihood asset of the
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Borena people (Chemeda et al., 2007). In my case study field work locations, I did not hear
about water management practices other than those introduced by the government.
Gender analyses in Ethiopia suggest that in affairs of the state and in religion, i.e. Orthodox
Christianity and Islam, more power is given to men than to women (Pankhurst, 1992, WB,
2010a). Gebre-Igzahiber and colleagues (2007, cited in WB, 2010a: 84) suggest that despite the
presence of women’s affairs agencies at all administrative levels, they have not contributed to
a structural change in gender relations biased against women. An Ethiopian case study on
gender and governance in rural services (WB, 2010a: 86) observes a “ghettoisation of women
in women affairs units” while they remain underrepresented in other bureaucratic and
political positions. In matters of community development, the study found a virtual absence of
women’s voices in planning and decision making (WB, 2010a: 87). I elaborate on the aspect of
gender in section 2.3.2 when I discuss community management of water supply.
2.1.5 Socio-economic development and livelihood patterns
In a world comparison, Ethiopia’s level of human development is low. The country was ranked
174 out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index in 2011 (UNDP). At the same time,
Ethiopia has experienced sustained, at times double-digit, economic growth since 2003
(Mwanakatwe, 2010). According to the World Development Indicators, levels of poverty have
decreased from 45% of the population living under the poverty line in 1995, to 38.9% in 2005
(WB, 2012b). Primary school enrolment, in particular, has grown substantially in recent years,
reaching over 100% in 2010 (WB, 2012b).
The rural population of Ethiopia has experienced the positive changes in socio-economic
development in the form of greater access to extension services. In Ethiopia, the two main
extension services are health and agriculture. In the Southern Region, the agricultural
extension worker to household ratio was 1:238 in 2010 (BoFED, 2011). While regional statistics
do not provide this ratio, the fact that 94% of kebeles had a health post in 2010 indicates a
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good presence of health extension services in the region (BoFED, 2011).11 Both types of
extension service have some relation with domestic water supply. Agricultural extension
services include support for traditional irrigation practices, which include the digging of
unlined shallow wells that can be used for vegetable gardens and other domestic purposes.12
Health extension workers encourage behaviour change in 16 basic health related topics, 6 of
which fall under the heading of domestic sanitation and hygiene including the safe handling of
water. Another duty of health staff is to check environmental sanitation conditions at
communal water schemes (MoH, 2006).
Predominant livelihoods in rural areas are subsistence farming and pastoralism.13 In the
Southern Region, this applies to 90% of the region’s population (BoFED, 2011: 138). Livelihood
activities are very diverse in the South, with coffee cultivation predominant in the Western
highlands and livestock breeding dominating in the lowlands (BoFED, 2011: 138).14 Despite this
diversity, most households practise rainfed agriculture in combination with some livestock
holdings (BoFED, 2011: 139). There is wide variation in rainfall patterns and other factors such
as the small and fragmented nature of land holdings, and limited access to agricultural inputs
and population growth, which contribute to household vulnerability and food insecurity, as
Alemayehu Konde and colleagues (2001) report on households in Wolayta Zone in the
Southern Region. In 2010, the regional Agricultural and Rural Development Bureau (2010)
estimated 10% of the region’s population was chronically food insecure. The Productive
Safety-Net Programme (PSNP), a multi-sector programme intended to reduce chronic food
insecurity and to increase access to markets and services, including rural water supply (MoARD,
11 The good outreach of extension services was confirmed in my fieldwork locations where the three
agricultural and two health extension positions were filled.
12 In the early 2000s, the Ministry of Agriculture implemented a national campaign to dig such wells. In
my case study woreda, however, many of the wells dug during that period have collapsed due to
flooding and soil erosion (Interview #179).
13 Pasture constitutes 63% of Ethiopia’s agricultural land area while 12-15 million of the then 77 million
Ethiopians were estimated to follow a pastoralist lifestyle in 2006 (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008).
14 Another indication of the region’s diversity is the stark difference in population density ranging from
665 persons per km2 in Gedeo Zone to 7 persons per km2 in South Omo Zone (BoFED, 2011: 46).
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2010), operates in 78 of the 134 regional woredas (MoARD, 2010). The PSNP also has a
component related to the construction of low-cost rural water supply infrastructure and
operates in my case study woreda. I therefore refer to the PSNP in several places in the thesis.
People’s socio-economic statuses and livelihoods are important contextual factors affecting
their demand for rural water supply in Ethiopia. For example, their economic status may not
allow them to pay for water, or their lack of education may be responsible for a lack of
awareness about the hygiene benefits of clean water.15 In the next section I explore in more
detail patterns of water availability and rural peoples’ need for water based on their
livelihoods; I look at the relationship between the two and juxtapose it with a discussion of the
types of technologies supporting rural water access in Ethiopia.
2.2 Water availability, needs, access and infrastructure
2.2.1 Patterns of water availability
Ethiopia’s geographic diversity, discussed at the beginning of this chapter, is mirrored in the
patterns of water availability. The country has eight major river basins, one lake basin, and
three dry basins. The river basins originate in Ethiopia’s central highlands, which experience
high rainfall levels of up to 3,000 mm per year, and flow out to the lowlands where annual
precipitation can be as low as 200 mm per year (MoWE, 2012b). The variability in rainfall
patterns within and across years in Ethiopia is among the highest in the world16 and an
important contributor to household vulnerability discussed in section 2.1.5 above (MoARD,
2010). Recent climatic trend assessments for Ethiopia, project increased rainfall, and more
changes to rainfall patterns across the country, including more extreme weather events
(McSweeney et al., n.d.).
15 E.g., a recent study by Degnet Abebaw and colleagues (2011) on water access in rural Ethiopia found
that there is a significant correlation between the household’s economic status and educational
background, and drawing water from an improved source.
16 Rainfall data for the period 1967-2000 indicate that annual variability in rainfall across different zones
in Ethiopia ranged from a low of 15% to a high of 81% (MoARD, 2010: 3).
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In rural Ethiopia, the main source for domestic water supply is groundwater as opposed to
surface water from rivers or lakes. The availability of groundwater depends heavily on rainfall
and aquifer replenishment (Calow et al., 2002). Figure 2.2 provides a groundwater availability
map for Ethiopia and a spatial overview of water availability during drought times based on
these two inputs. Ethiopia’s agro-ecological zones serve as a good orientation for patterns of
groundwater availability. The three major agro-ecological zones in Ethiopia are: the highlands
which are above 2,300m, the ‘midland’ areas ranging from 1,500 to 2,300m, and the
lowlands17, below 1,500m (Hurni, 1998: 4).18
The highland and midland areas are situated in the centre of Ethiopia; they cover
approximately 35% of the Ethiopian territory and are densely populated (Hurni, 1998: 21).
According to Calow, MacDonald et al (2002), in the highlands, there is very good availability of
groundwater which is easily accessible at many points via low cost technologies such as
protected springs and hand-dug wells. This classification matches water availability in the
highland kebele of my case study woreda, where small springs and shallow private dug wells
are common. I describe water availability in this location in more detail in Chapter 6 where I
discuss different framings of access to rural water supply.
In the midland areas, at altitudes of 1,500-2,300m, the groundwater resource base tends to be
moderate, while the higher population density in these areas imposes higher levels of demand
on a single source. Groundwater is extracted via a wide range of technologies, mainly
protected springs, hand-dug wells, and machine-drilled wells in the Southern Region.
Depending on rainfall patterns, groundwater availability in these areas can vary greatly within
and between years. When droughts occur, the shallower springs and manually dug wells dry
up first, putting more pressure on deep boreholes (Calow et al., 2002).
17 In Ethiopia, these three agro-ecological zones are called dega (highlands), weyna dega (midland) and
kola (lowlands).
18 Hurni (1998) distinguishes two additional agro-ecological zones in Ethiopia: high mountain areas
above 3,200m and drylands below 500m.
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Figure 2.2 Groundwater availability during drought in Ethiopia
Source: MacDonald, Calow et al. (2001)
In the lowland areas (1,500-500 m) that cover approximately one sixth of Ethiopia’s territory,
rainfall is more variable and droughts are frequent (Hurni, 1998: 2-3, 21), but population
densities remain relatively high. Groundwater is extracted mainly via deep boreholes. During
times of high demand, individual groundwater sources in these areas can become stressed
because there is less recharge from rainfall (Calow et al., 2002). The second kebele in my case
study woreda, a lowland area, exhibits these features, which I also describe in more detail in
Chapter 6.
The remaining 50% of Ethiopia’s territory is below 500 m. These are dryland areas, mainly in
the East and South of the country. Population densities are low, but because of the
predominant pastoralist lifestyle, demand for water supply is often high since groundwater
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sources are required to cater also for livestock. The drylands are not included in my fieldwork
locations.
An important influence on drinking water quality from groundwater in Ethiopia is the high level
of fluoride concentrations in many locations along the Rift Valley, which can pose serious
health risks (Haimanot, 1990). In Ethiopia, approximately 10 million people potentially are
affected (Kloos and Tekle Haimanot, 1999, RiPPLE, 2008, Tadesse et al., 2010). Although my
fieldwork locations are situated in the Rift Valley, water quality tests did not expose elevated
fluoride levels in these areas; I therefore do not discuss this issue in detail in this thesis.
Another contaminant of drinking water in Ethiopia is thermotolerant coliforms. A rapid
assessment of drinking water quality carried out between 2004 and 2005 showed that 73% of
all drinking water sources complied with WHO drinking water quality guidelines and Ethiopian
drinking water standards. The study did not find other significant sources of pollution of
drinking water in Ethiopia (Tadesse et al., 2010).
2.2.2 Patterns of household water needs
The factors affecting household water needs are related to a combination of livelihood styles
and settlement patterns (Calow et al., 2010), and the availability of protected and unprotected
water sources to cover households’ overall water needs. In addition, perceptions of water
quality, and issues related to governance of schemes, such as opening hours, agreements on
maximum volumes collected per household, queuing times, financial contributions and
scheme functionality, have an effect on individual household strategies to obtain daily water
needs.
People require water for a variety of domestic and productive purposes. In addition to drinking,
cooking and washing, households use water for livestock, small irrigation, vegetable gardening
and other small scale productive purposes such as beer brewing or brick making (Moriarty et
al., 2004). The fact that people need water for purposes spanning the domestic and productive
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realms is recognised by the term ‘Multiple Use water Services’ (MUS).19 A number of studies
on Ethiopia, from different angles, analyse the relation between peoples’ livelihoods and their
water needs. These include a study on equitable water services for multiple uses (Abebe et al.,
2010) and work on the costs and benefits of MUS systems (Adank et al., 2008); research to
better understand the relationship between water and food security including a study on the
water economy in relation with livelihood systems in different agro-ecological zones (Coulter
et al., 2010), and case studies on the links between water supply, sanitation and food security
(Tolossa and Tadesse, 2008); and research on the contribution of non-communal and
unprotected wells to cover households’ diverse water needs (Sutton et al., 2011).
This body of work highlights the great diversity of household water needs, which vary
depending on agro-ecological zones, livelihoods, seasonality and wealth. For instance, in the
highland and midland areas, where people practise a combination of livestock holding and
rainfed agriculture, a combination of protected and unprotected springs and shallow wells are
the main water sources for domestic use, livestock watering and small scale irrigation. During
the rainy season, people employ a number of strategies, including rainwater harvesting from
the roofs, collecting in pots and pans, and drawing water from unprotected wells and streams,
while in the dry season, reliance on a few perennial springs is high, which greatly increases
time needed for water collection. Wealthier households are able to mobilise more resources
than poor households to collect water, for example using donkey carts or paying for labour.
Wealthier households also have higher water needs based on the number of livestock and
available land holdings. In the lowland/dryland areas with predominantly pastoralist lifestyles,
overall water needs are much higher given that all wealth groups have large herds. In these
areas, water is accessed mainly via shallow and deep wells. During the dry season and
droughts in the drylands, the longer distances to water sources results in adaptive strategies
19 Much of the work in this area is conducted by a collaborative partnership called the MUS Group which
includes different national and international organisations interested in the topic (MUS, 2012).
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that distinguish wealth groups. For instance, wealthier households increase their water
consumption while poorer households adapt by reducing the amounts of water they collect.
I discuss local patterns of water demand in my fieldwork locations, in Chapter 6, where I
analyse peoples’ experience of access to rural water in a highland a lowland kebele in my case
study woreda. The objective in this section was to highlight the diversity of the water needs of
rural Ethiopians and their strategies to satisfy them. In the next section, I discuss which aspects
are included in the term ‘water access’ in the context of Ethiopia and the main technologies
used for domestic rural water supply in Ethiopia’s Southern Region.
2.2.3 Rural water access and types of technology
In Ethiopia, the definition of rural water access is two-tiered. The minimum service standard
for rural water supply is a volume of “15 liter per person per day (l/c/day) safe water supply
from a water point within a maximum conceptual radius of 1.5 km from the residence of the
beneficiary to the water point” (MoWR, 2009a). Hence, basic rural water supply in Ethiopia
refers to domestic purposes - drinking and cooking, washing and basic hygiene. Ethiopia’s
minimum standards are below international WHO guidelines (Howard and Bartram, 2003) for
domestic water, which suggest a minimum of 20 litres per capita per day from a distance of
1km, which I discuss in detail in Chapter 6.
In practice, infrastructure is the focus for delivering and assessing access to rural water supply
services in Ethiopia. The MoWR’s (Ministry of Water Resources) official access figures to rural
water supply are based on the estimates of how many people can be served by an ‘improved’
scheme, which corresponds to a list of technical facilities, classified by the JMP, that qualify as
an “improved drinking water source” (WHO and UNICEF, 2010).
Based on this calculation, access to rural water supply in Ethiopia has increased steadily from
only 11% access in 1990 to 65.8% in 2010. Figure 2.3, based on yearly information taken from
internal and published sector documents, illustrates this rapid increase, particularly since 2000.
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The narrow lens of domestic infrastructure through which the MoWR (and agencies
internationally) assess water access, is radically different from the patterns of water availability
and household water needs I discussed above. I return to the official rural water access figures
several times throughout the thesis and unpack their underlying politics. In the reminder of
this section, I explain the different types of technology for rural water supply, in particular
those types prevalent in the Southern Region that are relevant for my case studies.
Figure 2.3 MoWR records of access to rural water in Ethiopia from 1990 to 2010
Sources: various sector reports (Rahmato, 1999, MoWR, 2002, MoWR et al., 2006b, MoFED,
2010, MoWE, 2010)
There is a total of 17 different types of water supply schemes catering for rural areas in
Ethiopia (MoWR, 2005: 40). The four most common types in 2005 in the Southern Region were
hand-dug wells, shallow wells, deep wells, and protected springs. Table 2.1 presents selected
characteristics for these different schemes, which are described in detail below in relation to
their individual infrastructures.
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Table 2.1 Characteristics of the four most common rural water technologies in the Southern Region
Sources: (MoWR, 2005, Amberbir, 2007)
Approximately a fifth of all rural water schemes in the Southern Region in 2005 were hand-dug
wells (HDWs). Hand-dug wells, as their name implies, are dug manually, to an average depth of
15m and are a relatively low cost technology. In many areas of Ethiopia, individuals dig wells
on their own initiative or with the support of agricultural extension workers (see above).
However, to qualify as an ‘improved source’, in line with WHO water quality standards, a well
needs fitting of a hand pump. One of these types of wells, supplied for communal purposes, is
estimated to support 270 people in Ethiopia, a calculation based on the lifting capacity of the
pump. In addition, the MoWR supports the construction of so-called ‘self-supply’ wells to serve
small groups of households (discussed further in Section 2.3)
Another low-cost technology is protected springs, which, according to the MoWR, cater for an
estimated average of 338 persons. In the Southern Region, protected springs constituted 42%
of all schemes in 2005. They can be point sources or, if yield and settlement patterns permit,
they can serve several gravity-fed water points. Protected springs can serve any number from
a few households to several villages. Schemes with more than two distribution points can
become very costly and fall under a different scheme category that is not captured in Table 2.1.
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For machine-drilled wells, which can be shallow or deep wells, construction costs increase
substantially. Shallow wells (SWs), which reach groundwater levels of up to 60m in Ethiopia,
are fitted with manual hand pumps and to the non-expert appear the same as HDWs. Their
capacity in Ethiopia is estimated at 457 people.20
Deep wells (DWs) are common where groundwater levels are below 60m; motorised pumps
are required to bring the water to the surface, which substantially increases their construction
costs. It also increases the effort and skills required to operate and maintain them, and the
related costs in relation to fuel and higher repair costs. Water is pumped to an elevated
reservoir from where it is distributed to one or more water collection points.
As discussed in Section 2.2 above, not all technologies are viable in all agro-ecological zones of
Ethiopia. Protected springs are most common in the highland areas, a mixture of technologies
is used in the midland areas, and deep wells are typical of the lowland and dryland areas. Each
type of technology has advantages and disadvantages. While protected springs and HDW
require less finance for their construction and are easier to maintain, they are more subject to
seasonal changes, to drying up when the water table depletes, and to contamination. Deep
wells require substantial financial inputs and are more complicated and costly to operate, but
are more likely to continue to provide water during dry seasons and drought spells.
A major concern with all the technologies, which I referred to in Chapter 1, is their high rate of
non-functionality. Across sub-Saharan Africa, experts report persistently high rates of non-
functionality and repeated break downs of existing schemes (Harvey and Reed, 2007, Harvey,
2008, Lockwood and Smits, 2011). A recent Rural Water Supply Network (RWSN) review of
hand pump functionality rates in 20 Sub-Saharan African countries found 36% on average of
non-functional hand pumps across these countries (RWSN, 2009). In Ethiopia, in 2010, the
MoWE (2010: 11) estimated that 30% of all rural water schemes in Ethiopia were in disrepair
20 I assume that the higher estimate is based on a different type of pump and on the well reaching
different aquifers from HDWs.
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at some point during the year. Independent studies find higher non-functionality rates in the
country, ranging from 30%-40% in a World Bank study of 20 woredas (WB, 2009: 65), and 62%
in another case study of one woreda (Abebe and Deneke, 2008: 19). I discuss some underlying
reasons for these malfunctions related to the currently dominant service delivery model of
CBM (Community-based Management).
2.3 The Ethiopian rural water supply sub-sector
In this section, I present and discuss Ethiopian rural water sector. After a brief historical
overview of the sector’s institutional and policy framework I introduce and discuss the service
delivery model for rural water supply in Ethiopia, with particular emphasis on the predominant
CBM model. I explain the roles and responsibilities of sector offices in supporting this model,
and introduce the major development partners in the rural water sector, bilateral and
multilateral donor programmes and NGOs.
2.3.1 Historical overview
In the early 1990s, there were only some 6,000 water supply schemes in rural Ethiopia, serving
just 11% of the total rural population (Rahmato, 1999). Sector government structures to
support rural water supply were in their infancy at that time. Water-related interventions were
coordinated by the Water Resources Commission, based in the capital Addis Ababa, from
where it was logistically difficult to reach out to rural communities (Interview #89). The
institutional set up of the sector improved when the dedicated ministry MoWR was
established in 1995 (Tadesse, 2008). In October 2010, the MoWR merged with the energy
sector to become the Ministry of Water and Energy. Since this merger occurred in the period
after my fieldwork, I refer in this thesis to the MoWR.
The establishment of a separate ministry in 1995 enabled the development of strategic
directions for the sector. The 1999 National Water Resources Management Policy (MoWR,
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1999) set out basic principles and objectives for the provision of water supply, which were
further detailed in the 2001 water sector strategy (MoWR, 2001). The 2002 Water Sector
Development Programme (MoWR, 2002) and the 2003 Master Plan, set specific targets and
plans for the water supply sub-sector. Shortly after, in 2005, these were overruled by the
Universal Access Programme (UAP) (MoWR, 2005), which guided sector activities during my
fieldwork period in 2009-10.
The original – very ambitious - UAP goal was to achieve 98% access to rural water supply by
2012, far exceeding the internationally set MDGs, which is something I discuss in detail in
Chapter 6. The UAP strategy was revised twice. The first review in 2009 resulted in a change of
strategy to accelerate the pace of implementation and in an increased emphasis on “cost-
effective water supply schemes which can be implemented at household and community level
through community mass mobilisation” (MoWR, 2009a: 11).
The suggested technology mix in the revised UAP document envisaged 82% of all schemes
being low-cost, namely protected springs and hand-dug wells. The second review, at the end
of 2010, led to a change in the timeline for achieving universal access to rural water in Ethiopia,
from 2012 to 2015. As my fieldwork period occurred before the second UAP revision, my point
of reference in this thesis research is the 2009 revision. In the next section, I explain the
service delivery approach to rural water supply in the sector policy and strategy in more detail.
2.3.2 Service delivery models for rural water supply in Ethiopia
As in many other low income countries, the rural water supply infrastructure in Ethiopia is
predominantly provided via a ‘project cycle’ that ends when the infrastructure is constructed
and the scheme is handed over to the user community. The Ethiopian Water Resources
Management Policy aims at communities taking ownership of and being responsible for the
operation and maintenance (O&M) of rural water supply schemes and envisages, at minimum,
cost-recovery of O&M activities (MoWR, 1999). This policy direction refers to CBM as a service
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delivery model for rural water supply. As already discussed in the Introduction, the underlying
principle of this model is for decisions regarding rural water supply being taken at the lowest
appropriate level. This is operationalised through the participation of prospective users in
planning and implementation during the project cycle, including expression of ‘demand’
through cash or in-kind contributions to capital costs, and, after completion, taking
responsibility for the O&M of the water supply schemes via WASH21 committees (Harvey &
Reed 2007: 366). CBM is generally assumed to enhance empowerment and inclusiveness and
increase the community’s sense of ownership and, thus, the scheme’s sustainability (Dongier
et al., 2002). However, the consistently high non-functionality rates in rural water schemes
across sub-Saharan Africa discussed above and expert literature indicate inherent flaws in and
limitations of CBM.
The community management model has been criticised for its inaccurate assumption of
community cohesion (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999, Mehta, 2006), and for conflating community
participation during project implementation with community management of the
infrastructure after project completion (Harvey and Reed, 2007). Some highlight that the
normative intention of increasing empowerment and citizenship underlying participation in
reality can become “participation as … payment” (Jones, 2011: 54) and that participation may
be enforced rather than voluntary (Cleaver and Toner, 2006: 216). In Ethiopia, these functional
notions of participation are exemplified in the frequent comment that “the community has
been participated” (Interview #161).
Similar patterns apply to the role of gender in water supply. According to Tina Wallace and
Anne Coles (2005) the water sector has long recognised the central role of women in providing
for and managing domestic water supply, but has fostered female participation in projects
21 In line with trends to integrate water supply, sanitation and hygiene, described above, and related to
recent reform processes in Ethiopia, these committees are commonly referred to as WASH committees.
In my thesis, I adopt this terminology for consistency, although I do not discuss sanitation and hygiene
aspects here.
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predominantly for reasons of efficiency – “‘to make projects work’” (Joshi, 2011: 63). Wallace
and Coles (2005: 9) caution that, in the water sector, attention to gender often is conflated
with women’s participation, which ignores the wider gender concepts of power and inequality.
This is confirmed by reports of “tokenistic” (Harvey and Reed, 2004: 88) representation of
women on WASH committees, to satisfy a donor requirement rather than as a local initiative.
This observation is particularly relevant in Ethiopia, where studies show that women face
social and cultural barriers to attending community meetings and, when they do attend,
struggle to express their concerns (WB, 2010a); this is related to the broader context of gender
relations in Ethiopia, discussed in Section 2.1.4. The absence of women’s voices on WASH
committee and in other community meetings is investigated in this thesis research and
discussed specifically in Chapter 6.
Furthermore, the imperative of cost recovery to sustain scheme functionality can lead to
exclusion of more vulnerable and marginalised people (Cleaver and Toner, 2006). At the same
time, cost recovery is often not achieved because of insufficient capacity to collect O&M funds
and the professionalisation of scheme management under the CBM model (Fonseca and Njiru,
2003). Altogether, these criticisms point to a “cosmetic and tokenist” (Manor, 2004: 202)
character of community management that depoliticises the notion of citizenship (Hickey, 2010)
and fails to address the challenges related to the wider economic, institutional and political
structures in which this model is embedded.
The lack of attention to the wider context and to the local conditions is demonstrated in
analyses of the reasons for high non-functionality of rural water schemes. Peter Harvey and
Bob Reed (2004: xix) argue that many issues pertinent to hand pump failures in Africa are
related to the focus on infrastructure provision through a project delivery cycle “that [suffer]
from the engineering mindset of ‘design and build’”. The mindset of a project-based approach
to water service provision has important implications for monitoring practices, which consider
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the completed hardware as the main development output rather than considering rural water
supply as an ongoing activity. The focus on the project cycle was still an issue in 2011, as
indicated by a study on the sustainability of rural water supply in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Lockwood and Smits, 2011). This study and the one by Harvey and Reed argue that the
thinking related to rural water supply needs to move from infrastructure provision to the
concept of rural water supply services that require ongoing support from and regulation by
government, including monitoring.
An important challenge regarding the implementation of CBM across Sub-Saharan Africa is its
weak formalisation at country level and below, exemplified in the lack of legal status of
committees, lack of professional capacity to support CBM and lack of supporting legislation
and policy (Lockwood and Smits, 2011: 4). These issues apply especially to Ethiopia. Lemma
(2006), for example, finds that the ownership of assets is unclear, and, in several regions,
water committees responsible for operating and maintaining schemes had no legal standing.
The study found also that concrete guidance on CBM principles in Ethiopia was weak in
practice, partly because general policy directions contained in the policy and strategy had not
been translated into specific rules, regulations and guidelines at the federal level and below.
In addition to CBM, the Ethiopian government also promotes ‘self-supply’ as a service delivery
model in rural areas (see Section 2.2). ‘Self-supply’ refers to users improving their own water
supplies, usually through investments at household level (Sutton et al., 2011: 5; citing Anon
2008). In the 2009 revision of the UAP, the MoWR made implementation of low-cost
infrastructure at household level, which refers to ‘self-supply’, a key approach to achieving its
policy goal (MoWR, 2009a). However, in 2010, the Ministry had taken no real steps to
implement this new policy direction. At the time of my fieldwork, self-supply schemes were
not considered improved water supply infrastructures in the Southern Region and, therefore,
did not count as contributing to rural water access in the region.
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2.3.3 Government roles and responsibilities for delivering rural water supply
Section 2.1.3 explained that the decentralised governance framework of the EPRDF
government after 1992 led to devolution of responsibility for rural water supply services to the
regional administrations and, a second wave of decentralisation in the early 2000s, further
down, to woreda administrations. In the water sector, the establishment of separate
decentralised structures was slower. In the Southern Region, water experts were employed
first under the agriculture office. Water desks were set up in 2006 and became independent of
the agriculture sector only in 2009.
Below, I outline the roles and responsibilities of government bodies with regard to the project
cycle and O&M activities at the different administrative levels in Ethiopia and comment on the
challenges related to fulfilling these in practice. My explanations, which are summarised in
Table 2.2, refer to the Southern Region where, as explained in Section 2.1.3, zones are
democratically constituted. In other regions, the administrative set up below the regional level
may differ.
The MoWR mandate at the federal level with regard to rural water supply is mainly regulatory
involving issue of directions via policies, strategies and action plans, setting national standards
and supervising their implementation (Lemma, 2006: 7). Within the MoWR, water supply and
sanitation is one of nine directorates (Interview #64). This directorate also hosts project
implementation units for several sector donor programmes and the National WASH
Coordination Office, which coordinates all WASH activities across the water, health and
education ministries (MoWR et al., 2006a).
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Table 2.2 Roles and responsibilities for rural water supply in the Southern Region, 2010
Source: Arsano, Mekonnen et al. (2010)
Bureaux of Water Resources (BoWR) at the regional level are the executive bodies responsible
for implementing the federal policies, strategies and action plans in line with their specific
regional contexts, and carrying out regulatory duties (Arsano et al., 2010: 9). In terms of the
project implementation cycle, there is a division of labour in study, design and supervision of
schemes in accordance with the capacities of the sector offices at different administrative
levels. The BoWR studies, designs and supervises the construction of large-scale water supply
infrastructure such as multi-village schemes across the region. In terms of O&M, there is a
similar division of labour. The BoWR carries out repairs that are considered to be beyond the
capacity of woreda and zonal sector offices. In addition, the BoWR houses the regional WASH
Coordination Unit, which, in practice, mainly coordinates donor-funded WASH programmes.
At zone level, the water resources sector is joined with the mining and energy sectors within
the Water, Mines and Energy (WME) Department. The main role of the WME Department is
to provide technical support to woreda sector offices and to facilitate interaction between
regional and woreda levels (Arsano et al., 2010: 9). In the Southern Region, where zones are
democratically constituted, zonal governments, in theory, can mobilise their own financial
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resources to implement rural supply schemes. In practice, though the main activities of the
zonal WME departments I visited were consolidating plans and reports from the woreda level
and studying, designing and supervising the construction of shallow and deep wells. Zonal
WME departments also provide technical support to woreda sector offices for rehabilitating
broken down schemes (Interview #211).
At the woreda level, the water sector is represented by the WME Office which has had
representation on the Woreda Council since 2010. This is an important development because,
as noted in Section 2.1.3, since fiscal decentralisation to the woreda level in the early 2000s,
the woreda block grants allow some degree of decision making on service delivery at this level.
The WME office is the body responsible for planning and monitoring rural water supply in their
particular areas. In terms of the project cycle, WME offices study, design and supervise the
construction of low-cost schemes, namely HDWs and protected springs. In relation to O&M,
WME offices provide capacity support to WASH committees which, in my case study woreda,
includes follow up on tariff collections, technical support for scheme maintenance, and
chlorination (WME Office 2008). In addition, WME offices act as the secretariat for the
woreda-based WASH coordination structures. While there were no paid water sector staff at
kebele level, in theory, a WASH coordination committee exists, under the kebele
administration. In practice, the WASH coordination structures at woreda and kebele level are
not yet present, or not fully functional in many places.
In reality, various issues hamper the regional, zonal and woreda sector offices from carrying
out their respective roles and responsibilities to the full. I discuss gaps in budgeting and
strategic planning for rural water supply at the regional and woreda levels in Chapter 8 where I
address the uptake of monitoring data to inform decisions related to rural water access. Here, I
limit the discussion of the gaps between theory and practice, to various contextual challenges
related to project cycles and post-construction O&M responsibilities.
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During a project cycle, the responsibilities of government staff are well defined and
government officers often can count on logistical support from donor programmes and NGOs
to carry out their activities. However, sector staff face substantial practical challenges in
fulfilling their roles and responsibilities. Capacity constraints affect the project cycle, for
instance, when government officers responsible for supervising construction activities do not
have adequate transport or for some other reason fail to fulfil this role. This applied to one of
my project locations, where poor supervision had contributed to a poor quality water supply
infrastructure. Bad quality work can considerably shorten the lifespan of a scheme and puts an
additional burden on the community, which is principally responsible for managing the
infrastructure. While levels of corruption are considered to be low in the Ethiopian rural water
sector, a recent study by Roger Calow and colleagues (2011) found that procurement and
construction are the areas most vulnerable to mismanagement. So, while supervision as the
monitoring of an activity is not part of PM, which is the monitoring of results, it can have
important repercussions for rural water access. Furthermore, the number of study and design
documents submitted for shallow wells and deep wells in their areas varies among zonal WME
departments. In the allocation of financial resources for scheme constructions across the
region, the existence of more documentation increases the likelihood of receiving a regional
budget allocation from the BoWR (Interview #20).
When it comes to post-construction support, a further challenge is the lack of
operationalisation of water supply operation and maintenance policy. Regional level
proclamations do not sufficiently clarify the roles and responsibilities of the BoWRs with
regard to implementing federal water policy, which weakens the translation of policy into
practice (Lemma, 2006: 16). In the Southern Region, this is apparent in the weak role of the
community management section within the BoWR which has no specific tasks, or specific
budgets for particular activities (Interview #111). Furthermore, operational budgets, staffing
and logistics to support water committees in their O&M tasks are insufficient at all levels -
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from the regional BoWR to the woreda WME office (Lemma, 2006: 9). In the Southern Region’s
BoWR, availability of equipment constitutes a bottleneck. For example, the Bureau’s
maintenance team has only two trucks to carry out major maintenance work across 134 rural
woredas (Interview #20). In all zonal and woreda WME offices I visited, sector staff struggle
over problems related to lack of transport and fuel and, in more remote woredas, staff which
might number only one or two persons. The fact that, at a zonal WME evaluation meeting I
attended, WME officers cited these three issues as their major challenges is a further
indication that logistical bottlenecks are widespread. These logistical and structural problems
also affect implementation of the MoWR’s regular reporting activities, which I discuss in the
next section.
2.3.4 Sector monitoring of rural water supply
In the MoWR, the Directorate of Planning coordinates the sector’s monitoring activities.
Government monitoring consists of quarterly progress reports based on information provided
by the woreda level WME offices and compiled at the zonal level before presentation to the
regional BoWRs and federal MoWR. The monitoring reports refer to activity outputs. For
activity monitoring, the reporting format lists various steps marking progress in the project
implementation cycle and includes a section on maintenance activities by scheme type (BoWR,
2009b). Output reporting, which refers to PM, WME offices reports on the number of schemes
completed in their woredas over time, based on their existing records and newly finished
projects; they report also on the functional status of schemes. These reports are submitted at
quarterly meetings or via verbal communication (Interviews #4, 96, 177).
As with other responsibilities related to post-construction support, reporting on outputs is not
fully operationalised in Ethiopia. In contrast to reporting progress on construction activities, an
update on scheme functionality status is an extra activity. In the absence of a unified
procedure for regular reporting on scheme functionality status, fulfilment of this task is left to
the individual WME offices. Based on observation during my fieldwork, the offices’ ability to
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collect these data depends on their staff capacity, their logistical resources and the motivation
of individual sector experts to develop strategies for collecting regular data. So, although there
may be a reporting format for monitoring scheme functionality, this part of the monitoring
process was not fully operationalised in Ethiopia at the time of my field work. This is a problem
that extends to the water sectors in other Sub-Saharan African countries.22 My previous
experience in the sector mapping rural water access, I found updating the functionality status
of rural water schemes was a problem in Ghana, Nigeria, Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda (see
Welle, 2006, 2007b).
In addition to regular reporting, sector ministries conduct occasional scheme inventories to
update and correct their data. In Ethiopia, in the second half of 2010, the federal MoWR was
about to undertake such an inventory for the first time (MoWR, 2009b); previously, inventories
were carried out by individual regional governments. These regional inventories did not use a
standard format, were not carried out in the same time frames and did not cover the whole
territory of Ethiopia (Etherington et al., 2008). There was an inventory carried out in the
Southern Region in 2008. This inventory serves as one of my cases for detailed analysis of the
political and power dynamics of monitoring processes in Chapter 7. Next, I turn to donors and
NGOs supporting rural water supply in Ethiopia.
2.3.5 Partners in rural water supply
In Ethiopia, external development partners – bilateral and multilateral donors and NGOs – play
a substantial role in the provision of rural water supply. The MoWR estimates that, between
2006 and 2008, financial contributions by donors and NGOs combined, amounted to 49% of
the total funding for rural water supply schemes (MoWR, 2008a). This figure might be even
22 In their background paper for the “Monitoring Sustainable WASH Service Delivery Symposium” held in
April 2013, Smits et al. (2013) classify scheme functionality as an outcome. They further report that,
traditionally, sector monitoring has focused on monitoring outputs such as access and observe that
“recent monitoring initiatives have started going beyond measuring access, adding the functionality
status of the assets” (Smits et al., 2013: 3). DFID’s portfolio review (2012b) also found that reliable data
on rural water supply functionality is lacking. The donor launched a large call for operational research to
update the operational sustainability of WASH services in Africa and South Asia in 2013.
57
higher in reality because it is likely that not all NGO activities and multi-sector donor funding
for rural water supply are captured at the federal level, a point I discuss in more detail in
Chapter 8.
In terms of the implementation models of Ethiopia’s external partners, a distinction can be
made between NGOs who operate completely outside the government, multi-sector
programmes that are largely integrated into the Ethiopian government’s systems and working
procedures, and sector donor programmes whose delivery modes differ in various degrees
from the government approach.
NGOs operate outside the government structures to implement rural water supply schemes.
They report to and their operations are monitored by the Ethiopian government in line with
federal and regional NGO guidelines (BoFED, 2006). The actual level NGO collaboration with
relevant sector government offices can differ widely in practice. In my case study areas, NGOs
rely on WME offices for support during the project implementation cycle. A national Water
and Sanitation Forum, which represents local and international NGOs in the water supply and
sanitation sector in Ethiopia, estimates that approximately 100 NGOs were active in water
supply in 2010 (CCRDA, 2010: 17). However, this number might be significantly higher. In the
Southern Region, the report lists 17 NGOs active in rural water supply, while internal BoWR
records show 39 NGOs as active in the sub-sector.23 The major NGOs with operations in rural
water supply have a common national level platform via the Water and Sanitation Forum and,
through this platform, major NGOs are in dialogue with the MoWR on major sector reform
processes.
23 Another indication that the total number of NGOs operating in Ethiopia may be higher than those
captured by the Ethiopian national water sector NGO network is a quick comparison with Uganda. In
Uganda, the national water and sanitation network, UWASNET, has 187 member organisations
(UWASNET, 2012) although the country’s total population (30 million) is much smaller than Ethiopia’s
population (80 million). This comparison is based on the assumption that Ethiopia has a similar number
of water supply projects per capita as Uganda.
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Contributions from multi-sector development programmes, that is, the PSNP (Productive
Safety Net Programme) and the Protecting Basic Services Programme, reach woreda
administrations via the aforementioned government block grants through funds earmarked for
basic services, including rural water. The budget that woreda administrations allocate to rural
water supply – for the construction of protected springs and hand-dug wells, and scheme
rehabilitation – is implemented following the government roles and responsibilities outlined
above. According to a recent Public Finance Review by the World Bank (2009: 54), these
programmes represent one of the largest contributions to rural water supply.
Sector donor programmes have very complex arrangements for implementing rural water
supply in Ethiopia. The complexity relates partly to the way in which some sector donor
programmes are designed to boost implementation of sector reform processes. The
involvement of sector donors in reforms also means that their programme implementation
guidelines are in a state of flux. In Chapter 8, I discuss the negative repercussions of these
complex and parallel arrangements for planning and implementing rural water supply services.
In 2009/10, the main donors in the rural water supply sub-sector were the WB, DFID, the
African Development Bank (AfDB), UNICEF, Finland and the Japanese International
Cooperation Agency (JICA). At the time of my stay in Ethiopia, the WB’s Project
Implementation Manual was used as a model to assist the MoWR (2004b: 14) in implementing
a “demand-responsive” and “performance-based” approach to the sub-sector. In essence, the
idea was to use the WB’s Project Implementation Manual (PIM) to put into practice the policy
directions set out in the sector policy and strategy, and to build capacity at woreda WME
offices for a participatory bottom-up approach to WASH planning and implementation. DFID,
the AfDB and, later, also UNICEF broadly followed the WB’s implementation approach under
the WASH Programme after revision of the PIM in 2008 (MoWR, 2008b). The remaining sector
donors, Finland and JICA, had separate implementation models that were not primarily geared
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towards supporting sub-sector reform processes. Later, the term ‘WASH Programme’ evolved
further to represent all activities in the sub-sector on water supply, sanitation and hygiene
across the water, health and education sectors (McKim, 2009).
In 2009, an important issue with regard to the implementation of the WASH Programme was
the low rate of budget utilisation by individual sector donor programmes: 44% for the WB and
27% for the AfDB, compared to over 90% for government block grants. The low budget
utilisation rate is mainly a result of the parallel accounting and procurement systems and
procedures imposed by these donors (WB, 2009: 58-67). The administrative bottlenecks
created by these parallel systems considerably slow activities, negatively impact on staff
morale and anger prospective users (Welle et al., 2009).24 It is important to note that these
severe delays, which had a strongly negative effect on the implementation of rural water
infrastructure, were not subject to PM discussions in Ethiopia.
2.4 Summary of the contextual issues affecting performance
monitoring of rural water access in Ethiopia
Although Ethiopia has a decentralised governance structure, political decisions are mainly in
the hands of the EPRDF ruling party, whose membership effectively acts as a shadow structure
behind formal democratic institutions. With no significant locus of power outside the party
structure, the social organisation of the country is closely linked to the organisation of the
party and its political directions. This means also that decisions about the distribution and
quality of basic services, including rural water, are related to the internal governance of the
EPRDF. At the same time, other factors suggest limited space for debate. For instance, the
ruling party is not a one-dimensional entity. In the Southern Region, where my case study is
based, a fair distribution of resources among different ethnic groups is a factor influencing
24 The WASH programme was nicknamed ‘wushet’ meaning ‘liar’ in several regions because of the
perception of severe delays in implementation.
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government budget allocations for rural water schemes. Furthermore, rural water supply is not
as highly politicised as, for instance, the issue of hydropower, in Ethiopia. In the case of
hydropower, the policy space for debate is narrow because the Ethiopian government has a
strong political position on the topic. In rural water supply on the contrary, various sector
internal and external debates around monitoring since 2005 indicate a general openness
within the Ministry to make use of external support to implement sector reforms. I discuss the
relevant sector reform processes in more detail in Chapter 3.
In rural Ethiopia, water availability and household water needs, two contextual factors that
influence ‘access’, are very diverse. Water availability changes largely in line with the agro-
ecological zones in the country. Water availability varies within and between years in Ethiopia,
leaving households with the imperative to adapt diverse strategies to cover their daily water
needs. Importantly, households do not make a strict distinction between water for domestic
and productive uses, which is in contradiction with the provision of domestic water
infrastructure and related monitoring activities. Water demand depends on multiple factors,
including peoples’ livelihoods, settlement patterns and access to alternative, improved and
unimproved water sources.
The organisation of the rural water sector in Ethiopia also has a number of implications for
monitoring practices and the use of monitoring information.
First, it is important to acknowledge the impressive achievements in increasing the number of
rural water supply schemes since the early 1990s in rural Ethiopia, from around 6,000 schemes,
to 92,588 rural water schemes inventorised during the National WASH Inventory in 2010/11
(MoWE, 2012a). Despite the achievements in expanding the rural water supply infrastructure,
important bottlenecks remain in the sub-sector: The predominant service delivery model for
rural water supply in Ethiopia, CBM, focuses on technical aspects largely confined to the
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project delivery cycle. Monitoring practices also are geared towards that project cycle,
particularly for actors external to the Ethiopian administration, namely donors and NGOs.
The profound changes in Ethiopia’s governance structure since the beginning of the 1990s,
mainly characterised by fiscal and administrative decentralisation to woreda administrations
that led to the establishment of woreda WME offices, provided the preconditions for a
bottom-up planning and monitoring process related to rural water supply. At the same time,
the lack of formalisation of federal policy directions relating to CBM at the regional level and
below has been a barrier to support for WASH committees, the main bodies responsible for
O&M of rural water services. Together with the lack of logistical support, personnel and
capacity, this means that in practice, both sector monitoring and follow up on monitoring
results, are hampered. Furthermore, the large external support for rural water supply
channelled outside of government fiscal and administrative systems makes the delivery of
rural water supply services and the monitoring process more complicated.
In Chapter 3 I investigate the historical roots of PM, its conceptual underpinnings, and recent
applications in development cooperation in general, and the rural water sector more
specifically.
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3 Performance Monitoring in Development Cooperation
Chapter outline
“[M]uch development and humanitarian thinking and practice is still trapped in a
paradigm of predictable, linear causality and maintained by mindsets that seek
accountability through top-down command and control”. (2008: vii)
The paradigm of ‘linear causality’ referred to in the quote above by Robert Chambers is
embedded in PM, a monitoring approach aimed at measuring results. Chapter 3 introduces and
discusses PM and its role in Results-based Management (RBM), a management model that
focuses on performance improvement. I explain the central role of PM in development
cooperation, including in rural water supply. Section 3.1 outlines the historic roots of
‘performance’, and explains and discusses the definitions of PM and of RBM. Section 3.2
presents two examples of public sector PM and RBM implementations that focus on
accountability, followed by a discussion of key criticisms of PM. Section 3.3 traces the
emergence of a results-based agenda in development cooperation since the 1990s and its
manifestation in PM of water access at the global level, and at the country level in Ethiopia.
Section 3.4 concludes the chapter by summarising the discussion and introducing the research
question that motivates the investigation in my thesis.
3.1 Explaining Performance Monitoring and Results-Based
Management
Performance means different things to different people (Ramalingam et al., 2009). The
monitoring of performance does not have a specific theoretical base nor does it refer to a
unified method or procedure (Lebas and Eusks, 2007), but merely to the measuring of results.
The diversity of views on performance is related also to the fact that there are many different
and overlapping approaches, all referred to as performance, across the private and public
sectors. This stems from its historical roots discussed below.
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3.1.1 Historical roots of performance
Current approaches to performance evolved in the private sector during the period of
industrialisation, however, its roots also go back much further. They are linked to principles
used in three different areas: (1) military strategy devising a hierarchy of goals and developing
tactics to achieve them; (2) tax collection using surveys, documentation and reporting to
determine what people own and to ensure taxes are collected; and (3) principles in crafts
where training, supervision and standards are used to pass on specific skills (Ramalingam et al.,
2009).
The modern foundations of performance were laid by Adam Smith. He analysed the business
of producing pins by splitting the process into the specific tasks involved, studying how they
were performed, and measuring their efficiency by comparing results. At the beginning of the
20th century, Frederick Taylor, a US industrialist, applied Adam Smith’s approach to devise
specific management strategies for factory work processes. He established a scientific
approach to management through the introduction in the production process of ‘scientific
principles’, aimed at achieving greater or even output at lower costs.25 The approach spread
after being successfully applied by Henry Ford in the automobile industry for the mass
production of cars (Ramalingam et al., 2009). In current performance literatures, Taylor’s
approach is often referred to as ‘scientific management’ or the ‘scientific method’. Critics
argue that this approach is based on a positivist world view and a “belief in objective
measurement” (Lynch and Dicker, 1998 cited in Hailey and Sorgenfrei, 2004: 4), which, in turn,
is mobilised by discourse coalitions to support a specific story line about the relationship
between monitoring and decisions on rural water supply (Hajer, 1995), a point I elaborate in
Chapter 4.
25 The scientific principles were linked to his study of work methods, training and employment,
supervision, time management and payment incentives (Kanigel, 1997 cited in Ramalingam et al., 2009:
12-13).
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In parallel, at the beginning of the 20th century, other industrialists introduced principles that
led to two further strands related to performance: the quality control movement, and systems
of audit and financial management. In the context of this thesis, the principles associated with
‘scientific management’ are most relevant because they evolved into Management by
Objectives and Results-Based Management (RBM). In the 1950s, Peter Drucker, an influential
writer on management theory and practice, introduced the model of Management by
Objectives in organisational management. He devised a participatory process to set
organisational goals that cascaded down in the organisation via objectives and targets and also
linked individual employees’ objectives to the broader organisational goal (Ramalingam et al.,
2009).
What is important about the roots of performance is their firm base in the private sector and
close link to work processes in factories and, later, different types of organisations. The RBM
model has its roots in the principles of ‘scientific management’ developed by Taylor to increase
the efficiency of factory outputs. Positivist thinking related to ‘scientific methods’ is still
prevalent in current conceptualisations of PM. In the next section, I explain the process of PM
and its role in RBM in more detail.
3.1.2 Definitions and concepts related to performance monitoring
RBM is a management strategy that focuses on improving performance (Binnendijk, 2000b).
PM is central to RBM in that it is set up to measure progress between setting objectives and
achieving results. In the field of development cooperation, the OECD Development Assistance
Committee’s (2010) Glossary of Key Terms in Development Evaluation and Results-Based
Management is the source most commonly cited by development practitioners.26 Since the
OECD glossary represents the most widely shared interpretation of the concepts related to PM
26 The glossary was first published in 2002, and republished without textual changes in 2010. My
citations refer to the 2010 page numbers.
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in the aid sector, I mainly refer to this document in the discussion below of definitions and key
terms. I also discuss disagreements among professionals, where they arise.
According to the OECD (2010: 29), PM refers to ”a continuous process of collecting and
analysing data to compare how well a project, programme or policy is being implemented
against expected results”. The immediate question provoked by this definition is what is the
meaning of results? The OECD (2010: 33) defines results as “the output, outcome or impact
(intended and unintended, positive, and/or negative) of a development intervention”.
It is important here to note that not all authors agree with the OECD’s definition of results.
Some authors do not regard outputs, namely the “products, capital goods and services
resulting from the intervention” (OECD, 2010: 28), as a development result. In the WB’s
handbook for development practitioners on RBM, the authors Jodey Kusek and Ray Rist (2004:
16), argue, for instance, that outputs should not be regarded as a development result because
they do not answer the ”‘so what’ question’”. According to them, the building of a water
supply scheme, for instance, does not supply the answer to the ‘so what’ question because it
does not provide information about the results that emanate from completing this
infrastructure project. In comparison, outcomes, and impacts, which refer to the short,
medium and long term effects of an intervention’s outputs (OECD, 2010: 25, 29)27, provide
direct information on the progress made towards the achievement of their specific
development goals (Kusek and Rist, 2004: 12). Werner Meier (2003: 8), who reviewed RBM
approaches for the OECD, also holds that PM is usually outcome-related. However, others
argue that there is a disconnect between the outputs that are largely under the control of a
27 The full definition of impacts as “positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects,
produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended” (OECD, 2010:
25) recognises a more intermediate relationship with development interventions.
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programme, and outcomes and impacts which are more distant and less under the direct
control of any targeted intervention (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008: 17).28
Underlying the measurement of performance is an assumption that there is a linear cause-
effect relationship between development interventions and their results. This assumption is
made explicit in the OECD’s (2010: 33) glossary entry on the ‘results’, defined as
the causal sequence for a development intervention that stipulates the necessary
sequence to achieve desired objectives – beginning with inputs, moving through
activities and outputs, and culminating in outcomes, impact and feedback.
The illustration in Figure 3.1 highlights the single-stranded character of the cause-effect chain
in the OECD definition.
Figure 3.1 Illustration of the OECD results chain
Source: Author
Figure 3.1 highlights the linear causality running from setting objectives to measuring
development results in the prescriptive policy model underlying PM. The role of PM in this
28 With regard to rural water access, a typical example of an outcome is the ‘distance walked to the
source’ while ‘health improvements’ are an example of an impact (Poulos et al., 2006: 15), but many
other interpretations are possible. The different interpretations of results in relation to rural water
access are an important source of contestation at global, national and local levels. In section 3.3.2 I
present this conflict using different presentations of rural water access in Ethiopia. I return to
perspectives on rural water access in detail in the discussion of actors’ rural water access framings in
Chapter 6.
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management model is represented in the feedback loop from results to setting or revising
objectives. One observation in relation to this model is that the objective at the beginning of
the results chain is closely related to the desired outcome and impact. For example, the MDGs,
in themselves objectives, refer to development outcomes and impacts, the ultimate desired
result being a reduction (by half) in poverty. Furthermore, the feedback loop in the results
chain implies a linear relationship between performance measurement and objectives.
However, as discussed above, development results can be interpreted as outputs, outcomes or
impacts, which leaves room for interpretation of what exactly a development result represents.
Furthermore, the linear conceptualisation of the results chain is not well suited to address
uncertainties and the unexpected. For instance, repeated monitoring based on particular
indicators will only tell a story line from the perspective of these indicators rather than
explicitly exploring other factors that might challenge the hitherto established world view.
The uninterrupted arrows in the representation of the results chain in Figure 3.1 represent the
broader concept of RBM. The OECD Glossary (2010: 34) defines RBM as “a management
strategy focusing on performance and achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts”. This
definition of RBM puts the results chain within a broader public sector management model,
which assumes that PM results provide a uniquely rational basis for decisions. Kusek and Rist
(2004: 12) summarise this logic, explaining that:
“A results-based M&E system is essentially a public management tool governments
can use to measure and evaluate outcomes, and then feed this information back into
ongoing processes of governing and decision-making.”
Underlying this management model is the idea that policy processes follow a single-stranded
flow, from the setting of objectives in the form of desired results, to their achievement, and
that PM functions as a tool to uphold the loop between them. This model is based on a linear
understanding of change, the idea that policy results can be achieved by employing the
‘scientific methods’ introduced by Frederick Taylor in the early 20th Century (Rebien, 1996: 20).
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The linear understanding of change relates to a rational interpretation of the policy model, the
idea that monitoring interventions against results can be used in a rational way to arrive at
decisions about the social intervention in question. I discuss the alternative interpretations of
the rational versus the incrementalist view on the policy model in Section 4.3.1.
Proponents of RBM argue that the strength of this management model is that it reduces a
complex reality to a limited set of desired objectives and suggests a rational chain of inputs
and activities to achieve them. The power of performance measurement within this model is
that it provides a “common language and framework” (Power, 2004: 774) that results in the
reduction of complexity and thereby facilitates decision making. PM is valued also for its
capacity to highlight an organisation’s strengths and weaknesses, thereby allowing managers
to allocate resources more efficiently and effectively (Czarnecki 1999, cited in Hailey and
Sorgenfrei, 2004: 3). Externally, PM helps to hold an organisation accountable to its
stakeholder by tracing whether it is achieving its objectives (Hailey and Sorgenfrei, 2004: 3).
The reference to accountability in relation to PM is particularly strong in the introduction of
PM in the public sector, which is the focus of the next section.
3.2 Performance monitoring in the public sector
RBM is widely used across the private and public sectors (Hatry, 1997, Perrin, 1998: 374, Van
Thiel and Leeuw, 2002, Greiling, 2006), including the aid sector (Binnendijk, 2000a: 3, Picciotto,
2002: 13, Mayne, 2005), and among NGOs (Hailey and Sorgenfrei, 2004, Ramalingam et al.,
2009). As explained in section 3.1.1, over the years, PM has assumed different forms, focusing
at different times, for instance, on the measurement of efficiency or value for money, total
quality management, and other aspects (Hailey and Sorgenfrei, 2004: 9). At the same time,
alternative monitoring techniques have been developed to address some of the criticisms
related to earlier approaches. In development cooperation, for example, Outcome Mapping, a
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process-focused tool that measures results in terms of changes in peoples’ behaviour, is
closely related to a development intervention rather than presupposing a particular input-
result chain (Smutylo, 2005). Another methodology, Participatory Rural Appraisal, includes a
group of appraisal methods that aim to put local people at the forefront of the analysis and
subsequent planning and action regarding their life conditions (Chambers, 1992). However,
these alternatives remain at the margins of public-sector measurement systems. PM is at the
forefront for measuring the success of public sector interventions, whether in OECD countries,
or countries that have signed up to the aid effectiveness agenda, or those in the UN system. As
indicated above, a central argument for introducing PM in the public sector is its premise on
increasing public accountability, which I demonstrate and discuss below, based on two specific
historical examples.
3.2.1 Public sector performance monitoring and accountability
According to Daniel Williams (2003), the notion of performance measurement has been
around in the public sector in the United States at least since 1912. Williams (2003) found
evidence that, at that time, a public bureau in New York practised principles related to PM
such as the measurement of outputs; he establishes links to the more recent waves of PM in
the public sector since the 1970s. According to Williams (2003: 655), in the early 20th century,
the perception of corruption and waste of resources in government were key factors that led
to the introduction of PM in the public bureau.
While various approaches related to PM continued to be introduced in the public sector after
the second world war, it was not until the 1980s that performance became a key aspect of
public-sector management (Hailey and Sorgenfrei, 2004). In the 1980s, at a time of global
recession, governments were challenged by public perception of public services as inefficient
and expensive, and consuming too much of the domestic product (Mayne and Zapico-Goni,
1997: 6). Faced with the need to cut back public spending, governments turned to a new way
of managing public services, commonly associated with the term New Public Management
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(NPM) (Hood, 2001). As part of these reforms, governments also introduced a wave of
performance-based measures in the public sector. In essence, NPM is related to the argument
put forward in the American bestseller by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) quoted in the
introduction to this thesis, that governments need to “reinvent” themselves, by becoming
more entrepreneurial. Some of the trends associated with NPM are a greater emphasis on the
delivery of more efficient, affordable and higher quality services, and the introduction of
management principles from the private sector to achieve this (Mayne and Zapico-Goni, 1997:
6, Hood, 2001). In essence, PM, with a focus on monitoring the results of public services, was
seen as essential for making the public sector more economic, efficient and effective (London,
1994).
The context in which PM was argued for in the 1912 example, as well as in the more
established example of NPM from the 1980s onwards, points to a resort to PM in times of
governance crisis. In the early 20th century, the New York public bureau faced allegations of
corruption and mismanagement of public resources. Similarly, in the 1980s, NPM reforms
became popular at a time when the public sector was perceived as inefficient and ineffective.
PM, in this context, can be seen as a means to restore trust with the public by appearing to
increase accountability, for instance, by invoking the image of an efficient manager.
The above analysis is informed by the writings of Peter Aucoin, a Canadian academic who
worked on reform of public administration. According to Aucoin, NPM reforms have some
basis in the managerialist school of thought, which argues for getting rid of bureaucratic
rigidities and focusing instead on the mission, personnel and customers of the organisation
(Aucoin, 1990: 118). In essence, the managerialist school replaces the paradigm of the public
servant whose main task is to follow procedures, with the image of the manager who is
focused on achieving particular ends for the organisation. Among other things, this implies
Management for Results (MfR). In organisational terms, this design relates organisational
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authority, responsibility and accountability to its resources, outputs and results (Aucoin, 1990).
MfR, based on the ideas of Management by Objectives introduced by the management
specialist Peter Drucker in the 1950s, puts emphasis on achieving accountability through
internal learning, and the role of PM in that being to support a management culture focused
on results. However, in the public sector the implementation of such ideas has been
problematic, for reasons I discuss through the criticisms put forward against these concepts,
presented in the next section.
3.2.2 Critiques of performance monitoring in the public sector
Much criticism of PM and RBM in relation to public sector programmes, relates to the
technicalities and practicalities related to their implementation rather than the rationale
behind the concepts themselves (Hailey and Sorgenfrei, 2004: 13). For example, John Mayne
(2005) discusses 12 organisational and technical challenges related to implementing RBM in
public sector organisations, identified in an OECD review of 26 member states.
One of the key criticisms of PM questions the very logic of monitoring for results, focusing on
the downsides that were described as important strengths in section 3.1.2. Specifically, critics
argue that PM misrepresents a complex reality by its reduction to a few, measurable results
(Power, 2004: 774). Results are represented by a “small number of quantitative indicators,
which can actually disguise and mislead rather than inform what is really happening” (Perrin,
1998: 372). In this context, it is argued that developing indicators is a political process, since
indicators will represent only a particular perspective of a more complex reality, but not
necessarily a relevant one (Newcomer, 1997 cited in Perrin, 1998: 372). An example of a
misrepresentation of reality through PM is the emphasis that audits put on the economic
dimension of an organisation’s performance, the value for money, to the detriment of other
aspects related to effectiveness and efficiency (Power, 1997: 51).
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The measuring of complex reality based on a few indicators has been criticised also for
creating perverse incentives (Perrin 1998). A famous example of a perverse incentive created
by measurement systems was the ‘body count’ in the Vietnam War as a measure of success,
which led to increased killings of civilians on strategically unimportant battlefields (Rogers,
2004: 2).29 Others point out that pressure to meet performance targets can lead to ‘gaming
behaviour’. A well known example of this is the waiting lists in the UK’s National Health Service.
According to one report, over 50% of consultants at one point reported attending to non-
urgent cases first, in order to comply with waiting list targets (NAO, 2001 cited in Ramalingam
et al., 2009). A more typical example in a development cooperation context is that
performance measures can lead to an incentive to “neglect the poor, distant or otherwise
difficult populations” (Clements, 2005: 3) since it may be more difficult to achieve measurable
results when trying to reach these groups.
Furthermore, there are questions about to what extent the theoretical propositions of MfR
within the managerialist school have been realised in practice in the past (Mayne, 2005). Rolf
Sandahl (1997: 154) who reviewed the implementation of NPM reforms in Sweden, concludes
that the relation between results-based information and budgetary process decisions was “at
best tenuous”. According to him, evidence from Sweden suggests that “major changes at the
aggregate budget level are based on political consideration rather than information about
results” (Sandahl, 1997: 154), while decisions were more likely to be based on information on
results at the operative level.
There are numerous examples of limited implementation of RBM principles in the aid sector by
the aid agencies of donor countries and the UN system. Werner Meier (2003: 5), who reviewed
RBM approaches in development cooperation for the OECD, cautions that RBM reforms are
29 The introduction of PM in the Vietnam War is associated with Robert McNamara’s term as Secretary
of Defense. MacNamara is said also to have used results-based management principles to transform the
management of the World Bank during his presidency from 1968 to 1981 (Natsios, 2010).
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relatively recent in the OECD countries. He comments also that the introduction of
performance measurement is often not accompanied by wider internal organisational reforms
linked to RBM. Annette Binnendijk (2000a: 4), along similar lines, observed that while many
development cooperation agencies have experience in developing performance measurement
frameworks, there is scant evidence on the use of this information for internal management
decision making. An RBM review of various UN agencies by the UN Office for Internal Oversight
Services (OIOS) reveals that RBM practice at the UN “has been an administrative chore of little
value for accountability and decision making” (OIOS, 2008: 1). A weakness found by the OIOS
with regard to PM is that “indicators of achievement and performance measures have
generally been framed in a manner that depends upon subjective interpretation” (Hauge and
Pena, 2007: 1).
The above criticisms suggest that, in reality, PM may be deeply subjective and political. They
indicate also that a performance measurement culture may end up justifying and defending
actions (Perrin: 1998: 375) that may have been taken for other reasons, while creating a
seeming conformity with objectives based on the rational logic of the PM process. PM creates
accountability and establishes control via abstract numbers. This means that, in the public
sector, PM might ultimately be used as a means to create seeming public accountability, which
does not hold under more thorough scrutiny.
This brief review of RBM examples in the public sector confirms a potential schism between
the need to demonstrate accountability and the reality of PM in the public sector domain.
Evidence from the two public sector examples described above shows that PM was introduced,
at least partly, as a means to demonstrate increased accountability to the public. At the same
time, commentary from reviewers of PM experiences in the public sector30, indicates that
there is little evidence to support a single stranded results chain between PM and decisions
30 This is not to suggest that the internal logic RBM model is unproblematic in the private sector. The
emphasis on the public sector relates to the thesis’ topic only.
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taken. Rather than working in a machine-like fashion, as suggested by the linear model of RBM,
its implementation is full of “disconnections, disruptions and disjunctions” (Ramalingam et al.,
2009: 24). As a result, PM can become an instrument of control rather than an approach to
foster a new internal management culture (Meier, 2003: 11). This suggests that PM, in practice,
may end up as mere lip service to accountability.
3.3 Performance monitoring under the aid effectiveness agenda
In the field of development cooperation, some form of PM has been practised for a long time.
Up to the 1990s, development cooperation was dominated by the implementation of so-called
‘project-aid’, specific development interventions confined to a particular geographic area. A
popular tool for PM of development projects is the Logical Framework Approach (LFA), a
planning and management tool originally introduced in development cooperation by USAID
(Meier, 2003: 3). The LFA is based on a linear model linking inputs, activities and outputs of
development interventions to a hierarchy of development objectives (Hailey and Sorgenfrei,
2004: 13)31 . In the 1970s, single, isolated projects gave way to more comprehensive
programmes, typically aimed at integrated rural development (Hyden, 2005), but still using an
adaptation of the LFA. In the 1980s, market principles entered the realm of development
assistance under neoliberal reforms of structural adjustment, leading to the outsourcing of
scheme management to user committees and demand-based approaches in the water sector
discussed in the introduction. By the 1990s, the existing project-based approach to
development cooperation was facing criticism for failing to bring about sustainable and more
31 The LFA originally was developed in the 1960s for military purposes, and adopted as a planning tool by
NASA before being applied to development by USAID. The roots of the LFA in the US military provide an
interesting link to the reference to performance origins in military strategy. In development cooperation,
the LFA has been widely used as a planning tool since the 1970s. While the strength of the LFA is said to
lie in the reduction of a complex reality to a simple set of causal relationship between inputs, activities
and outputs, it has also been widely criticised as a ‘blueprint approach’ to development, that takes no
account of the complexity of real-world situations (Hailey and Sorgenfrei, 2004: 13). An adaptation of
the LFA by German development cooperation, a version that fosters stakeholder participation
throughout the project cycle, became popular in development projects in the 1970s and 1980s (Pollvogt,
1987 cited in Welle, 2003: 672)
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widespread change (Berg, 1993).32 The new argument was that unless people owned their
development process, aid would not be effective. This led to the emergence of a new
paradigm in the 2000s, the aid effectiveness agenda (Hyden, 2005).
3.3.1 The aid effectiveness agenda
In the 1990s, the perception among the public in donor countries that development
interventions were inefficient and ineffective, contributed to ‘aid fatigue’ and declining aid
budgets, similar to what happened in cases of RBM introduction in the Western hemisphere,
discussed above. It is in this context that a results-based agenda was introduced to the
development cooperation context (Binnendijk, 2000a: 3). At a global level, the new focus on
working towards development results is represented in the Millennium Declaration ratified by
189 Heads of State, and containing a set of 8 MDGs which aim to halve poverty by 2015 (UN,
2000). With regard to water, the MDG target 7c specifies “to halve, by 2015, the proportion of
people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation” (UN, 2008).
Under the banner of ‘making aid more effective’, a number of reforms have been introduced
to development cooperation with the overall aim of improving the delivery and management
of aid in order to achieve longer lasting results.
These global reform efforts towards increased aid effectiveness are closely related to the
multilateral development banks (Christiansen and Hovland, 2003). In the World Bank,
principles of RBM were originally introduced under the presidency of Robert McNamara (1968-
81) (Natsios, 2010). The drive towards aid effectiveness happened much later, though, in the
late 1990s, driven by the aforementioned criticism of project aid, a popular movement for
debt relief,33 and by the wider shift from structural adjustment – an economic-led agenda – to
a more governance-based paradigm in development cooperation concerned with ‘getting the
32 Key criticisms of project aid include: high transaction costs through separate accounting and reporting
structures and tied aid; undermining of state systems by creating parallel implementation structures and
special staffing arrangements; strong reliance on donor funding leading to weak long-term sustainability
and a lack of democratic accountability because of arrangements geared to satisfying constituencies in
donor countries (Lawson et al., 2002 cited in Christiansen and Hovland, 2003).
33 In particular the ‘Jubilee 2000’ and the ‘Drop the Debt’ campaigns.
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institutions right’, a topic I introduced in Chapter 1. The push towards better governance from
the multilateral institutions, particularly the World Bank, is related to the development in 1999
of Country Development Frameworks (CDFs). It is from these CDFs and from the need to
establish a common mechanism between the WB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, that the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) evolved in 2000, as a new approach to development
assistance (Christiansen and Hovland, 2003). The PRSPs thus represent the start of a global
push to make aid more effective.
A new global aid architecture was created that set out a new “global partnership” (Picciotto,
2002: 3; italics in original) between donor and recipient countries. This new aid architecture is
underpinned by a results-based agenda developed over the course of several conferences and
high level meetings in the first five years of 2000. In Monterrey, Mexico, governments agreed
that levels of increased aid towards the MDGs would be matched with “better governance,
reform policies, and a greater focus on development effectiveness and results” (Kusek and Rist,
2004: 4) in developing countries. The shuttle of consultations related to aid effectiveness
culminated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005. The agenda spells out five
principles:
Principle 1: Ownership - aid recipients formulate their own poverty reduction strategies;
Principle 2: Alignment - donors support the national strategies and systems;
Principle 3: Harmonisation – donors synchronize their interventions in a country;
Principle 4: Managing for Development Results - development policies are directed at and
monitored against achieved results;
Principle 5: Mutual Accountability – there is a joint responsibility for these goals among
donors and recipients (OECD, 2005).
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According to Robert Picciotto (2002: 7), when he was Director General of the WB’s Operations
Evaluation, the aid effectiveness agenda, with its focus on development results, represented a
new paradigm in development cooperation. Under this paradigm, recipient countries develop
their own poverty reduction strategies, which, with streamlined support from the donor side,
set the path to achieving the MDGs. In an ideal situation, donors would directly support the
budgets of recipient countries rather than setting up parallel financial systems. The logic
underpinning the reforms under the aid effectiveness agenda reflects the linear results chain
of PM: it holds that aid recipient countries set up their own poverty reduction goals and
strategies and, through sector reform processes, align their systems to enable them to
measure progress against these goals. By measuring against these goals, they increase
accountability to their citizens, but, equally also, to donor countries who financially contribute
to the recipient country’s efforts to achieve these goals. At sector level, the aid effectiveness
agenda has contributed to the emergence of ‘sector-wide approaches’ (SWAP). SWAP
represents reform processes aimed at moving from a situation of fragmented projects to a
results-based management system based on a single sector strategy and programme
supported by all parties (Foster et al., 2001). In the water sector, steps towards SWAP include
the establishment of coordination mechanisms among donors and recipient governments,
such as joint technical reviews and to common donor reporting procedures, and financing
arrangements such as basket funds (DANIDA, 2006). In 2012, most countries are reported to
have established sector planning and coordination processes in the water sector with the
intention to use sector data to inform effective investment planning, but, so far, sector
planning based on results is a challenge for many countries (WHO, 2012b: 13).
The pervasiveness of the aid effectiveness agenda is expressed in the number of related
initiatives. Among the donors and recipients of aid, 114 countries have signed the Paris
Declaration (Welle et al., 2008) and over 65 countries have developed PRSPs (WB, 2012a). The
aid effectiveness agenda also forms the basis for all funding by multilateral banks and for the
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HIPC Initiative (Kusek and Rist, 2004: 3). In 2005, countries classified as poor and heavily
indebted, under HIPC became eligible for 100% relief of their debts with multilateral financial
institutions – the IMF, The World Bank and the African Development Bank. One of the key
conditions for debt relief was the development of a poverty reduction strategy paper, an
initiative to reduce the external debts of world’s poorest and most highly indebted counties
(IMF, 2011).
In practice, challenges to implement this agenda are formidable, not least because the donor-
recipient relationship adds to the complexity of the public policy process and has an effect on
accountability relations. Furthermore, a number of new donors, such as the Chinese
Government, and various Arab States, operate outside this framework (Kharas, 2007). Likewise,
NGOs, whose interventions make substantial contributions in the water sector, are not part of
the aid effectiveness agenda. At country level, the move towards aid effectiveness, a situation
where donors are fully aligned to recipient government systems and where the latter base
their policy agendas on PM results, at best, can be characterised as piecemeal.
3.3.2 Global monitoring of rural water
In the water sector, international WASH monitoring started with the first International
Drinking Water Decade in 1981 to 1990. During that period, data were collected by the WHO
based on country-level questionnaires, which proved hard to compare internationally
(Butterworth et al., 2013).34 The second international water decade – Water for Life – runs
from 2005 to 2015 and is based on MDG 7c, “to halve, by 2015, the proportion of people
without sustainable access to safe drinking water” (UNDESA, 2012). Since 1990, global
monitoring of water has become better coordinated and easier to compare across countries.
At the international level, UN Water was established as an inter-agency mechanism to follow
up on MDG 7c (UN Water, 2006). The agency mandated the JMP (Joint Monitoring Programme)
34 The results of this first international decade, which aimed to provide water and sanitation to all, were
disappointing: at the end of the decade, water provision had hardly kept pace with population growth
(Carter et al., 1993).
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for Water Supply and Sanitation, of the WHO and UNICEF, with monitoring access to water
supply and sanitation.35
Although agreed on in the year 2000, the base year for monitoring progress against the MDG
7c is 1990 (UNDESA, 2012). The indicator for measuring rural water access is the “proportion
of the population using an improved drinking water source” (UNDESA, 2012, emphasis added).
As briefly outlined in Chapter 2, the term ‘improved’ refers to a certain technological standard
that protects the source “from outside contamination” (WHO and UNICEF, 2010). Based on
this criterion, the following sources qualify as ‘improved’ according to the JMP: “rainwater,
protected spring, protected dug well, tubewell or borehole, public tap or standpipe, piped
water into yard/plot, and piped water into dwelling” (WHO and UNICEF, 2010).
To measure progress against this target, the JMP relies on existing national representative
household surveys such as USAID funded Demographic and Health Surveys or other relevant
surveys administered by individual countries’ statistics departments. This means that the JMP
is largely dependent on the questions developed by national statistical agencies on the type of
drinking water sources used by the household. The JMP does not report information on
individual surveys, but uses all available data points to draw a trend line. Reported estimates
are based on the trend line even when a data point is available for the given year. Because of
data availability problems, the latest survey available to the JMP may date back several years
prior to the reporting year (WHO and UNICEF, 2012d). In the case of Ethiopia, the latest data
available to the JMP for its report in 2010 was for year 2007 (WHO and UNICEF, 2012b).
The differences in how the JMP defines and measures global progress in rural water access
compared to national line ministries results in sometimes stark contrasts among access figures
35 Performance reporting on water and sanitation by the JMP is complemented by two further reports,
the biennial Global Analysis and Assessment of Water and Sanitation (GLAAS), which monitors
governance and institutional issues including progress on setting up and planning, against national
sector monitoring and information systems at country level (WHO, 2012d), and the World Water
Assessment Programme (WWAP), published every three years, which provides a strategic outlook on
global freshwater sources and is organised by sector (UNESCO, 2012).
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reported for the same country. In the case of Ethiopia, as cited in the Introduction, the
divergence in figures is particularly pronounced: the JMP reports 34% rural water access in
2010 (WHO and UNICEF, 2012b) whereas the Ethiopian MoWE36 reports 65.8% access for the
same year (MoWE, 2010) (see Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2 Ethiopia rural water access estimates by MoWR/E and JMP from 1990 - 2010
Source: various Ethiopian water sector and cross-sector reports (Rahmato, 1999, MoWR, 2002,
MoWR et al., 2006b, MoFED, 2010, MoWE, 2010) and UNICEF and WHO (2012b)
Some of the criticisms of RBM discussed in Section 3.2 are evident in this brief insight into
global monitoring of rural water. While I discuss different interpretations of rural water access
in detail in Chapter 6, here I highlight a few issues. For instance, Indicator 7c, ‘the use of an
improved source’ of the JMP highlights a narrow, technical aspect related to rural water supply
compared to the complex reality of rural water access that emerges from the discussion of
water availability and water need patterns in Ethiopia in Chapter 2. Compared to the JMP’s
focus on the use of a particular facility designed for domestic water supply, studies into
peoples’ water needs in Ethiopia highlight a great diversity in terms of needs related to
 peoples’ livelihoods (e.g. whether the household owns livestock, has a vegetable
garden, brews beer);
36 Here, I refer to the Ministry of Water and Energy, which succeeded the MoWR in October 2010.
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 the agro-ecological zone in which the household lives (water being most readily
available in the highlands and least available in the low- and drylands);
 seasonality (shallow water sources drying up in the dry season putting pressure on
fewer, high yielding sources); and
 the economic status of the household (with reports of poorer households forced to
reduce consumption during the dry season and droughts, while wealthier households
can exploit additional labour and economic resources to maintain or increase their
consumption from protected sources in these periods).
In addition, there are dimensions including water quality, gender and equity among others, but
a few that are completely missing in the JMP definition are discussed in Chapter 6.
Another aspect I want to highlight at this point is the mismatch between the seeming
objectivity assumed in the definition of results for PM discussed in Section 3.1.2, and the
political reality of defining rural water access. The contestation over what constitutes a result
comes out in the different interpretations provided by the JMP and the Ethiopian MoWE.
While the JMP’s target and indicator both refer to water access as an outcome (people using
an improved source), the MoWE refers to it an output (infrastructure provided). Technical
debates over whether a result constitutes an output or an outcome, as discussed in Section
3.1.2, take on a political character in concrete policy settings exemplified by contestations over
access figures between the Ethiopian MoWE and the JMP (Butterworth et al., 2013).
Insights into the problems that the JMP experiences with the practicalities of measuring also
indicate that the single-stranded results chain assumed under PM is problematic. Instead, each
step in the monitoring process involves a decision that has consequences for resulting access
figures. For example, the JMP’s aforementioned reliance on national statistical agencies of
countries leads to problems of data availability with important consequences for the results
the JMP reports. In the case of Ethiopia, the JMP is likely to under-report access because the
last accessible data point for the agency to report for 2010 is 2007.
There are also questions with regard to the meaningfulness of the MDG 7c itself. On 6 March,
2012, the UN announced the global achievement of the MDG on water (WHO, 2012c). At the
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moment of this global announcement, rural water access stood at 34% in Ethiopia according to
the JMP. Yet, based on the low access in the base year 1990, namely 5%, the MDG of halving
the rural population without water access had been achieved in Ethiopia (WHO and UNICEF,
2012b). When considering the MDGs in light of this concrete example, the related
achievements become questionable.
As already pointed out in Chapter 1, a global consultation process to review the existing MDG
targets and indicators for water supply, sanitation and hygiene has been underway since 2011.
Some of the issues I point to above are currently being assessed by the technical working
group on drinking water supply. I discuss current developments towards post-MDG monitoring
in the light of the findings presented in Chapter 9. Next, I turn to the sector reforms that have
been implemented in Ethiopia in the move towards greater aid effectiveness.
3.3.3 Sector reform processes in rural water supply in Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, water sector reforms started in 2004/5, at the time when access to water supply
became a feature of the country’s national poverty reduction strategy, known then as
PASDEP.37 While the sector previously had formulated targets towards increasing access to
water supply, the new sector plan, the UAP (Universal Access Programme), substantially
moved the goal posts for achieving water access. Under the UAP, the MoWR committed to
increasing rural water access from 35% in 2005, to 98% by 2012 (MoWR, 2005), an initial
seven-year time frame, which was extended to ten years (2015) in the 2009 revision of the
UAP (MoWR, 2009a).
Also in 2005, a reform process initiated by the European Union Water Initiative (EUWI)
brought together the major sector development partners and the Ministry to discuss steps
towards developing a SWAP for WASH. Reform efforts focused on the domestic rural and
urban water supply sub-sectors and on integration with sanitation and hygiene activities under
37 PASDEP: Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty.
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the education and health ministries.38 Starting from 2006, Multi-Stakeholder Forums (MSF)
served as the main platform for discussing reform efforts between the three water, health and
education ministries, sector donors and NGOs. During the first MSF, in 2006, the participants
developed a list of nine sector undertakings (see Figure 3.3), based on a jointly carried out
sector review (MoWR et al., 2006b).
Figure 3.3 Sector undertakings agreed upon at MSF in 2006
1. Popularise and operationalise the Universal Access Programme
2. Disseminate and communicate water, sanitation and hygiene sector policies
3. Implement policy and regulatory measures to increase private sector
participation
4. Establish and improve regulation for community management in the sector
5. Enhance and harmonise finance mechanisms in the sector
6. Implement Monitoring and Evaluation system for water, sanitation and
hygiene
7. Plan, budget and scale up existing human resource development activities
8. Implement and monitor the WASH Memorandum of Understanding
9. Establish supply chain outlets
Source: MoWR and EUWI (2006)
Also in 2006, the ministries of health, education and water signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) expressing their intention to coordinate WASH-related activities cutting
across the three sectors (MoWR et al., 2006a). The MoU included developing a joint
monitoring system on WASH-related results, representing one of the nine sector undertakings
listed in Figure 3.3.
In 2005, another sector undertaking, the streamlining of sector financing, was strongly
influenced by events outside the sector. At the time, various donors were considering aligning
their finance mechanisms with those of the Ethiopian government by directly supporting the
federal budget. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, in the aftermath of the 2005 general
elections, the Ethiopian government clamped down heavily on opposition and demonstrators
38 More recently, a working group on watershed management was established to develop joint
monitoring approaches (Interview #223).
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(Abbink, 2006a). These events led several donors to reconsider their move towards direct
budget support. Instead, various mechanisms were created to support the delivery of basic
services via block grants directly allocated to woredas, Ethiopia’s local governments. These
include the PBS and the PSNP, both programmes that include rural water supply.39 This move
had a bearing on the rural water supply sub-sector in that it led to an additional financing
channel at the woreda level that bypassed the MoWR. It contributed to the complexity of
financing arrangements in the rural water sector thereby weakening the potential link
between PM results and budget allocations in the sector, an aspect I discuss in detail in
Chapter 8.
Meanwhile, the sector reform process initiated in 2006 halted, it stopped short of establishing
WASH coordination bodies and a unified way of managing the sector (MoWE, 2011). The WB-
initiated WASH Programme, designed as a blueprint for a future unified approach for
implementing rural and urban water supply infrastructure, I described in Chapter 2, stalled in
2007 inter alia because the sector could not cope with its complex financial reporting and
procurement requirements. Nevertheless, major new investments in the sector from the AfDB
and DFID broadly followed the WB’s Programme Implementation Manual under an emerging
‘WASH Programme’ to harmonise donor approaches.40
One practical change in the monitoring of donor activities related to rural water supply
consists of a format that summarises sector donor activities in a single report format as
opposed to the previously separate reports to the MoWR. Government sector offices, for their
part, continue to report separately, to their respective line ministries, following their existing
sector monitoring procedures. In the meantime, efforts continued to develop a joint WASH
monitoring framework. In 2008, a joint Monitoring and Evaluation Manual was developed
39 As discussed in Chapter 2, the PSNP (Productive Safety Net Programme) and the PBS (Protection of
Basic Services) are multi-sector programmes, aimed respectively at improving food security and
productivity and at expanding access and improving the quality of basic services.
40 Since my field work period ended in October 2010, there have been further revisions to the Project
Implementation Manual, leading to greater alignment with Ethiopian financial systems.
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(MoWR, 2008c). While the health sector was seen as already having a strong monitoring
framework for sanitation and hygiene, the water sector generally was perceived as having a
poor monitoring system in place. Rural water supply figures in particular were hotly debated
among sector stakeholders.41 At the centre of the contention over rural water access is the
aforementioned stark contrast between the MoWR’s reports suggesting a strong increase in
rural water access, and the internationally reported JMP figures, which are consistently and
significantly lower. Since 2009, a National WASH Inventory has become the focus of efforts
related to monitoring of rural water supply. According to a senior sector official (Interview
#206), a key intention of the inventory is to get all sector stakeholders “speak the same
language” when it comes to water access. Since data collection for the National WASH
Inventory started after my field work, it does not constitute part of this thesis. Some of the
challenges and opportunities related to this process have been summarised elsewhere
(Butterworth et al., 2010, Welle et al., 2012, Butterworth et al., 2013).
3.4 Summary of the discussion
To summarise, PM forms part of RBM, a management strategy that focuses on performance
improvement. Central to this management strategy is the presumption of a single-stranded
results chain that links objectives with the results related to a particular intervention. The role
of PM in RBM is as a feedback loop between results and objectives, to inform decisions that
will improve the performance of the intervention in question. RBM and, as part of that, PM,
originate from business management models developed during the 20th century in the private
sector. Since the 1980s, RBM has spread to the management of public sectors in rich and poor
41 However, progress on access to sanitation facilities is also contested. While the Ministry of Health
reports that 56% of households had access to sanitation facilities in 2010, their use is estimated to be
much lower, at 20%. The JMP, meanwhile, reports 47% access to sanitation facilities for shared and
basic facilities in 2010 (Newborne and Liisanantti, forthcoming). Furthermore, access to sanitation
facilities does not, in itself, indicate better hygiene practices, which are needed to bring about health
benefits (Mehta and Bongartz, 2009).
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countries alike. A central rationale for introducing RBM in the public sector is the premise that
this management strategy increases accountability of public sector management. However,
evidence from the application of RBM in the public sectors of different countries highlights
important problems with this management model. On the one hand, there is evidence of RBM
leading to ‘perverse incentives’ and ‘gaming behaviour’ thereby at best refuting its original
goal and at worst causing harm as illustrated by the case of the ‘body count’ during the
Vietnam War. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence that the implementation of
RBM in the public sector remains piecemeal and that full application of this management
strategy may be unrealistic, particularly in public policy areas that are politically important or
sensitive.
This criticism notwithstanding, PM, as a central part of RBM, has been firmly established in
development cooperation under the aid effectiveness agenda. The RBM philosophy is reflected
in the aid effectiveness Principle No. 4: ‘managing for development results’. Global
development results have been set by the MDGs, of which target 7c relates to water supply
and sanitation. Global PM of MDG 7c is carried out by the JMP, and sector government
progress towards managing for results is reported in UN-Water’s GLAAS report. At country
level, in Ethiopia, reform efforts towards increasing aid effectiveness started in 2005 with the
establishment of a multi-stakeholder dialogue on WASH. Up to 2010, this dialogue had led to
increased harmonisation among donor programmes, but it is far from being aligned with the
sector’s public finance and public management systems. In terms of monitoring rural water
supply, reform efforts have focused on developing a unified WASH monitoring system for the
sector. At the time of my fieldwork, this system was not operational. However, government,
donors and NGOs alike all monitor development results.
To reiterate the important position of PM in the water sector, and to demonstrate that the
model’s inherent logic is indeed reproduced among sector stakeholders, I provide the
87
following quotes. UN-Water, the agency that oversees international monitoring of water
supply by the JMP, states the purpose of monitoring as “to track progress against given
objectives” and “to inform decisions, focus and orient political and policy reforms, and to
channel financial resources in the most effective way” (UN Water, 2006: 9).
GLAAS, UN-Water’s assessment tool to trace policy and institutional reforms in the water
sector, comments in 2012 (WHO, 2012b: 13):
“Most countries have established national sector coordination and planning processes,
but many also report having inadequate information and data for effective investment
planning. Only one half of responding countries respond that their planning processes
are based on annual or biennial reviews, and even fewer countries are in a position to
perform their planning based on reliable data from national information systems”
The Ethiopian MoWE states in a recent presentation to sector partners on preliminary results
of the National WASH Inventory (MoWE, 2012a):
The need to strengthen Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) in the WASH sector is
increasingly acknowledged by both Government and development partners []. Moreover,
Government is committed to accurately measure progress towards the achievement of
UAP and MDG targets with regard to WSS [Water Supply and Sanitation] – for better
quality plan and allocation of resources to accelerate progress.
While the first quote reaffirms the linear causality inherent in the single-stranded PM results
chain, the second and third are illustrations of a global effort to measure progress towards
implementing the model. The second quote also documents the difficulties countries currently
face to fulfil aid effectiveness requirements in the water sector. When I speak of this logic
inherent in PM as an ‘established belief’ or a ‘commonly held assumption’ in this thesis, I mean
this in discursive terms as used by Maarten Hajer who refers to “routinised forms of discourse”
(1995: 57) to explain “why a particular understanding of the environmental problem at some
point gains dominance and is seen as authoritative” (Hajer, 1995: 44). In line with Hajer, I
interpret the dominant reference to the single-stranded feed-back loop of PM in policy
documents, sector reviews and among sector actors as the “disciplinary force of discursive
practices” (Hajer, 1995: 57) that makes actors adhere to a particular storyline or narrative. At
88
the same time, in their discursive engagement with the concept of PM, actors can change their
positions, for example, recognising the shortcomings of PM in private conversations, a point I
reflect on in Chapter 5 which sets out my methodology.
In subsequent chapters, I investigate the contradiction between the way PM is commonly
presented – as an objective and linear process to improve performance - and the more messy
reality that emerges from the global and national monitoring of rural water access in Ethiopia.
The central question that guides my investigation is:
What role does performance monitoring play in shaping policy decisions on rural water access
in Ethiopia?
In Chapter 4 I explore the theoretical insights that inform this investigation.
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4 Politics of knowledge production underlying performance
monitoring
Chapter outline
In this chapter, I explain the theoretical insights that inform my investigation of PM. Section 4.1
starts by positioning my analysis within the body of literature that critiques PM primarily from the
perspective of the politics of knowledge production. I then conceptualise PM as one particular form
of ‘social appraisal’, the process by which society informs itself of the implications of alternative
policies. Section 4.2 discusses the notion of framing, which brings the political dynamics in
appraisals to the centre of analysis. I explain how power can be exercised through actors’ framings,
which shape the inputs into knowledge production processes. Section 4.3 discusses the notion of
‘performing monitoring’. Based on the idea that actors’ rationales may differ from officially stated
appraisal objectives, PM becomes an act of stage management by the actors who stage their
performance by promoting their interpretation of the truth. Viewed from this perspective, PM may
end up justifying rather than contributing to the forming of decisions and wider social commitments.
In addition, monitoring results and associated decisions may result from different appraisal
processes of various degrees of formality as well as from ontological aspects. The chapter concludes
in section 4.4, by presenting the research questions informed by the preceding theoretical
discussion.
4.1 Examining the politics of knowledge production
Chapter 3 introduced the linear model of PM; I explained that a central argument for its
increased importance in the public sector was improving accountability of public services for
citizens. The examples I gave of PM introduced into development cooperation showed that, in
reality, its implementation remains piecemeal. Also, various experiences of implementing PM
in the public sector have demonstrated issues such as ‘perverse incentives’ and ‘gaming
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behaviour’ to comply with targets. These examples indicate that PM, implemented in the
public sector, cannot easily be described as either uniquely objective or linear. The discussion
in Chapter 4 focuses on scholars who fundamentally criticise the notion of performance, by
highlighting the politics and power relations inherent in the underlying process of knowledge
production. This critique is my point of departure for the theoretical insights that guide the
analysis of PM in this thesis.
4.1.1 Critiquing performance from the perspective of the politics of knowledge
production
Michael Power, a Professor of Accounting, critiques auditing practice, a branch of performance
related to financial systems and accounting that I outlined in Chapter 3, saying that auditing
“techniques and procedures are perceived to ‘work’ because they have become institutionally
acceptable ways of gathering and processing evidence” (Power, 1997: 87-88). In his view,
performance measurement is not, itself, uniquely objective, but rather represents a set of
routines and practices that have become institutionalised as a standard in the profession of
auditing. Michael Power (1997: 115) also suggests that “performance is a contestable notion”,
a phrase that he uses to refer to the contestation over outputs and outcomes - both seen as
constituting performance. This point emerges clearly in the literature of PM, and in the
realities of monitoring access to water supply, namely the contestation between the MoWR
and the JMP over access to water in Ethiopia, discussed in Chapter 3. In Michael Power’s view,
the contestation over outputs and outcomes shows that what counts as performance is
ultimately a question of political power. Power is embedded in a hierarchy of measures that
characterise performance. This means that auditable performance becomes an end in itself, a
game around defining indicators, with the result that “auditing constructs concepts of
performance in its own image” (Power, 1997: 119). Rather than increasing transparency and
accountability, as suggested by the linear model underlying performance, in Michael Power’s
view, auditing represents a new form of “image management” (Power, 1997: 143).
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Michael Power’s analysis is supported by the work of Theodore M. Porter, a Professor in the
History of Science, who examines statistical thinking. Porter challenges the notion of a
uniquely objective measurement in statistics. According to him, quantification can be seen as a
“technology of distance” (Porter, 1995: ix), by which knowledge is constructed as seemingly
independent of personal judgement. He argues that there is an assumed idea behind
quantification of a “mechanical objectivity” (Porter, 1995: 7). The notion of ‘mechanical
objectivity’ implies that knowledge is based on the application of “sanctioned methods or
perhaps the mythical, unitary ‘scientific method’” which produce “presumably neutral facts”
(Porter, 1995: 7). With his reference to ‘scientific method’, Porter picks up on an assumption
that is firmly embedded in the concept of PM, which I discussed in Chapter 3. The notion of
‘scientific method’, introduced to standardise and maximise the performance of working
procedures to produce goods, reinforces the idea that PM follows a linear model. The appeal
of abstract numbers in that context is that they appear fair and impersonal, which lends them
an air of ‘objectivity’, a point also discussed by Alain Desrosières (1998). Porter relates this
apparent air of ‘objectivity’ suggested by statistical numbers to bureaucratic actors that lack a
clear democratic mandate. I argue that this can be extended to PM in the public (and possibly
private) sector of any country. Quantification helps the bureaucrats because it provides a
subtle way to take decisions. In the words of Porter, the objectivity resulting from
quantification “lends authority to officials” (Porter, 1995: 8). One might add that the notion of
objectivity can serve to justify the decisions that have been taken, for different reasons, a
point I discuss in Section 4.3.
Furthermore, ‘objectivity’ can also be seen as achieving a political character in the process of
social validation. According to Porter, (Porter, 1995: 33), in this process, power is exercised to
validate specific measurements among a range of potentially valid measures that would yield
different solutions. Michael Power argues similarly in his comment that, in auditing, some
measurements become elevated over others. His argument resonates with those of Michel
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Callon and Fabian Muniesa, who highlight that in economic markets, calculations are framed
by the drawing of a boundary between those goods that are taken into consideration and
those that are left out (Callon and Muniesa, 2005: 1235). Donald Mackenzie (2008) makes the
same point in relation to calculations in financial markets. The objectivity inherent in the
specific measurement represents ‘impersonality’, which, in reality, is often “conflated with
objectivity as truth” (Porter, 1995: 74).
The idea of ‘conflating objectivity as truth’ echoes reflections made by Jean-Francois Lyotard
(1996) on the postmodern condition. Lyotard argues that performance maximisation may be
used as a way to legitimise decisions. He holds that, in performance maximisation, truth
becomes replaced by specific methods of performance resulting in what he calls
‘performativity’. Mackenzie (2008), who does not make reference to Lyotard, proposes the
idea of “Barnesian performativity” as a process where economics, by applying economic
models, makes markets change in accordance with these models. Viewed from this angle of
knowledge production, ‘performativity’ is the process of creating an image that then becomes
the reality, an observation that draws on Callon who holds that “economics, in the broad sense
of the term, shapes and formats the economy rather than observing how it functions” (Callon
1998: 2 in: MacKenzie, 2008: 16). In that sense, PM can be interpreted as creating an image of
the world that is compliant with PM parameters.
These knowledge-power dynamics are recognised also in the STEPS Centre’s Working Paper 6:
“Liquid Dynamics: challenges for sustainability in water and sanitation”, which holds that these
dynamics “shape the interventions made into hydrological cycles, their material effects, and
the consequent forms those cycles take. Social processes affecting framing, in this way, can
have real hydrological impacts” (Mehta et al., 2007: 17).
The authors referred to above criticise key issues of the linear model of PM I identified in
Chapter 3: the uniquely objective character of PM represented in a single stranded results
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chain between setting objectives, monitoring results and taking action to keep the particular
project or programme on course towards the expected results. Three points emerge from the
critiques presented above, which guide the development of my framework of analysis:
First, the authors hold that setting performance objectives, while presented as neutral, in fact,
is a political process. Importantly, their critique shows that performance ultimately may
replace truth by defining the objective of appraisal through the appraisal method applied. The
result is that PM creates an image of reality that mirrors a particular point of view. One of my
entry points to investigating the uniquely objective character of PM is to compare different
actors’ framings of access to rural water supply. The preceding chapters have provided some
insights on this – such as the contrast between Meselich’s experience and the neutral access
figure, and the difference between measuring access to a technology designed for domestic
purposes and the dynamic nature of peoples’ water needs depending on their livelihood
practices, patterns of water availability, wealth and other factors.
Second, the above scholars make reference to specific political and power dynamics inherent
in the process of PM. For example, Callon and Muniesa speak of drawing boundaries between
those aspects that are considered in an analysis and those that are left out; Michael Power
refers to the political power dynamics involved in creating a hierarchy of performance
measures; and Porter highlights how a mechanical objectivity emerges from the sanctioning of
methods that lead to seemingly neutral results. This area of criticism points to the need to
examine the political and power dynamics inherent in PM processes, with a particular
attention to the ways in which powerful actors determine methods and other appraisal
parameters to influence PM processes and results. In this thesis, I investigate this topic by
analysing the power dynamics underlying regular reporting processes, and investigating a sub-
process of a scheme inventory.
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Third, the authors draw attention to the legitimising character of PM. Porter argues that the
objectivity of numbers lends authority to bureaucrats. Lyotard and Power highlight how
performance replaces truth, or creates a truth that mirrors a particular viewpoint. In so doing,
performance helps to construct a seeming rationality behind decisions that may have been
taken for other reasons such as privately favoured ends, contextual constraints or other. PM
can help to justify decisions and, thereby, lend legitimacy to the actors involved. An important
source of legitimacy in public sector PM is the apparent accountability it provides for
stakeholders. An entry point to analysing this aspect is a look at the wider social dynamics that
come into play in policy processes, and investigation of the role of PM in that process. In this
thesis, this is accomplished through an examination of budget allocations and strategic
planning for rural water supply at regional and woreda level, and analysis of the factors
underlying the decision to repair a deep well in my case study location.
In the remainder of this chapter, I develop an analytical framework that allows me to
incorporate the above insights into my specific analysis of PM of rural water access in Ethiopia.
4.1.2 Investigating the social dynamics in appraisals
In my investigation of PM, the interest is in an analytical approach that conceptualises PM as a
means of knowledge production. I am interested also in a framework of analysis that
specifically addresses the political and power dynamics involved in appraisal processes. The
STEPS Centre’s approach to ‘social appraisal’ fulfils this role. In their Working Paper 3
“Empowering Designs: towards more progressive appraisal of sustainability” the authors
define ‘social appraisal’ as “the collection of social processes through which knowledges are
gathered and produced in order to inform decision making and wider institutional
commitments” (Stirling et al., 2007: 1).
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As the adjective ‘social’ indicates, the STEPS Centre’s definition of appraisal refers to the
broader social settings in which appraisal processes take place.42 The authors’ use of the
adjective ‘social’ makes reference to the wider systems in which appraisal is embedded, and
the institutional and governance processes that interact with appraisal (Stirling et al., 2007:
ibid). By making social appraisal the subject of analysis, the politics of knowledge production
and use become the centre of analysis. The STEPS Centre’s understanding of social appraisal
allows me to focus my analysis not just on specific appraisal methods but also on the wider
institutional and governance settings that constitute social appraisal. It is in this context that
both specific appraisal methods and their wider context form part of the focus of my analysis.
When examining different appraisal designs, I pay particular attention to how power relations
bear on appraisal exercises. Adrian Smith and Andrew Stirling, two of the authors of the STEPS
Centre’s Working Paper 3, have elaborated their understanding of ‘social appraisal’. Below, I
make use of this more detailed explanation and discuss their understanding of ‘social
appraisal’.
Smith and Stirling (2007) developed a specific understanding related to ‘social appraisal’ as
part of their broader goal to better understand the dynamics of governance in relation with
socio-technological systems. To do so, the authors make a heuristic distinction between
appraisal and commitments (Smith and Stirling, 2007: 352). Social appraisal is about “ways of
understanding” or “ways of knowing” in relation with socio-technical systems, while social
commitment is about “ways of being”, the forming of social choice (Smith and Stirling, 2007:
354). In practice, appraisal and commitments are interlinked; for example, elements along the
policy process such as problem identification, agenda setting, policy implementation and
evaluation are subject to both appraisal and commitments. The authors distinguish analytically
42 An example of a definition of social appraisal, where the adjective ‘social’ as the object of appraisal is
understood according to its definition in social psychology that social appraisal refers to the cognitive
process of individual self-evaluation with regard to social relationships (Scherer et al., 2001, Urda and
Loch, 2005). Another example, from the field of business and finance, defines social appraisal as an
extension of cost-benefit analysis (Pearce and Nash, 1981).
96
between the two to bring “the contrast between managerial and political perspectives” (Smith
and Stirling, 2007: 354) to the centre of attention. This endeavour is also at the heart of my
analysis, namely to draw out the difference between the managerial goals related to PM and
the political realities to which PM is subject.
Commitment relates to the material interests of actors and to the ways they engage in the
reproduction of specific configurations of a socio-technical system. Discursive commitments
among actors facilitate material commitments. There is an interpretative flexibility in
discursive commitments, which allows for different formations of groups of actors. An example
of a discursive commitment is the assertion of a position by a person with political influence.
However, when the same person debates the merits and shortcomings of a socio-technical
system, the authors (Smith and Stirling, 2007: 355) interpret this as epistemic, as a form of
appraisal. Material and discursive commitments are complemented by institutional factors
supporting a particular socio-technical system; these latter factors are seen to bias a system
against radical change. Next, I explain the process of appraisal in more detail.
Appraisal relates to ‘ways of knowing’, the ways in which knowledge is produced through
different practices, approaches and tools. Smith and Stirling (2007: 356) highlight two
distinctions that apply to any type of appraisal: the breadth of inputs, which may be broad or
narrow, and the way in which outputs of social appraisal “‘open up’ or ‘close down’ the
formation of discursive and material commitments in wider governance”. Importantly, the
notion of broad and narrow inputs and opening up and closing down of outputs cuts across all
types of appraisal according to Smith and Stirling. They equally affect expert-analytic types of
appraisals and deliberative-participatory ones.
The breadth of appraisal inputs relates to the extent to which different causal relationships are
considered. Another dimension of breadth is the variety of perspectives, e.g. professional,
disciplinary, or other, which contribute to the production of knowledge. Independent of the
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character of the inputs into appraisal, the outputs of appraisal may serve to open up or close
down specific commitments. Opening up of appraisal results may take on the form of
providing a new perspective on an existing socio-technical system; closing down refers to
appraisal results that suggest a particular course of action (Smith and Stirling, 2007: 357).
Closing down occurs repeatedly in appraisal processes, for example, through the choices of
committee members, of a particular questionnaire, or the choice of a particular data analysis
method. Opening up in the course of appraisal, in contrast, relates to taking in new insights to
inform a given problem, which opens the way to greater reflexivity in governance. Smith and
Stirling’s notion of closing down is consistent with the establishment of boundaries in market
calculation processes, discussed by Callon and Muniesa (2005), and highlighted in Section 4.1.
According to the above description of social appraisal, each step or element in an appraisal
exercise is interlinked with social commitment. For example, a monitoring exercise involves
many steps from setting objectives, choosing a strategy, developing questions, choosing
monitoring agents, implementing the monitoring exercise, analysing the data to presenting
results. In each step, the actors with existing social commitments or material interests, and
who are involved in discursive practices and constrained by existing structures, will imprint
their interpretations and preferences. It is here that framing and power become important in
social appraisal. This is the topic of section 4.2.
Appraisal and commitment are two sides of the same coin, but are separated here for
analytical purposes (Smith and Stirling, 2007: 354). Their separation allows me to analyse them
individually in relation to the object of appraisal, access to rural water supply in Ethiopia. Their
analysis reveals that a number of appraisal exercises can occur in parallel. The formal PM
process, referred to here as PM, which tends to be at the centre of attention, may represent
only the tip of an iceberg of other, less formal, appraisal exercises. In fact, in relation to access
to rural water supply in Ethiopia, less formal appraisal results, institutional factors and material
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conditions may have a stronger influence on social commitment than formal appraisal results.
An indication of this is that the results of the National WASH Inventory, conducted in 2010-11,
were not publicly available at the time of the final writing of this thesis in December 2012, the
long time lag making these results less relevant for strategic planning. I discuss this possibility
further in Section 4.3 below.
As highlighted by Porter, the same phenomenon can be appraised in different ways, with
contrasting results. Throughout an appraisal process, the actors continuously make choices
that impact on the appraisal. This basic observation suggests that social appraisals are subject
to power. Different agents, depending on their relative power positions, are able to influence
appraisals, based on their particular interests and constraints. By so doing, they make social
commitments that have the effect of elevating some appraisal areas. According to Stirling
(2005, 2008), one way that agents exercise power is by framing the inputs into appraisals as
well as their outputs. In Section 4.2 I present and discuss different approaches to framing and
explain the exercise of power through framing in social appraisal.
4.2 Framing and power in social appraisal
The term ‘framing’ is popular in several different areas of the social science literature. While
some authors use the term simply as a metaphor, others elaborate framing as a substantive
concept in order to help to analyse how societies generate meaning (Fisher, 1997). As a means
to interpret the social world, the concept of framing has found an entry into a wide variety of
disciplines including sociology (Goffman, 1974, Snow et al., 1986, Benford and Snow, 2000),
linguistics (Lakoff, 2003), communications (Entman, 1993), political science (Schön and Rein,
1994, Campbell, 1998, Surel, 2000, Saarikoski, 2006), geography (Mansfield and Haas, 2006),
development studies (Fairhead and Leach, 1998), and science and technology studies (Levidow
et al., 1997, Jasanoff, 2005, Millstone, 2007).
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Framing also features prominently in the work of the STEPS Centre, i.e. in the research centre’s
core working papers on governance, systems, and designs (Leach et al., 2007b, Scoones, 2007,
Stirling et al., 2007) and in the working paper outlining STEPS’ water and sanitation domain
(Mehta et al., 2007). Rather than reviewing the diverse contributions among the social
sciences on the concept of framing, I limit my discussion below to what I see as the most
substantial and most widely referenced contribution to framing, the work on framing by Rein
and Schön. I compare their approach to framing with the STEPS Centre’s understanding of the
concept.
4.2.1 Interpretation of framing by Rein and Schön
In the field of Interpretive Policy Analysis, the authors Martin Rein and Donald Schön are well
known for their work on framing as a way to analyse complex policy controversies (1993, 1994,
1996, Rein, 2006). According to Rein and Schön (1996: 89), frames are
strong and generic narratives that guide both analysis and action in practical situations.
Such narratives are diagnostic / prescriptive stories that tell, within a given issue
terrain, what needs fixing and how it might be fixed. ... These generic story lines give
coherence to the analysis of issues in a policy domain, often through reliance on a
unifying metaphor which enables the frame holder to make a graceful normative leap
from is to ought.
In their definition, Rein and Schön conceptualise framing as a story line, which suggests the
discursive and dynamic nature of framing. In that perspective, individuals can adopt different
frames depending on the context in which they find themselves, and depending on the
particular interests and constraints they experience in that situation. The notion that
individuals can hold different framings emerges in my findings on actors’ framing of access to
rural water supply.
The above definition suggests also that framing, as a narrative, establishes a specific cause-
effect relationship among different possible explanations of cause and effect. Rein and Schön
hold that framing is a normative act, allowing individual or institutional frame holders to
employ ‘generic’ and ‘unifying’ metaphors to imply a particular cause of action. In their book,
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Schön and Rein (1994) give the example of two different portrayals of urban housing in Boston.
One story presents the complex problems related to urban housing as a cycle of decay and
disease that is in the need of renewal; the alternative story is of urban housing as constituted
by social interaction and informal networks of natural communities that need to be preserved
(Schön and Rein, 1994: 24-27). The authors’ interpretation of a storyline as a framing that
establishes a particular cause-effect relation draws attention to the possibility that PM is not a
neutral, linear process of relating causes to effects. Instead, this process can be seen as
mediated by actors’ framings as exhibited in Schön and Rein’s urban housing example.
Furthermore, Schön and Rein distinguish between rhetorical and action frames. Rhetorical
frames are frames that are used in policy debates to persuade groups of people or justify
actions, while action frames inform policy practice (Schön and Rein, 1994: 32). Action frames
may be in line with or may contradict the rhetorical frames. While Schön and Rein identify only
one type of rhetorical frame, they differentiate between three different levels of action frames:
policy frames, institutional action frames, and meta-cultural frames.43 In their distinction
between rhetorical and action frames, they draw attention to the fact that actors use
rhetorical framings as self-justification, and that their action frames may contradict their
rhetorical frames. The authors exemplify this dynamic with the rhetorical frame of the ‘safety
net’ that dominated discussions of welfare policy in the Reagan and Bush administrations.
They hold that the rhetorical frame of the ‘safety net’ was contradicted by practical changes
mainly aimed at excluding ‘welfare cheaters’. Schön and Rein’s observation that frames may
be used to justify commitments, such as decisions or actions, resonates with the critique on
performance presented above. According to Porter, abstract numbers can be seen as a way of
43 A policy frame is “the frame an institutional actor uses to construct the problem of a specific policy
situation” (Schön and Rein, 1994: 33). In comparison, institutional action frames are more generic
according to Schön and Rein. They are the frames held by an institution, and from which institutional
actors derive more specific policy frames. According to Schön and Rein (1994: 33), institutional action
frames are “complex and hybrid in nature” because they see them as an amalgamation of overlapping
frames held by different individuals in an institution such as the Boston Redevelopment Authority.
Meta-cultural frames are much more general, namely “broad, culturally shared systems of belief” and
they cut across rhetorical and action frames (Schön and Rein, 1994: 33-34).
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making a decision without seeming to do so. This ends up legitimising bureaucrats. I discuss
decision justification in more detail in Section 4.3.
An issue that arises from Schön and Rein’s approach to frame analysis is related to their focus
on a retrospective study of texts emanating from speeches, debates, laws, regulations and
routines (Schön and Rein, 1994: 34). This focus allows the authors only to study dominant
framings that have been documented in one of the above ways. Subordinate framings, which
have not been documented, may be lost, and controversies over framings may never be
detected as long as the framing only of the hegemonic actor is documented. This is an
important omission in studies of the exercise of power through framing. Below, I discuss the
STEPS Centre’s interpretation of framing, specifically how the exercise of power through
framing in social appraisal is explained.
4.2.2 STEPS interpretation of framing
Stirling (2005, 2008) and Stirling, Leach et al. (2007) discuss framing in the context of their
understanding of ‘social appraisal’, which I introduced in Section 4.1.2. If appraisals are
conceptualised as encompassing any situation that involves a process of evaluation, whether
formal or informal, social appraisal becomes a very widely applicable concept. It can be
understood also to include the situations of policy controversies discussed by Rein and Schön,
because it involves processes of knowledge production and use. According to Stirling, Leach et
al. (2007: 16) framing
refers to the particular contextual assumptions, methodological variables, procedural
attributes or interpretative issues that different groups might bring to a problem,
shaping how it is bounded and constituted, and the relative salience of different
factors. Framing effects together condition the ways in which even the most finely
specified method is implemented in practice, and strongly influence the patterning of
results.
The STEPS Centre’s definition of framing is consistent with Rein and Schön’s definition of
prescriptive story lines that tell about what needs fixing and how it might be fixed. The STEPS
Centre refers to this as the act of ‘bounding’ and ‘shaping’ a problem, and giving more weight
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to some factors in preference to others in this process. In comparison to Rein and Schön, who
focus on ‘generic’ and ‘unifying metaphors’ in the action of framing, the STEPS definition
emphasises method. Although method and metaphor might at first sight appear rather
different features, I argue that they have some commonalities. Rein and Schön argue that
metaphors function to support a particular story line; they express the essence of the story, for
example, describing a crisis in urban housing as a disease. Stirling et al.’s reference to methods
also fulfils the function of telling a story in a particular way, based on the method used to
appraise a particular problem. Methods, therefore, can be seen as constitutive of a story.
The constitutive effect of methods is inherent Stirling et al.’s definition of framing, which
distinguishes three aspects: framing of the problem; framing of the appraisal; and framing of
the appraisal results. In theory, therefore, the method might inform the framing of the
problem, rather than vice versa. This suggests a circularity between the framing of the problem
and its assessment. In order to define a problem people measure it. Framing can be
constituted by methods and, at the same time, be used to justify those methods. This
understanding of framing in social appraisal allows me to analyse the process of PM as a form
of ‘image management’ put forward for auditing by Michael Power.
Unlike Rein and Schön, Stirling and his colleagues do not distinguish between different types
and levels of framing. Instead, they distinguish between different aspects of framing directed
at the problem or object of appraisal, the inputs into appraisal and appraisal outputs, as
presented in Section 4.1. This returns me to Smith and Stirling’s earlier discussion on social
appraisal and to the exercise of power through framing in this context.
4.2.3 The exercise of power through framing in social appraisal
The concept of power has been studied by many scholars, all of whom draw attention to the
different ways in which power is exercised. Power can be exercised directly, for example in a
Machiavellian sense through coercion and force (Nederman, 2005), or in the sense of Max
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Weber, by enacting authority through domination (Gingrich, 1999), or as viewed by Robert
Dahl (1957: 203) in relation to the political democratic system - that A “can get B to do
something that B would not otherwise do”. Others conceptualise the exercise of power in a
more indirect and distributed form in society. For example, Stephen Lukes highlights that the
exercise of power can also be invisible, inherent in non-decisions, or even in the shaping of
peoples’ preferences (Lukes, 1974). Antonio Gramsci’s contribution relates to an
understanding that power is exercised not only through coercion but also indirectly through
hegemony, namely by forging passive consent among those who are ruled (Femia, 1981), while
Michel Foucault’s work highlights the exercise of power through knowledge inherent in
dominant discourses (Gutting, 2012). Foucault’s conceptualisation of knowledge and power is
central to the STEPS Centre’s work (Leach et al., 2007a) and also informs the Centre’s
understanding of exercise of power through framing.
In appraisal exercises, power may be exerted deliberately and openly, or indirectly, and it can
lead to intended or unintended consequences. For example, a powerful actor can exercise
power within an appraisal exercise with the normative intention to empower marginalised
voices. Depending on the interests of the individuals involved in, or affected by, the appraisal,
including the actor looking on, the use of power by this powerful actor may be seen as good or
bad. The role of power in appraisal, therefore, cannot be seen as inherently positive or
negative or unidirectional, but it is important to acknowledge that power necessarily plays a
role in appraisals (Stirling, 2008: 274). In concrete instances, however, power works in a
specific way, benefitting some and disadvantaging others.
One way in which actors can employ power is through framing, and this is possible in any part
of an appraisal exercise. Framing has a bearing on the inputs into any form of appraisal
exercise whether participatory or expert-analytic in nature. Framing occurs in the design,
implementation and analysis of appraisal through, for instance, choosing the methods for its
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design, the way the enquiries are carried out, or by selecting among the data collected in the
analysis. Independent of the framing of inputs, framing also influences the outputs of
appraisals, which often are regarded as no longer part of the appraisal exercise: for example,
the prioritising of research agendas in an organisation, or the prioritisation of research results
that are communicated to a wider audience (Stirling, 2008: 275).
In this conceptualisation, power is always situated. There is no one actor whose framing is
dominant in all situations; it is dependent on the particular context. For example, the MoWR is
able to exercise its power by framing the official calculation of access to water supply within
the sector, but this power diminishes at the international level. Also, subordinate actors have
agency. There may be situations where they are able to put forward their alternative
interpretation of access to rural water, as I show in Chapter 7 where I investigate appraisal
dynamics.
Stirling (2008: 275) notes also that the exercise of power via framing is often tacit, or may even
be intentionally covert and, therefore, may not be recognised. For example, participatory
appraisals are generally regarded as a good thing from a democratic point of view, even
though they can end up as a rubber-stamping instead of an expression of the views of
marginalised people (see, for instance, Mosse, 2004). This indirect exercise of power is central
to the aspect of social commitment in appraisals. It is here that actors, based on their
rationales, can shape appraisal exercises and their results, to conform to their preferences
rather than the formal objective of the appraisal. In Section 4.3, I explain these dynamics in
more detail. In particular, I elaborate the idea of decision justification and ‘performativity’ to
explain what I the title of this thesis refers to: the difference between ‘monitoring
performance’ and ‘performing monitoring’. I discuss intentionality in social appraisal, which,
importantly, may be different from the official appraisal objective, and which is key to
answering my main research question: what role does performance monitoring play in shaping
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decisions on rural water access in Ethiopia? Beforehand, I briefly discuss different views of the
policy making model that PM is subject to. This literature is useful because it assists me in
exploring in more detail various factors that explain why the rational, linear view of PM
prevails despite the overwhelming evidence of its limitations discussed in Chapter 3.
4.3 Monitoring performance or performing monitoring?
4.3.1 The rational versus the incrementalist perspective on policy
Policy analysts invoke different policy models to interpret political processes (Jenkins, 1978).
Two prominent views on the policy making model are the rational and the incrementalist
perspective (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984, Hill, 1993, Hill, 1997). The rational model of decision
making, first put forward by Herbert A. Simon, takes on an “idealised” (Hill, 1997: 101) view of
the policy process. This view assumes decisions are taken based on a number of rational steps
where different options are weighed up. The incrementalist view criticises this model and
holds that, in reality, decision making in public administrations follows the model of “muddling
through” (Lindblom, 1959). According to the incrementalist view, decisions are the result of a
continuous adjustment based on the accommodation between different interests (Hill, 1997:
103). Some authors have sought to accommodate the two positions by distinguishing between
fundamental and incremental decisions (Hill, 1997). Others have characterised the debate
between the rational and incrementalist model as “artificial” (Smith and May, 1998: 172)
because it confuses the relationship between realist and normative frameworks of analysis.
The RBM model and PM in relation to aid effectiveness I discussed in Chapter 3, follow the
rational policy model. In this thesis, I critically examine the role of this model in taking policy
decisions on rural water access. As part of this, I bring together a range of factors identified in
the literature on the politics of the policy process, which help to explain the continued
dominance of the rational policy model.
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4.3.2 Why the rational policy model continues to prevail in policy discourse
In their examination of the policy cycle, many authors who share an incrementalist perspective
make reference to the political dynamics inherent in this process. Individual contributions
highlight a range of factors that bear on the policy process. These different perspectives,
discussed here below, help to identify different reasons why the rational, linear view of PM
continues to persist in policy practice cycles as demonstrated in Chapter 3.
Merilee Grindle and John Thomas (1991) highlight how the political economy, namely the
values, perceptions and experiences of policy elites together with the specific historic,
institutional and political context, determine what they call a relative ‘policy space’ for reform.
Specifically, they highlight the importance of perceptions of crisis that provide windows of
opportunity to successfully implement a reform effort. The economist Paul David (1985), and
others, show that economic changes do not occur solely through rational choice, but are
influenced also by phenomena, such as ‘path dependency’, that can lock practices into a
particular path.
Other authors mobilise the nexus between knowledge and power to explain policy change.
James Keeley and Ian Scoones (2003c: 39) explore different analytical lenses that bring a
continuous “interplay of discourse, political interests and the agency of multiple actors” to the
foreground of analysis. The authors also explicitly note the inertia of some policy processes. In
their study of knowledge, power and politics of environmental policy making in Ethiopia, they
find that, in some instances, even when criticised, certain ways of working continue to ‘stick’
because of specific formations of actor network coalitions and circumstances. (Keeley and
Scoones, 2000, 2003a).
Maarten Hajer (1995), in his argumentative approach, highlights the “constitutive role of
discourse in political processes” (Hajer, 1995: 58) in which storylines “provide actors with a set
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of symbolic references that support a common understanding” (1995: 62) used as political
devices to achieve discursive closure.
The persistence of the rational policy model, here the rational, linear view of PM, can thus be
explained by a combination of factors. These include its embeddedness in particular
institutional structures, bureaucracies and actor network groups around the aid effectiveness
agenda in development cooperation; another factor relates to path dependency in the way
that the rational model has become part of people’s everyday practices around the project
implementation and monitoring cycle of delivering rural water supply infrastructure that
becomes perpetuated and reinforced over time; a further explanation is that the rational
policy model of PM suits dominant political interests in donor-recipient policy circles in that it
provides a coherent storyline of bureaucratic accountability, averting blame and attributing
responsibility among actors. These and other factors will become apparent in the three
empirical chapters of my thesis.
Many authors who criticise the rational perspective on policy point out the dilemma that
actors who are locked into policy processes need to be seen as acting rationally and as solving
problems (Hill, 1997). As a result, the rational policy making model is used “as gloss for a range
of practices” (Smith and May, 1998: 172) and in order to legitimise and mobilise political
support (Mosse et al., 1998, Mosse, 2004). In other words, it may serve to justify decisions
(Collingridge, 1980, Stirling, 2008), as expressed in the STEPS Centre’s approach to social
appraisal. An example for this in RBM is the symbolic value of management control systems
that reassure a concerned public that government employees are accountable even though
this might not be the case (Lipsky, 1980: 164). Next, I elaborate further on actors’ rationales in
social appraisal processes and how these may lead actors to justify decisions in line with the
rational policy model.
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4.3.3 Rationales in social appraisal
In discussing participation in social appraisal, Stirling, building on Fiorino (1989; in: Stirling,
2008) differentiates between normative, substantive and instrumental rationales. The
normative rationale emphasises normatively democratic aspects related to the design of
appraisal processes. Participatory appraisals, for instance, intend to bring the voices of
marginalised people to the centre of analysis. The substantive rationale refers to a situation
where the intention is to “achieve better ends” (Stirling, 2008: 268), for instance, to better
understand the particular phenomenon in question. Finally, the instrumental rationale “aims
to secure particular ends” (Stirling, 2008: 269). With reference to David Collingridge (1980,
1982, 1983) Stirling highlights that an instrumental rationale may bear on appraisals through
weak or strong justification. Weak justifications allow the actors to choose a particular form of
appraisal, for example, a participatory one, not to foster any particular outcome, but simply to
avoid blame in the case that the desired outcome is seen as problematic. In talking of strong
justification, Stirling (2008: 276) refers to a situation where dominant interests seek to enact
favoured social commitments by framing appraisals to justify a very particular decision
outcome. For example, an actor may choose narrow parameters to monitor access to water
supply in order to yield a positive picture of policy.
4.3.4 Decision justification
The idea of decision justification is crucial in this thesis, and I use it to illuminate my argument
that PM may not represent a uniquely objective and linear process. I, therefore, explain in a bit
more depth what lies behind this idea, which is based on the writings of David Collingridge
(1980, 1982, 1983). In these early 1980 works, Collingridge critiques what he called the
‘justificationist’ model of decision making, and develops a new theory of social choice.
According to Collingridge (1982: 4), the standard view of decisions as being rational, namely
that they can be justified based on a rational choice from among all available options, is flawed.
His criticism is directed at decision theories in welfare economics, and Bayesian decision
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theory. His overall point is that decision theory does not describe how decisions are taken in
reality, but, instead, is based on textbook models displaying how they ought to be taken
(Collingridge, 1982: 3). Collingridge (1982: 3-4) challenges the models put forward in welfare
economics and Bayesian decision theory for their inherent inconsistencies and their narrow
scope among all possible types of decision problems. According to Collingridge (1980: 25),
many decisions need to be made under conditions of risk, uncertainty and ignorance and, in
such situations, there is not sufficient information available to apply models of welfare
economics, and their extension in Bayesian decision theory. Despite the problems related to
the rational model, the decision maker still is faced with the need to justify the choices made
in accordance with it (Collingridge, 1983: 3).
Collingridge’s critique of Bayesian decision theory is highly relevant for the rational policy
model underlying PM. From Collingridge’s observation that decisions are made under
conditions of risk, uncertainty and ignorance it follows that PM, conventionally perceived as a
rational and linear process, is also subject to such conditions. For instance, insufficient
information on groundwater tables may force actors to take decisions between different types
of water infrastructure under conditions of uncertainty.
4.3.5 ‘Performativity’ and ‘performing monitoring’
The focus on the exercise of power through framings, and on different kinds of rationales on
the part of the associated social actors, opens up a new perspective on PM. Viewed in this light,
knowledge production in the linear fashion commonly envisaged in PM, is to a significant
extent ‘socially constructed’. In reality, then, PM can be seen not as the conventionally
asserted uniquely rational appraisal of performance. Instead, PM is more about ‘performativity’
– the management of certain politically necessary performances played out on a theatre stage
as described by Stephen Hilgartner for the case of science advisory committees (Hilgartner,
2000). Viewed from the perspective of ‘performativity’, truth is replaced by performance.
Actors are staging performance by putting forward their interpretation of the truth as
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informed by their rationales. In such situations, formal processes of appraisal may serve more
to ‘justify’ prior social commitments in instrumental political terms, than actually to help form
them in substantive terms. The monitoring of performance turns into ‘performing monitoring’
as indicated by the title of this thesis.
This alternative perspective on appraisal processes throws a new light on a key argument for
public sector PM: the stated need to increase accountability to citizens. From the perspective
of performativity, bureaucrats under pressure to demonstrate performance, manipulate PM to
create and uphold seeming accountability to the public.
Importantly, a number of different appraisal processes, of various degrees of formality,
typically proceed in parallel and relate to each other in complex ways. Not all of them
necessarily conform to the same patterns in the forming or justifying of social commitments.
Among these parallel appraisal processes, PM is the tip of the iceberg: the most codified and
therefore visible appraisal process, and the less visible inputs into appraisals and social
commitments, which lie below the waterline, include, for instance, ‘tacit knowledge’ (Nonaka
and Takeuchi, 1995).
Furthermore, social appraisal can be understood as a process of ‘muddling through’ – rather
than comprehensive rational procedures for evaluating policy options (Lindblom, 1959). Here,
a number of factors other than PM can be seen to affect the forming of social commitment.
These wider considerations illuminate the possibility that the outcomes of appraisal and
associated decisions may be the result of contingent forms of ‘path dependency’, involving
contextual detail, material conditions, windows of opportunity, and so on, as in the critiques of
the rational policy model discussed above. The dynamics of appraisal addressed here are just
one factor in play.
This suggests that PM, rather than representing a uniquely objective process, may, in fact, be
subjective and be subject to power. If PM, representing one particular form of appraisal, is not
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objective, but subject to constant manipulation, then it may, in some cases, end up justifying
rather than forming decisions and wider social commitment.
In summary, the insights from the STEPS Centre’s understanding of social appraisal allow a
breakdown of the knowledge production process into its knowledge component (appraisal)
and wider social component (commitment). The notion of framing brings the political
dynamics of knowledge production to the fore. Power can be exercised directly or in indirect
forms, through actors’ framings, that shape inputs into knowledge production processes.
Framing, as discussed by Rein and Schön, explains a process in which the actors, by employing
unifying metaphors to create a story line, establish a particular cause-effect relationship.
Stirling, Leach et al., who discuss framing in the context of social appraisal, draw attention to
the notion that appraisal inputs, such as specific methods or indicators, can be seen also as
constructing a particular story line. Furthermore, Stirling, (building on Fiorino) highlights that
actors’ rationales can be different from an officially stated appraisal goal. An actor may have
an instrumental rationale to achieve a particular appraisal result and manipulate knowledge
production processes accordingly. This manipulation allows actors to justify decisions.
My contribution to this theoretical discussion has been to elaborate this dynamic in the
context of performance. I draw attention to the notion of ‘performativity’, the management of
certain politically necessary performances played out on a theatre stage. Furthermore, I
elaborate the STEPS Centre’s understanding of social appraisal through the insight that
appraisal results and associated decisions may result from different appraisal processes of
various degrees of formality as well as from other ontological aspects. In the final section of
this chapter, I present the research questions that guide my analysis of PM of rural water
supply in Ethiopia.
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4.4 Research questions
My main research question springs from my interest in a critical examination of the established
belief that ‘monitoring performance’ in the public sector is a rational and linear process that
increases accountability to citizens. In line with this interest, my main research question is:
1) What role does performance monitoring play in shaping policy decisions on rural water
access in Ethiopia?
I investigate the linear model of PM from three different angles. The first consists of a cross-
examination of the underlying assumption that the definition of access to rural water
adequately represents the different notions of access as relevant to the affected actors
themselves in Ethiopia. My first sub- question is:
a) What are the specific ways in which key actors (those affected and those implementing) at
different levels (individual, kebele, woreda, zone, region, federal and international) frame
access to rural water?
In addressing research sub-question (a), I aim to capture the diversity of subjective notions of
‘access’ and to establish how these are represented in the definitions used in formal PM
exercises. I propose that this will allow me to question the rational character of the definitions
and indicators used to measure ‘access’ to rural water supply in Ethiopia.
The second angle relates to monitoring practices. My intention here is to test whether
monitoring processes in reality conform to the linearity assumed by the feed-back function of
PM expressed in the results chain of the RBM (Results-based Management) model outlined in
Chapter 3. Research sub-question (b) therefore concerns the social dynamics involved in PM
practices:
b) Which actors’ framings are represented in monitoring exercises and results concerning
rural water access?
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Rather than investigating all possible aspects related to the social dynamics observable in
appraisal procedures taken as a whole, research sub-question (b) emphasises the particular
dynamics related to framings and their underlying rationales. My interest is to investigate the
power dynamics in these specific processes that bring the framings of some actors to the fore
while suppressing others.
The third angle of investigation is concerned with the conventional assumption of the RBM
model that there is an essentially linear determining relation between PM and associated
decisions. In order to test the validity of this assumption in the case of monitoring the
performance of rural water access in Ethiopia I ask:
c) What is the explanatory power of PM in decisions taken on rural water access?
This sub-question addresses my interest in the causes shaping specific decisions on rural water
access, and the mechanisms that led to these as opposed to alternative decisions. I am
interested, in particular, in whether the role of PM is a necessary, a sufficient or merely a
contributing factor to test the frequently assumed linear relationship between monitoring
results and the decisions prompted by the RBM model. Chapter 5 presents the methodological
approach I take to answer these questions.
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5 Methodology
Chapter outline
My methodology is based on a qualitative research design and a case study approach using
process tracing as the method of data analysis, and a combination of semi-structured
interviews, group discussions, participant observations and document review as data collection
methods. Chapter 5 presents the research design and takes the reader on the journey from
formulation of the research questions to my findings, mainly related to the period of my
fieldwork in October 2009 to October 2010. Section 5.1 outlines the motivation for my research
and the overall research design. Section 5.2 describes the start of my fieldwork, which was a
phase of exploration during which I decided about the type of case study and the specific
research sites. Section 5.3 discusses the choice of data collection methods and the issues I
encountered when gathering the data including those related to my position of researcher, and
ethical considerations. Section 5.4 describes the data analysis process and how this led to the
eventual case study focus.
5.1 Motivation and overall research design
Prior to starting my DPhil studies, I had worked and lived in Ethiopia. I first visited Ethiopia in
2006, as part of a five-year research programme consortium on water supply and sanitation -
‘Research inspired Policy and Practice Learning in Ethiopia and the Nile Region’ (RiPPLE),
funded by DFID. From April to November 2007, I was seconded from RiPPLE to work for an
Ethiopian government agency, the Amhara Regional Health Bureau. During my secondment, I
supported the regional sector agency to develop a framework to monitor uptake of sanitation
and hygiene behaviour across the Amhara Region, in line with a new federal guideline
developed by the Ministry of Health. While we – that is, a local representative of the WB’s
Water and Sanitation Programme (WSP) and I – worked directly with the regional Bureau of
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Health on monitoring sanitation and hygiene behaviour, other donors and NGOs implementing
water supply, sanitation and hygiene activities relied on their own approaches and personnel
to monitor their interventions. Although WSP was given the task of implementing a new
federal approach, we worked largely in isolation from federal level sector monitoring reform
processes to develop a unified WASH monitoring system. My interest in and motivation for
investigating PM originated in this experience. I was startled by the number of parallel
monitoring initiatives being conducted, and intrigued about to what extent the results of these
parallel efforts would be exploited. I was doubtful about whether, in reality, policy processes
corresponded to the linear model of PM discussed in Chapter 3, linking monitoring results to
decisions under RBM. My interest, therefore, was to approach monitoring not from the main
evaluation and RBM literature, but from a fresh perspective that understands monitoring not
just as a specific, rule-bound exercise but also as a wider social process.
5.1.1 Research design: a case study approach to trace processes
The nature of the investigation in this thesis is to capture different perspectives on the
phenomenon of ‘access to rural water supply’, and to understand the factors that affect
monitoring processes and decisions related to this phenomenon in the context of Ethiopia.
Andrew Van de Ven (2007: 145) and Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman (2006: 457-8) distinguish
between two basic research models in the social sciences: variance models, which examine
“effects of causes” and process models, which investigate the “causes of effects”. My research
model is process-oriented; it examines the ‘causes of effects’, namely the mechanisms that
caused an event to happen, in my case monitoring results and decisions on rural water access.
I chose a case study research design to study a specific phenomenon in depth. I understand
the term ‘case study’ as describing an intensive and detailed research design situated in a
particular context (Ritchie et al., 2003: 52).
According to Bennett and Elman (2006: 456), recent developments in case study research
focus on “causal mechanisms as the basis of explanation” and see process tracing as “a key
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form of within-case analysis that is now on an equal basis with the method of cross-case
comparison”. Cross-case comparison, a method drawing comparisons between different cases,
was favoured in the early literature on qualitative methods. Tracing processes is at the heart of
my investigation not only because it is a novel data analysis method in qualitative research but
also and mainly because it is in line with the approach to data analysis that I followed
intuitively in many previous research undertakings. When I discovered the methodological
literature on process tracing, I saw it as an opportunity to refine a method I was familiar with,
and which, at the same time, would be well suited to addressing the research questions. Since
process tracing determined my data collection methods and process, I explain this case study
method in more detail and my particular application of it.
5.1.2 Process tracing as a research methodology
According to a review by Tulia Falleti (2006) on methodological work on process tracing, it is a
method that has been used for several decades, and across various disciplines, to link historic
narratives with theoretical explanations. In the field of political sciences, several contributions
by George and Bennett establish process tracing as a method to examine social phenomena
(George, 1979, Bennett and George, 1997, 2005b, Bennett and Elman, 2006).
According to Bennett and George (2005a: 206-7), the process tracing method
attempts to identify the intervening causal processes – the causal chain and causal
mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the
dependent variable. ... [P]rocess tracing forces the investigator … to consider the
alternative paths through which the outcome could have occurred, and it offers the
possibility of mapping out one or more potential causal paths that are consistent with
the outcome and the process-tracing evidence.
In practice, tracing a process means tracing the micro-steps and links that lead to a specific
outcome by establishing a continuous cause-effect chain (Bennett and George, 2005b: 206). To
illustrate the task of the researcher, Bennett and George use a metaphor originally invoked by
Michael Scriven: the researcher works like a detective who looks for alternative signatures that
may have caused an event to happen (Bennett and George, 2005b: 217). It is important to
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note that, in reality, more than one mechanism causes an event, thereby creating several
causal paths or multi-causality. Multi-causality rests on an understanding that social
phenomena occur in “open systems” where several mechanisms combine to produce an
outcome (Danermark et al., 1997: 66, 206). Social science theory helps the researcher to
identify particular “causal pathways” among manifold potential factors that may have caused a
particular event (Little, 1995: 54). In theory-derived hypotheses of causality, for instance,
social scientists test alternative causal explanations for why a particular event happened. It is
important to note the assumption of multi-causality underlying the social science method of
process tracing in comparison to the commonly held assumption, put forward in Chapter 3,
that policy processes, including PM, ought to follow a linear cause-effect or results chain.
In their chapter ‘Process tracing and historical explanation’ Bennett and George (2005b)
provide their most in-depth exploration of the method, identifying various ways in which
process tracing can be applied. In my thesis, I use process tracing guided by theory, and apply
it to test the explanatory power of a specific mechanism. Through theory-guided process
tracing, the researcher can verify the predictions of different theories by testing and
eliminating alternative, theory-derived, causal processes that may have generated the
outcome in question (Bennett and George, 2005b: 218). This is achieved in this thesis, when I
study the factors affecting monitoring processes and results. Here, I use the STEPS Centre’s
approach to studying ‘social appraisal’ with an emphasis on the exercise of power through
framings, as an analytical framework to guide my explanation of these processes. Process
tracing features strongly in Chapter 7 where I analyse the political and power dynamics
inherent in government monitoring of rural water supply at regional and district level.
I use process tracing also to assess the explanatory power of an assumed causal explanation.44
In this application, process-tracing allows me to test the causal power of an explanation as
44 George and Bennett use the term ‘independent variable’ rather than ‘causal explanation’.
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being “necessary or sufficient for an outcome” (Bennett and George, 2005b: 220), and to
uncover previously omitted explanations of a social phenomenon. I interpret a necessary cause
to mean factors that are essential for the phenomenon of interest to arise (i.e. they are always
present), but which may require other factors. A sufficient cause refers to the imperative
presence of a particular factor, and the lack of necessity for other factors, for the phenomenon
to arise (Little, 1995: 32). A contributory cause includes those factors whose presence may
influence the emergence of the phenomenon of interest, but which are not necessary. I do not
interpret ‘necessary’ and ‘sufficient’ causes in a deterministic fashion, but rather, in line with
the understanding that social science phenomena are characterised by ‘open systems’, I
interpret them as probabilistic (Little, 1995) or in terms of exhibiting a tendency (Danermark et
al., 1997: 203). In this thesis, I use process tracing to test the hypothesis inherent in the RBM
model which links PM in a linear fashion to decisions related to rural water access. An
alternative explanation is that PM is merely a contributory factor in these decisions. I explore
this by tracing the relation between monitoring results and decisions related to rural water
supply at regional, woreda and individual water supply scheme level, in Chapter 8.
5.1.3 Limitations of process tracing
There are some constraints that may weaken the explanatory power of process tracing. First,
process tracing requires a significant amount of data to support all the steps in a causal
process (Checkel, 2005: 18). Therefore, if the data are insufficient to trace an uninterrupted
cause effect chain, this may weaken the explanatory power of the method (Bennett and
George, 1997: 12). I address this in the present research by focusing on a few phenomena that
I studied in depth, and by relying on a combination of data collection methods, that is semi-
structured interviews, participant observation and document review, to triangulate my
findings, as I explain further in Section 5.2.
Second, researcher bias can cause alternative causal paths that may also explain a specific
outcome to be disregarded because of a bias towards the preferred hypothesis (Bennett and
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George, 2005b). I would agree that the ‘mechanisms’ I uncover are likely not to be exhaustive.
However, I do not see this as a problem because a key aim is to test the hypothesis that PM
provides a uniquely rational basis for decisions. I expect that my alternative explanation based
on the STEPS Centre’s approach to the study of ‘social appraisal’ is likely to be enriched rather
than weakened by additional, alternative causal mechanisms. This is in line with a view of
social reality as ‘multi-causal’, proposed above. Notwithstanding this, my analysis is
strengthened by its investigation of causal linkages at the micro, meso and macro levels. In the
case of my thesis this would, for example, suggest investigating factors affecting decisions on
access to rural water from the perspectives of the individual household, the scheme, the local
government and the region. Another way in which I strengthen my analysis is that I study the
phenomenon of PM of rural water supply from different angles. For example, I analyse the
uniquely rational basis of PM by investigating the power dynamics inherent in the monitoring
process, as well as studying the factors leading to water access decisions and, among those,
the explanatory power of PM.
5.2 Field work phase I – determining my case study
5.2.1 Orienting myself in Ethiopia
When I arrived in Ethiopia in October 2009, for my fieldwork, I was very fortunate to become
affiliated to the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) as a visiting research
student. In granting me this affiliation and writing the crucial ‘Letter of Recommendation’, Dr
Seleshi Bekele, the then Director of the Institute opened doors for me which allowed me to
conduct my fieldwork in the country. IWMI provided me with office space, which gave me the
opportunity to meet other doctoral students and researchers working on water issues in
Ethiopia.
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In the first phase of my fieldwork, October to December 2009, I was based in Addis Ababa, the
capital of Ethiopia. In this period, I took an intensive course in Amharic, the official working
language of Ethiopia, to allow me to engage in basic conversation and get by in Ethiopia on a
daily basis. These basic Amharic language skills turned out to be very helpful in interview
situations and during my field observations. My efforts to introduce myself in Amharic often
broke the ice in the initial interview stage. At woreda level and below, I worked mainly through
an interpreter, but my basic knowledge of the language allowed me to understand the gist of
what my interviewees were talking about, and whether my translator was skipping any of the
detail they provided.
While in Addis Ababa, I made regular visits to former colleagues at the RiPPLE project office,
who were in shared office space with the NGO WaterAid and several water related initiatives
and organisations. These visits allowed me to catch up on news on sector events, and several
former colleagues facilitated contacts with the main NGOs and donor organisations working on
rural water supply. Another crucial contact was a young British economist seconded to the
MoWR, to support the establishment of a WASH monitoring system. I had many conversations
with this economist, who became a good friend during the course of the year. We discussed
the latest steps related to WASH monitoring within the Ministry and, through our
conversations, I gained insights into the dynamics underlying this process at federal level.
Case study site selection
Selection of my case study site evolved over the period of several months. Since my research
design was qualitative, sample selection was purposive and based on a number of explicit
criteria (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 78).
My original idea had been to compare the practices of monitoring rural water supply, of
different organisations, that is, NGOs, donors and the Ethiopian government. I wanted to
explore the diversity of their approaches and examine those organisations with the most
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diverse approaches in more depth. I was interested to know whether greater breadth in the
inputs into appraisal, discussed in Chapter 4, affected monitoring results, and also was
interested in the relation between monitoring and the decisions taken. In my original research
design, therefore, a case represented an organisation, not a geographical or administrative
area in Ethiopia. A key criterion for an organisation’s selection was obtaining a diverse sample
of monitoring approaches. To gain an overview of these, during the first three months of my
fieldwork, I conducted interviews with 13 NGOs and 6 bilateral and multilateral donor
organisations.
At the same time, I wanted to compare monitoring practices in a particular local setting where
I planned also to investigate different notions of access to rural water; thus, specific rural
locations in Ethiopia had to be selected as fieldwork sites. I had a number of criteria for a case
study site. First, in line with the criterion of diversity of monitoring approaches, I was
interested in locations where different types of donors and NGOs were active, in order to
facilitate comparison among their approaches. In addition, I assumed that a site where several
organisations had water supply interventions would provide a potentially rich set of
monitoring practices and decisions to investigate. I also wanted a location that encompassed
several agro-ecological zones and with different types of water supply infrastructure
constructed over an extended period of time to capture different types of water supply
interventions. I was interested in a location with relatively high numbers and low turn-over of
water sector staff to ensure there would be a sufficient number of monitoring practices to
trace and there would be good availability of interviewees among people who had been
engaged in these processes.
The literature on case study methods suggests four broad types of cases that can serve as
criteria for purposive selection of a sample (see Figure 5.2). Many of the criteria described
above are characteristics of an ‘extreme’ case - type b in Figure 5.1. Type b cases are ‘extreme’
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in the sense that mechanisms appear in a purer form (Danermark et al., 1997: 105, Ritchie and
Lewis, 2003: 79). In the context of my research the adjective ‘extreme’ describes the
characteristics of a case that exhibits relatively ideal conditions related to a phenomenon, for
example, studying excellence in companies by selecting a sample of particularly innovative
firms (Patton, 2002b: 230-247). My rationale for choosing an extreme case as sampling
strategy was to study the relation between PM and decisions taken in a context with relatively
‘ideal’ conditions. By ‘ideal conditions’ I mean a context where the linear model related to
RBM is most likely to be practised, and many water related decisions are taken. I assumed that
these conditions were more likely to be present in a region with a strong operational capacity
in terms of human resources and established working procedures and in woredas that were
comparatively well-supported and resourced in the Ethiopian context. My logic was that, if I
found no clear link between PM and decisions taken on rural water access in woredas with
high staff and funding levels, detecting such a link would be even less likely in poorly staffed
and resourced locations.
Figure 5.1 Types of cases
a) the normal or typical case yields information on the causal mechanisms of a social
phenomenon under normal/average conditions;
b) the pathological or extreme case is a case study of a critical condition where underlying
mechanisms are being challenged and, as a result, come to the surface, for example, where a
social norm is challenged, or a case where a mechanism is present in a more extreme form such
as studying excellence in companies by selecting a sample of particularly innovative firms;
c) comparing critical or heterogeneous cases refers to studying several cases that are assumed to
manifest the same structure, but differ in other aspects, in order to identify their overarching
commonalities or qualitative differences; and
d) the critical case is a study of an odd, or particular phenomenon, in order to identify
mechanisms that allow this condition to occur. Studying what makes extremely old people live
to such old age is an example of a critical case. Critical cases are examined to allow a logical
conclusion to be drawn for other cases. For example, studying under which conditions a
programme is accepted by a group of people who are otherwise generally critical of the
programme.
Sources: Danermark, Ekstroem et al (1997: 104-5, 170-1), Patton (2002a-247) and Ritchie and
Lewis (2003: 79ff)
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In practice, a logistical criterion was imposed – related to conducting fieldwork in a rural
location in Ethiopia. I realised that I needed a location which I could reach by public transport,
where I could find basic accommodation, and someone to facilitate my fieldwork and translate
during interviews.
The first step in my case study site selection of identifying a region was easy. Among the nine
regions of Ethiopia, the Southern Region was an obvious choice because he regional BoWR
(Bureau of Water Resources), in 2008, had conducted a regional inventory of all rural water
sources. This provided me with a recent monitoring process and results. The Southern Region
is also one of four regions in Ethiopia considered to have high capacity for the conduct of
development interventions – another indication of good conditions to trace monitoring
processes and decisions on water access. In addition, the regional capital, Hawassa, was
logistically not difficult to reach, and the RiPPLE programme had an office and accommodation
facilities, which I could use.
When it came to the selection of a local case study site, I chose two woredas in accordance
with the criteria related to an ‘extreme’ case, namely woredas that were most likely to exhibit
ideal conditions for PM. I assumed that a good way of judging this was the level and type of
support they received. There was support in the form of a Dutch NGO, SNV,45 which ran a
capacity building programme to support the implementation of the UAP, Ethiopia’s sector
strategy aimed at universal access to water supply, in six woredas. The NGO’s activities
revolved around the conduct of water supply, sanitation and hygiene inventories, and support
for strategic planning and monitoring based on these inventories. Similarly, the
aforementioned RiPPLE programme had supported water supply inventories in two of the
region’s woredas. Focusing on areas supported by RiPPLE and SNV narrowed the choice of
45 SNV is the Netherlands Development Organisation.
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potential case study sites from 134 rural woredas in the whole Southern Region (BoFED, 2008:
8) to 8.
I also wanted to capture a wide range of the actors involved in implementing and monitoring
access to rural water supply, including local and international NGOs, bilateral and multilateral
donors and sector specific as well as multi-sectoral programmes. Two locations stood out: one
was supported by RiPPLE, an action-research programme, the WB, a multilateral sector donor,
the PSNP, a multisectoral programme to increase food security, and the international, faith-
based NGO ‘World Vision’; the second woreda was supported by a capacity-building project of
the NGO SNV, the multilateral donor UNICEF, the PSNP and the local NGO ‘Acts of Compassion’.
Both woredas had a mix of the four most common water supply scheme types described in
Chapter 2. The first woreda crossed three agro-ecological zones – the highlands, midlands and
lowlands, while the second woreda was situated in a midland area, but included a variety of
improved and unimproved sources covering people’s water needs. In terms of livelihoods, in
both areas the main occupation was rainfed agriculture in combination with some livestock
holdings, and both areas included a range of different wealth groups.
5.3 Field work phase II – data collection
While I collected data throughout my stay in Ethiopia from October 2009 to 2010, the most
intensive data collection phase was from March to July 2010. During this period, I travelled
back and forth between Addis Ababa, the regional capital Hawassa, two zonal capitals, and the
two woredas. I spent two months in the first case study woreda and five weeks in the second.
The two main data collection methods employed during that period were participant
observation and semi-structured interviews. My participant observation activities, which I
describe in Section 5.3.1, provided me with an invaluable contextual understanding of the
issues related to water supply and the day-to-day activities related to monitoring, planning and
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implementing water supply. I used the insights gained from my observations to decide on
concrete topics for the semi-structured interviews, described in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 Participant observations
Participant observation is a qualitative research method that aims to discover “the nature of
social reality by understanding the actor’s perception/understanding/interpretation” of it
(Sociology Central, 2003: 1). In the process of participant observation, the researcher watches
and immerses herself in the social world related to a particular phenomenon but retains an
“observer’s eye” for analysing these lived experiences (Sociology Central, 2003: 1).
I mainly used open participant observation to better understand the wider rural water supply
context and the dynamics involved in daily monitoring practices. The groups I interacted with
were informed about my research and had given me permission to accompany them. My
participant observation experiences consisted of observations of water-fetching activities
around water schemes, and water handling in the home, of informal conversations with local
residents, government extension staff, NGO and government employees, and also
accompanying government staff members on routine monitoring activities and attending
government monitoring related staff meetings and activities. Below, I explain my introduction
to the two case study woredas, followed by a chronological depiction of my participant
observation activities.
In March 2010, I went on a first exploratory visit to one of my case study woredas,
accompanying a UNICEF monitoring officer on one of his regular monitoring visits. Much later,
I realised that this had been very problematic. The Head of the woreda WME (Water, Mining
and Energy) office associated me with UNICEF, which previously had raised allegations of
corruption against his office, which I was not made aware of by UNICEF at the time. The fact
that I was introduced as interested in monitoring water supply interventions, by the
organisation that suspected the WME office of irregular practices did not get me off to a good
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start with the WME office. When I returned to the woreda several months later, I found it
impossible to gain detailed and comprehensive insights into monitoring practices and decisions
from the two persons with strategic positions in the woreda WME office. Finally, I decided not
to use most of the data I collected in this woreda. Nevertheless, it was useful to have a
comparison to the dynamics at the other field work location. Furthermore, the fact that
monitoring practices and decisions were difficult to trace in a woreda that received explicit
capacity building support for strategic planning based on monitoring, in itself, is an interesting
finding.
In comparison, my introduction to the second case study woreda was very smooth, thanks to
Tsegaw Hailu, the woreda coordinator of RiPPLE who was based there. Since Tsegaw was an
engineering graduate from Arba Minch University,46 he had many contacts in the water sector.
I owe the rich data from this field work location to the cordial relationships he had developed
with staff in different sector offices at the woreda and zonal levels, and his contacts with
fellow graduates across the region. The RiPPLE office and his home, which are located on the
same compound, were frequently visited by local sector staffs to discuss engineering design
issues and current topics of concerns, for instance, how to address the severe flooding which
was affecting part of the woreda at the time of my visit. This provided the opportunity for me
to listen in on conversations and to understand the day to day issues that woreda water
officers were concerned about. The many informal conversations also gave me an insight into
the personal motivations of staff members. Highlights of my participant observation were
accompanying the WME officers on some of their monitoring visits and maintenance duties
across the woreda, including a visit to the highland areas where we spent three days partly to
accommodate my interviews and partly to allow them to carry out routine assessments and a
46 Arba Minch Institute of Technology (AMIT) is based in the zonal capital, approximately 50km from my
case study woreda. Established in 1986 as the Water Technology Institute, AMIT teaches various
degrees in water technology studies at undergraduate and postgraduate degree level (Arba Minch
University, 2012).
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feasibility study for a major scheme rehabilitation. Through these activities, I developed a good
understanding of the day to day concerns and daily activities of woreda WME office staff. I
developed great respect for their dedication, creativity and persuasion skills, to improving
water supply access in an environment with few resources, small salaries, and little reward for
going out of their way.
At kebele level, I spent time at different water schemes and at local cafes chatting, via
interpreters, to men, women and the local youth, to extension workers from the health and
agriculture sectors, and to local officials. These informal encounters with different people were
not only very enjoyable, they also allowed me to get a better understanding of the wider
context of rural water access in these locations. For example, I acquired a better knowledge of
the interactions between health extension workers and WASH committee members and the
important role played by one individual, who was not an EPRDF party member, in acting as an
advocate in relation to various of the kebele’s concerns. I discuss further in Chapter 8 how this
person influenced the dynamics related to the operation and maintenance of the main water
supply scheme in the kebele. I would have liked a deeper insight into water fetching and
handling at the household level. My observations here were limited to the time during and
between interviews. I was prevented from spending extended time in households mainly by
the language barrier – many women did not speak Amharic, but another local language, and
the time it would have taken to build trust and a comfortable relationship which would have
allowed me to stay around the household for extended periods.
At the zonal and regional levels, I participated in various monitoring activities. I attended a
quarterly sector review meeting at the zonal level, and I accompanied a regional government
evaluator of an NGO activity in one of my fieldwork locations. I spent time in the regional
BoWR and the two woreda WME offices, during which I was able to chat with staff (via pidgin
Amharic and English), and to observe their working practices.
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Overall, participant observation gave me a sense of the context in which monitoring rural
water access is embedded. Semi-structured interviews formed the backbone of my data
collection because they provided me with a crucial source of information for process tracing:
narrative accounts connecting outcomes with explanations from the perspective of different
people and with their perspectives on water access, a key input to analysing framings, which I
discuss in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.2 Conducting semi-structured interviews
According to Steinar Kvale (1996: 2), the term ‘inter-view’ stands for “an interchange of views
between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual interest”. His definition takes the
term ‘inter-view’ literally as highlighting the aspect of two people exchanging views on a
specific topic. This understanding of an interview highlights its subjective nature. The purpose
of a research interview, according to Kvale (1996: 5-6), is “to obtain descriptions of the life
world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described
phenomena”. Kvale uses the metaphor of a ‘traveller’ to describe the relationship between
interviewer and interviewee. Rather than seeing these two as being independent, and the
interviewer extracting objective knowledge from the interviewee, Kvale sees interviewer and
interviewee as interconnected through their different power positions and backgrounds, which,
in turn, influence the interview journey.
My strategy for creating the right conditions for my interview journeys was to try to create a
relaxed atmosphere at the beginning of the interview. To put my interviewees at ease I often
started with a neutral question about their employment history and professional background.
Talking about their personal background encouraged them to get into a story telling mode and
provided me with clues about their perspectives and other experience prior to their current
position, which might be relevant for my investigation. During the main part of the interview, I
introduced various topics, depending on the position and background of the interviewee, and
the time available. These main topics were based on an interview guide I developed around my
129
research questions. They covered framings of rural water access, decisions taken, and
monitoring practices. I had defined a second interview guide to acquire background
information related to the history of the sector (see annexes 1 and 2). Since I was aware that
our different positions would likely influence interviewees’ stories, wherever possible I used
open ended questions. Since the intention was to capture story lines related to monitoring
processes and decisions, a frequent question was “And what happened next?” To uncover the
different reasons for specific outcomes I would ask “Why do you think this happened?” To
achieve more clarity about respondents’ interpretations of a described event I asked “Can you
explain in more detail what you mean by this?” (Legard et al., 2003).
I held interviews or group discussions with a total of 222 people. Interview times ranged from
15 minutes to 3 hours; some of my key interviewees were interviewed several times. I audio-
recorded and transcribed most of the interviews except for those with water users and
members of WASH committees where the time needed for translation during the interview
allowed me to make notes of the responses and where the medium of translation led to a
reduced version of the story. As explained in Chapter 1, I refer to my interviewees as numbers,
which are linked to a confidential list of names, positions and interview dates provided in
Appendix 3, while group discussion participants are listed in Annex 4.
5.3.3 Factors affecting my interview ‘travels’
Taking up Kvale’s metaphor of an interview as a journey that is influenced by the positions of
the two persons involved in the conversation, I found that my interview travels often were
influenced in several ways. My identity as a Western researcher, in the eyes of many of my
interviewees below the woreda level, established me in the position of a potential donor,
which, I believe, at times influenced the stories they told me. Sometimes users were cautious
about mentioning negative experiences with accessing water supply and instead were quick to
highlight the need for more funding. In some cases, when interviewing officials, I had the
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impression that their answers were formulated to accord with what they thought I wanted to
hear.
The closer my research was to the local level, woreda and below, the more it was partly
mediated by the interpreters on whom I relied. The need for of translation made it more
difficult to identify story lines because interpreters would sometimes slightly reword the
question, changing it from an open question to one that suggested a certain answer. In
translating interviewees’ responses, interpreters initially were summarising the stories in a few
words, rather than translating the whole account. In addition, the need for translation
considerably lengthened the interview time, and reduced the number of questions I could ask.
By going through the recordings retrospectively, and discussing in depth the nature of my
research, I and my interpreters reached an understanding about a common, good interview
strategy.
In addition to the influence on the interview journey of the relationship between me and the
interviewee, the subjective experience, professional background (predominantly engineering)
or an event immediately predating the interview, sometimes had an impact on interviewees’
responses. This was particularly obvious in the context of enquiries about framings of water
access. For example, when asked about their subjective interpretation of the official definition,
a respondent might refer to an issue that had emerged during a recent monitoring field trip. In
other cases, I sensed that interviewees were holding various parallel framings of access in their
heads. They would tell me a story in one part of the interview, and later qualify the perspective
in another part of the interview. This observation reflects my understanding of framing as a
socio-discursive phenomenon. From this perspective, an individual can express different
frames of access to rural water depending on the specific context or the question being asked.
My account of actors’ framings, therefore, is necessarily subjective. At the same time, the fact
that I conducted a large number of interviews on framings of access to rural water supply – 64
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with representatives of government and non-governmental stakeholders and 41 with users –
revealed recurring themes and patterns. This suggests that the subjective accounts I obtained
point also to shared understandings.
A specific issue arose with regard to users’ framings of access. I could not directly ask users
about their perspective on ‘access’ to water supply since the concept requires abstraction of a
situation. Instead, I asked them to describe different issues related to fetching and using water
in their everyday lives. I visited users in their homes where I interviewed women, children and
men about their daily activities related to fetching and using water. To triangulate and
complement their accounts of access, I carried out observations at each protected water
supply scheme in the kebele, interviewed water user committees, and people fetching water.
Altogether, I visited 17 water schemes and interviewed 41 users across three kebeles. I
obtained further insights on water supply in the kebele by interviewing salaried staff and
political representatives in each setting, by walking around the kebele, and from hand-drawn
maps depicting the water supply situation in the kebele. Nevertheless, my local user
perspective might lack some depth because of the language and cultural barriers highlighted
above. It also may be tilted towards prevalent framings of water access – for instance, I
enquired in more detail about water for domestic purposes, than water for productive uses.
5.3.4 Positionality and ethical considerations
During the fieldwork for my doctoral project, I worked on issues very closely related to one
research theme of the action research project, RiPPLE, namely the topic of ‘woreda inventory
systems’, which aimed at improving WASH information for greater sustainability of WASH
services (RiPPLE, 2009). However, my doctoral research questions are distinct from RiPPLE,
which mainly evolved around the National WASH Inventory and the prospects for using its
results in relation to the distinct information needs of different sector stakeholders.47 Where
47 A summary of the research results will be published in 2013, in Chapter 2 of “Achieving Water Security:
Lessons from Research into Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene in Ethiopia” (Butterworth et al., 2013)
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there was research collaboration with RiPPLE that touched on my thesis topic, I have
referenced related joint research outputs. In my view, the repercussions of working on a topic
closely related to RiPPLE are mainly positive in that I was able to contextualise my particular
research topic within a wider body of research related to monitoring in the water sector.
Naturally, the discussions with former colleagues influenced my research journey. For instance,
my involvement in discussions related to a regional Water Resources Inventory (WRI) carried
out in the Southern Region pointed me to the interesting political dynamics underlying that
process, which I trace in Chapter 7.
Gender relations and stereotypical roles also came into play during my research. In particular,
many of my, often young, male, interview partners were keenly interested to connect with me
on a personal level. While it was sometimes challenging to draw firm boundaries while
remaining open and polite, it meant that I had many opportunities to learn about the wider
socio-political situation outside the formal interview settings, for example, meeting up for a
coffee, lunch, or an evening drink. Unfortunately, I was not able to develop many informal
relationships with women, which may also have contributed to an account that is biased
towards a male perspective. Other interviewees, particularly local users, tended to see me as a
donor, with the related biases in their tales, which I discussed above.
Throughout my research I tried, as much as possible, to adhere to the ethical principles set by
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) (2010).48 Before embarking on the interview
process, I obtained official letters of recommendation from the federal MoWR, and from the
regional BoWR, confirming that my research had their institutional support. At the start of all
my interviews, I explained the nature of my study, described the interview topics covered and
made it clear that any information they gave me would remain confidential. Prior to an
48 The ethical principles refer to: ensuring integrity, quality and transparency, obtaining informed
consent from research participants, confidentiality of information, voluntary participation, avoidance of
harm, and impartiality of the research
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interview I obtained verbal consent from the interviewee to conduct and record the
conversation. In order to protect the identity of my interviewees, I do not refer to their names
and concrete job titles in the text. Annex 3, which links the interviewees’ numbers to their
personal information will be made available only to the examiners of this thesis. I do not name
the field work locations, but the detailed description of the case study context, I hope,
provides sufficient material for the reader to interpret and appreciate the case study material I
present.
Although adhering as closely as possible to ethical principles, the social science research
process is likely to involve practical, very concrete ethical dilemmas for the researcher.
Monitoring practices are a potentially sensitive topic that may reveal issues of malpractice and
corruption and, during my fieldwork, I encountered situations in which I had to make difficult
decisions, particularly in the case of the fieldwork woreda where allegations of financial misuse
had been posed by UNICEF against the WME office. In all circumstances, my main
consideration was to act in the interests of vulnerable individuals and to protect them from
harm. Throughout my research the intention was to be transparent and honest in my
interactions, and to uphold confidentiality. These precautions notwithstanding, it is impossible
for an outsider to understand all the political and power dynamics obtaining in a field work
location. In my case, several months after I finished my fieldwork, one of my interpreters faced
(unfounded!) rumours that I had reported misuse of budget within a major donor programme,
a challenge that threatened him personally and professionally. Luckily, the rumours died down
after several weeks.
5.4 Data verification and analysis
After July 2010, the most intensive period of data collection came to an end. I concentrated on
the verification of my data in Ethiopia. In the two research woredas, I invited my interviewees
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for feed-back sessions on my research findings immediately after my stay. The sessions were
attended by 8-12 participants, mainly government and non-government sector professionals.
The discussions emanating from my presentation proved very useful for verifying my account
of monitoring processes and of my identification of factors affecting access-related decisions.
For feedback at the regional and federal levels, I returned to Ethiopia in October 2010. At the
regional level, I organised a feed-back meeting at the RiPPLE office. At the federal level, my
presentation was part of a two-day sector symposium focusing on WASH monitoring in
Ethiopia, which I co-organised (Butterworth et al., 2010). The session was well attended and I
received useful feed-back from the participants regarding my initial findings. At the federal
level, the verification mainly helped to draw attention to issues I might have missed in my
interpretation of framings related to rural water access.
The focus then turned to data analysis. As explained in Section 5.1, my main research analysis
method is process tracing. The function of process tracing is a) to test the hypothesis put
forward by RBM, which assumes a uniquely objective, linear relationship between PM and
decisions taken, and b) to identify different factors impacting on a number of selected
decisions taken on rural water supply and the specific role of PM among those. While Bennett
and George (1997, 2005b) provide a detailed discussion of process tracing as a case study
method, their writings are less informative about the step-by-step application of the method.
Therefore, I relied on other, more general, literature on data analysis and then devised my
own strategy for applying process tracing to my case. Below, I summarise the main steps of my
data analysis.
I organised my data using the qualitative analysis software NVivo. To start with, I followed an
inductive approach to the analysis. I wanted to ‘let the data speak to me’ to make sure that I
did not miss any findings by overly relying on predetermined explanatory models proposed in
various bodies of the literature I had consulted previously. Following guidance on carrying out
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qualitative data analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994, Ritchie et al., 2003) I created categories,
first inductively, as I read through the interview transcripts, observations and grey literature,
and then by reorganising them hierarchically, also following guidance on qualitative data
analysis, using Nvivo (Bazeley, 2006). However, the large number of interviews rendered this
task too time consuming. I also found the process tedious because I ended up developing too
many and partly overlapping categories, to keep track. One important insight from this more
inductive approach was the importance of less formalised monitoring processes for taking
decisions on rural water access.
I also encountered difficulties in my attempt to compare the monitoring activities of different
organisations – namely sector monitoring by the line ministry, programme monitoring by three
donor supported programmes, and project monitoring by two NGOs. One issue that had
emerged during data collection was that the line between the different monitoring activities
was blurred. The sector donor programmes’ monitoring approaches and activities were in a
state of flux; they were in the process of being merged with the slowly evolving sector WASH
monitoring system across the water, health and education ministries, as explained in Chapter 3.
As a result, it was difficult clearly to identify and compare distinct monitoring approaches and
processes. In addition, I was not able always to trace the detailed steps of the monitoring
processes of every organisation; and when this was possible, it provided a rather technical and
boring account. Furthermore, I did not find a great diversity in monitoring approaches. Rather
than using fundamentally different indicators and approaches, the monitoring methods
differed in their details. At the same time, I discovered that all organisations used a results-
based approach to monitoring their interventions.
I, therefore, decided to change my strategy. Rather than comparing different monitoring
approaches, I decided to focus on the most prominent aspect in the practices of all the
organisations, namely their focus on monitoring ‘results’. I decided also to select examples for
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which I had detailed evidence that strengthened the process tracing method. Rather than
focusing on examples from NGOs, which operate somewhat in isolation from the sector, I
focused on the most sector representative monitoring practices, namely sector government
monitoring and also on one example from the WB. My case study, therefore, comprises
examples of social dynamics underlying formal and less formal PM exercises at different
administrative levels in the Ethiopian rural water supply sub sector. This approach has the
advantage that it provides an overview of the political and power dynamics involved in PM,
from the global to the very local level.
The results of my data analysis are organised in line with the three angles of investigation
exemplified by my three research sub-questions set out in Chapter 4. I discuss the findings
related to the three angles of investigation in three separate chapters that contain my
empirical findings. In the first empirical chapter, Chapter 6, I focus on actors’ framings of rural
water access in Ethiopia to address research question 1a:
What are the specific ways in which key actors (those affected and those
implementing) at different levels (individual, kebele, woreda, zone, region, federal and
international) frame access to rural water?
In the second empirical chapter, Chapter 7, I turn to the social dynamics inherent in PM to
address research question 1b:
Which actors’ framings are represented in monitoring exercises and results concerning
rural water access?
In the third empirical chapter, Chapter 8, I investigate the factors underlying selected decisions
on rural water access at different administrative levels to address research question 1c:
What is the explanatory power of PM regarding decisions taken on rural water access?
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6 Framings of rural water access in Ethiopia
Chapter outline
The focus of this chapter is framings of rural water access for Ethiopia. I capture framings at
different administrative levels – from global to local – and related to different types of actors –
government, donor, NGO representatives – and men, women and children, that experience
rural water access as part of daily life. The intention in this chapter is to capture the diversity of
rural water access framings and establish to what extent official framings, used as yardstick for
‘access’, represent the different notions of access proposed by different stakeholders. Section
6.1 examines access framings contained in international level normative frameworks and
guidelines and official national documents. Section 6.2 examines interpretations of access by
sector government stakeholders and representatives of the NGO and donor communities in
Ethiopia. Section 6.3 explores the access notions of those affected. Section 6.4 summarises and
discusses the differences between diverse notions of access related to lived experience, and
the official parameters used to measure ‘access’ in Ethiopia and internationally.
6.1 Access framings in international normative guidelines,
benchmarks, and the Ethiopian Universal Access Programme
Internationally, ‘General Comment 15’ on the right to water, adopted by the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in November 2002, codifies the normative criteria for
‘access to water’. The MDGs agreed upon in 2000 precede the normative framework set by the
General Comment. By specifying indicators and benchmarks for access to water supply at the
international level, MDG 7c strongly affects rural water access framings at the international
level. At the national level, in Ethiopia, the UAP (Universal Access Programme) sets official
standards for rural water access. Below, I characterise and discuss the framings inherent in
these documents.
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6.1.1 General Comment 15 on the human right to water
In 2010, eight years after publication of General Comment 15, the UN General Assembly
recognised the human right to water with 122 votes in favour, none against, and 41
abstentions (UN, 2010). General Comment 15 sets out a number of normative standards to
achieve the human right to water. According to General Comment 15, water must be
“adequate for human dignity, life and health” (2002: 5). It stresses also that:
The adequacy of water should not be interpreted narrowly, by mere reference to
volumetric quantities and technologies. Water should be treated as a social and
cultural good, and not primarily as an economic good. The manner of the realisation of
the right to water must also be sustainable, ensuring that the right can be realised by
present and future generations.
More particularly, General Comment 15 defines a number of factors underlying ‘adequacy’, in
relation to availability, quality and accessibility. ‘Availability’ refers to water for domestic and
personal use, including “drinking, personal sanitation, washing of clothes, food preparation
and personal hygiene” (UNESC, 2002: 5), based on WHO guidelines on minimum water
quantities (Howard and Bartram, 2003). ‘Quality’ refers to WHO guidelines for drinking-water
quality, to prevent and control water-borne diseases (WHO, 2010), and on peoples’
perceptions of odour, taste and colour. Further, General Comment 15 (2002: 6) identifies four
dimensions of ‘accessibility’:
1. physical accessibility refers to physical reach and security sensitivity to gender
requirements when accessing a water service;
2. economic accessibility refers to the affordability of accessing water services;
3. non-discrimination refers to water services not discriminating against vulnerable and
marginalised sections of the population; and
4. information accessibility refers to the right to obtain information on water issues.
These General Comment 15 criteria set the broad normative scope for thinking about ‘access
to water supply’. However, in many respects, the Comment is at an abstract level. For example,
it does not specify the meaning of water as a ‘cultural good’ and ‘affordability’ is not defined in
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concrete terms. The two aspects where the Comment refers to specific minimum guidelines
are ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’, both based on previously existing WHO guidelines. As already
discussed in Chapter 2, the WHO defines the minimum quantity to ensure ‘basic access’ as 20
litres per person per day (l/p/d) (Howard and Bartram, 2003). Based on a number of studies,
the WHO estimates that people are likely to use 20 l/p/d if total collection time is below 30
minutes and distance to the water source below 1,000 metres (Howard and Bartram, 2003: 17).
It is for this reason that many definitions of ‘access to rural water supply’ refer to a minimum
volume of 20 l/p/d in relation to an indicator of distance or time for fetching water. It is these
aspects, volume and distance (or time to fetch water), that commonly form part of water
access framings. They are reflected in the Ethiopian context, in official definitions and in
framings based on Ethiopian sector stakeholders’ statements, as I discuss in Sections 6.1.3 and
6.2.
6.1.2 Millennium Development Goal 7c
Recall that MDG 7c intends “to halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation” (UN, 2008). The indicator put forward for
Target C under MDG 7 measures “the proportion of population using an improved drinking
water source” (UNDESA, 2012). When comparing the MDG target with the indicator used to
measure it, two issues stand out. First, the adjective ‘sustainable’ is omitted from
measurement; second, the adjective ‘safe’ is measured via the proxy indicator ‘improved
drinking water source’. As explained in Chapter 2, according to the JMP of the WHO and
UNICEF, responsible for monitoring MDG 7c, ‘improved’ refers to a list of technical facilities49
that, “by nature of [their] construction or through active intervention, [are] protected from
outside contamination” (WHO and UNICEF, 2010).
49 Including the following: “rainwater, protected spring, protected dug well, tubewell, or borehole,
public tap or standpipe, piped water into yard/plot, and piped water into dwelling” (WHO and UNICEF,
2010).
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As stated earlier, the MDGs precede General Comment 15, and, therefore, cannot be assessed
directly against this normative framework. Nevertheless, it is striking that the MDG 7c
indicator does not make reference to any of the normative aspects - availability, quality and
accessibility - that comprise the human right to water. I interpret this as representing a
technical perspective on water access, or that ‘access’ is viewed from the perspective of an
engineering task of providing different water supply scheme types. Focusing on the technical
aspects of rural water access may also appeal to bureaucrats because it is easier to monitor
than more normative aspects such as equitable access. I apply this broad interpretation also to
the WHO guidelines on volume, distance and quality. All these parameters can be seen as
reflecting typical engineering tasks related to the design and construction of infrastructure
facilities. An engineer bases his or her infrastructure design on a projection of the quantities of
water needed, and devises pipelines to reach prospective customers from a specified distance.
The focus on an ‘improved drinking water source’ makes an artificial distinction between
sources that are ‘safe’, based on a particular infrastructure design classified as ‘improved’, and
all other sources that are ‘unsafe’.
In light of the framing concepts discussed in Chapter 4, the global JMP indicator tells an
abridged story that relates water ‘access’ largely to the existence of a particular type of
infrastructure. In contrast to this technical perspective, there is a real ‘grey’ zone where people
use multiple – improved and unimproved – sources of water for different purposes, and where
other dimensions, such as affordability or the discrimination of vulnerable and marginalised
people, also impact on the realisation of ‘access’. This much more complex access picture
emerged in Chapter 2, in the discussion of the diverse aspects impacting on peoples’ water
needs. In Section 6.3, where I discuss local notions of rural water access, the shortcomings
inherent in the JMP’s narrow, technical framing become even clearer. Next I explore the
notion of access in the Ethiopian UAP.
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6.1.3 Ethiopia’s Universal Access Programme
In Ethiopia, the Universal Access Programme for Rural and Urban Water Supply and Sanitation
(MoWR, 2005, 2009a) provides official standards for access to rural water supply. Developed in
2004, and revised in 2009, the UAP is Ethiopia’s “road map” for improving water supply and
sanitation and the country’s sector strategy for achieving the MDGs (MoWR, 2009a: 1). While
the original UAP document does not contain a precise definition of access to water supply, its
2009 revision uses the two terms “water supply access coverage” and “water supply coverage”
(MoWR, 2009a: 23). ‘Water supply access coverage’ estimates the proportion of the rural
population that potentially can obtain 15 l/p/d safe water, from a functional or temporarily
non-functional but repairable water supply facility, within a 1.5 km radius of the beneficiary’s
dwelling (MoWR, 2009a: 23-4). ‘Water supply coverage’ refers to populations for whom the
intended levels of service are achieved, i.e. where every person obtains 15 litres of drinking
water per day from a source within 1.5 km radius of their home (MoWR, 2009a: 23). The UAP
makes no reference to water quality.
Reference to these two descriptions of rural water ‘access’ means that the UAP differentiates
between and understands two levels of services. In the view of senior ministry officials, the
first definition represents the ministry’s current pragmatic yardstick for measuring ‘access’
based on the challenging conditions in Ethiopia. The second refers to a future condition that
the MoWR hopes to achieve in the mid- to long term (Interview #206). Below, I elaborate on
the differences between the UAP’s definitions and compare them with the international level
framings discussed above.
In its definition of ‘water supply coverage’, the UAP refers to the parameters of ‘volume’ and
‘distance’ to the water source, specified in the WHO guidelines discussed above. In choosing
these parameters, the MoWR is following international guidelines, which means that the WHO
standards directly influence the framing of access to water supply in Ethiopia. However, in
reducing the minimum daily quantity from 20 to 15 litres and increasing the distance from a
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dwelling to the source from 1km to 1.5km, the UAP introduces considerable relaxation of the
internationally suggested minimum standards, with considerable, potentially detrimental,
consequences, first and foremost, for women’s access, women being the main carriers and
managers of domestic water. In Chapter 7 I explore possible reasons for this relaxation of
standards. For reasons of clarity, in the rest of the thesis, I refer to the UAP’s definition of
‘water supply coverage’ as the ‘volume-distance’ parameters.
The second UAP definition, ‘water supply access coverage’, refers to potential rather than
actual access. It refers to an average beneficiary number based on a minimum yield and
minimum capacity of lifting devices (water pumps) for each scheme type. These are outlined
for selected scheme types in Table 6.1 (MoWR, 2009a: 24).
Table 6.1 Average beneficiaries for selected water supply scheme types
Source: MoWR (2005: 41)50
I explain the notion of access related to this definition using the example of a hand-dug well,
the first scheme type displayed in Table 6.1. According to ‘water supply access coverage’, a
hand-dug well’s coverage is estimated at 270 people on average - regardless of whether the
scheme is functional. The revised UAP gives specific instructions on how to calculate ‘water
supply access coverage’, shown by the formula below. It involves multiplying the total number
of each scheme type by the national average number of beneficiaries per scheme type, and
50 The original table contains more scheme types. The ones presented in Table 6.1 are those referred to
by interviewees and present in my case study woreda.
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dividing this number by the official population figure for the area in question - provided by the
CSA (Central Statistical Agency) (MoWR, 2009a: 24).
Access coverage (%) = H x A x 100 H = Number of sources
P A = National average number of
beneficiaries for scheme type
P = CSA Population of the area
As indicated in the above formula, the ‘water supply access coverage’ figure is usually
expressed as a percentage. This calculation method moves away from the ‘volume-distance’
framing and the notion of ‘water supply access coverage’ effectively is based on a hypothetical
situation: a hand-dug well theoretically serving 270 people (see Table 6.1). This takes no
account of how many people live within 1.5km of the well, how many litres of water they
collect per day and whether or not the scheme is functional. In an attempt to clarify ‘water
supply access coverage’, in what follows, I refer to this as the ‘scheme potential’ parameters.
During the time of my fieldwork, the MoWR reported progress towards universal rural water
access based on these ‘scheme potential’ parameters.
By using the infrastructure scheme as shorthand for ‘access’, the UAP’s ‘scheme potential’
parameters align with the JMP, representing a technical perspective. My interpretation of the
MoWR’s technical framing resonates with an observation by an Ethiopian sector professional
that:
Quite frequently, in Ethiopia, planners have emphasised the agronomic, engineering or
technical aspects of water projects, and most of the important decisions have been
made by technical experts, with little regard to issues of management and beneficiary
participation (Amberbir, 2007: 33).
From this it follows that, in the case of the UAP, the abridged story lines emerging from the
framings inherent in ‘volume-distance’ and ‘scheme potential’, focus on the technical
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parameters related to ‘access’. I have referred to the ‘volume-distance’ parameters as a
relaxed version of the WHO guidelines. And the UAPs ‘scheme potential’ parameters strongly
resemble the JMP indicator referred to above, which reports on the use of infrastructure. I
interpret these resemblances between global and Ethiopian ‘access’ framings as indicating that
international framings have a strong influence on national level framings of ‘access’ in the case
of Ethiopia.51
However, there are differences between the JMP and the UAP perspectives. For instance,
while the JMP measures ‘use’ based on data obtained from household surveys, the MoWR
extrapolates ‘access’ figures based on counts of the infrastructure in place. In performance-
related terminology, the JMP measures an ‘outcome’ while the MoWR measures an ‘output’,
leading to the contestations reported in Chapter 3. This difference could be interpreted also as
stemming from the JMP’s demand perspective which measures ‘use’, compared to the
MoWR’s supply perspective which measures the ‘hardware’, but not a ‘service’. A comment
from a senior monitoring expert in the MoWR confirms this. He stated explicitly that the
ministry is concerned with “monitoring the supply side” (Interview #186). One reason for the
methodological differences in the JMP’s and the UAP’s measures of access is the former’s need
for data sets that are comparable across countries, which it obtains via household surveys
carried out by national statistical agencies (discussed in Chapter 3). The JMP, therefore, relies
on a global indicator. As a result, its framing of ‘access’ is necessarily path-dependent, that is,
51 In interviews, the same officials who defended ‘scheme potential’ to report against the UAP
acknowledged possible shortfalls related to this method for capturing the real situation on the ground. I
interpret this as due to the discursive nature of framings where individuals may express different
framings depending on their situation: formally, federal level MoWR employees, some of whom are in
senior positions in the EPRDF, Ethiopia’s ruling party, need to report progress towards the UAP and
PASDEP benchmarks. They are accountable for achieving formal government targets, which tend not to
reflect the real situation on the ground. At the same time, off the record (e.g. in informal conversations
in the corridor), these individuals are more critical of the official approach to measuring access.
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the JMP’s framing of access is highly dependent on the availability of internationally
comparable datasets.52
A final observation concerning the framings of ‘access’ relates to the circularity between its
definition and the indicators used to measure it. Rather than the definition determining the
methods for measuring ‘access’, in the case of water supply, the definition is driven by the
indicators used to measure access, namely scheme types, volume and distance. In other words,
it is the method for measuring access that drives its definition in JMP and UAP access framings.
This circularity resonates with Lyotard’s observation on ‘performativity’ that performance
indicators replace truth. In Section 6.2 I examine the views of Ethiopia sector stakeholders,
across various administrative levels, on the notion of access.
6.2 Ethiopia sector stakeholder framings of rural water ‘access’
In my examination of Ethiopian sector stakeholder framings of rural water access, I am
interested in particular in how far they offer alternative perspectives to the official definitions
discussed for the UAP.53 The perspectives presented below follow the administrative hierarchy
in Ethiopia, descending from the federal level to the region, zone and woreda. The section
consists of two parts that examine the views of government stakeholders, and those of donor
and NGO representatives.
6.2.1 Framings of water sector government stakeholders
Consistent in the framings provided by government staff, whether technical experts or political
appointees, at federal or woreda level, was the reference to the difference between the UAP’s
52 For further discussion on the differences between JMP and the Ethiopian MoWR access figures, see
Butterworth et al. (2013).
53 I interviewed 38 government stakeholders, 11 donor and 15 NGO representatives in Ethiopia on the
issue of ‘rural water access’ framings. In order to capture framings, I asked interviewees about their
understanding of rural water ‘access’. Most actors started by referring to one of the official UAP
definitions. When my interviewees did not elaborate on the UAP definition from their perspective, I
asked them to what extent the stated definition corresponded with their personal views on ‘access’.
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two access definitions contained in the notions of ‘volume-distance’ and ‘scheme potential’.
Many interviewees also voiced their reservations about the ability of the ‘scheme potential’
parameters to capture ‘real’ access situations. Below, I give examples of these views.
At federal level, a statement from a senior official in the MoWR, highlights a common view on
the shortcomings of the ‘scheme potential’ notion. When asked about his understanding of
water ‘access’, he acknowledged that:
In the rural areas, our service level is 15 l/p/d within a radius of 1.5km. This is really a
challenge, you know. In some densely populated areas, there are really thousands of
people using a water scheme and that water – 15 l/p – may not be sufficient. In this
case, we wrongly consider that we are supplying a lot of people with limited resources.
In some other scarcely populated areas, a hand pump, which can be used by 500
people, may only be used by 10 or 20. In this case we have the potential but the
potential is not fully utilised because it is a sparsely populated area. These are the
challenges of our universal access calculation. (Interview #84)
This senior official makes the point that the UAP’s method for calculating access based on the
‘scheme potential’ parameters, fails to capture the real picture. His particular concern is over
beneficiary estimates by scheme type, represented by the letter ‘A’ in the UAP access
calculation model presented above. He was apprehensive that, in reality, schemes may be
used by many more or many fewer people than assumed under the UAP ‘scheme potential’
interpretation of access.
Sector staff in regional and zonal sector offices expressed similar reservations about the
‘scheme potential’ parameters. A former head of a zonal WME (Water, Mines and Energy)
department, for example, told me that:
I cannot say even our way of calculation is accurate because we are not looking at the
actual population who are using that scheme but simply say a hand-dug well can serve
this much population. When this is seen in the actual time, it differs. (Interview #211)
In this extract, the former department head stresses that extrapolation of the population to
achieve access numbers is inaccurate because it is not indicative of actual numbers of scheme
users. One of the engineers in the regional BoWR highlighted concerns related to the fact that
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current reporting does not take account of the parameters of the UAP ‘volume-distance’
definition. Currently, the sector does not capture the fact that people may fetch very small
volumes of water and may travel from farther away than 1.5km (Interview #148).
The views of employees in the WME office at woreda level were the most diverse among all
government staff I interviewed. They framed access by referring to the situation in their
woreda, and based on their individual experiences and responsibilities. The water engineer in
the office, who is responsible for the office’s planning and reporting, reiterated the point made
by officials at the zonal and federal levels. He highlighted that the UAP’s way of calculating
access based on ‘scheme potential’ does not correspond with the actual number of scheme
users in the woreda. According to him, sometimes more and sometimes fewer people are
served. He drew attention also to the importance of hygiene and sanitation in relation to
water supply to achieve health benefits (Interview #96). His colleague, formerly the head of
the woreda’s WME office, stresses that the entire process of fetching water to handling it at
home, contributes to access and noted that governance issues, particularly related to scheme
management, could constitute an obstacle to access. He pointed to inequalities in access
between different kebeles (Interview #179). The mechanic, responsible for O&M issues in the
woreda, described access in terms of the technical aspects related to scheme operation and
repairs. He told me that there was great pressure put on the WME office from the
communities, the woreda council, and NGOs, to improve functionality rates in the woreda
(Interview #162). The staff member responsible for community mobilisation commented on
the different perceptions of the value of protected water supply schemes across the woreda.
In the highland areas of the woreda, where people fetch water from unprotected springs
during much of the year, the WME office needs to create awareness of the importance of
using water from improved schemes. Encouraging users to pay fees and committees to repair
broken down schemes in the highlands, is a challenge for him. In contrast, in the lowlands,
where unprotected water is less available, residents regard water schemes as an important
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issue. Here, the challenge is persuading people that water from hand-dug wells is fit for
drinking, and convincing them of the value of these low-cost facilities (Interview #166).
The above examples show that, for sector government stakeholders, the ‘scheme potential’
parameters of the UAP represent the main reference for thinking about rural water access.
When voicing reservations regarding the ‘scheme potential’ access notion, sector government
stakeholders highlighted that the formula estimating beneficiaries by scheme does not
represent the real picture, in other words, does not provide an accurate account of water
scheme users.54 The second common criticism relates to shortcomings of the ‘scheme
potential’ compared to the ‘volume distance’ notion of access. A key finding here is that many
of the sector stakeholders do not refer to dimensions that go beyond the technical perspective
represented in the UAP. It appears that sector staff, generally, are caught up in the parameters
set by the UAP access framings.
The highest degree of framing diversity was evident among government staff at the woreda
level. Here, sector staffs frame access in close relation to their daily work. The community
mobiliser, for example, was concerned with local residents’ perceptions about what is a ‘good’
water source and the consequence this has for his work. In contrast, the technician, first and
foremost, is interested in the technical aspects related to scheme repair in relation to access,
while the former office head highlighted governance issues related to scheme management.
6.2.2 Framings of donor and NGO representatives
Compared to government staff, the most obvious commonality among NGO and donor
representatives is their consistent reference in describing access, not to ‘scheme potential’,
but to the ‘volume-distance’ parameters in the UAP definition. All the interviewees from these
two groups referred to access in terms of collecting 15 l/p/d from within a 1.5km distance of
54 Their reservations are confirmed in my findings in Chapter 7 of the different methods employed to
calculate access in a regional WRI (Water Resources Inventory) in the Southern Region where counting
actual users compared to average beneficiaries resulted in a difference of just under 20 percentage
points (35.5% compared to 53.9%).
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the individual dwellings. A UNICEF representative55 expressed a general attitude when he
explained to me that:
UNICEF works very closely with the Ethiopian government, so there is not much point
in UNICEF having its own version of access and the government having another one. So
the definition of government is also the definition of ours. (Interview #216)
It is not clear to me whether interviewees consciously chose between the two definitions in
the UAP, or whether they are quite simply not conversant with the MoWR’s decision to base
official ‘access’ figures on the assumptions underlying the ‘scheme potential’ parameters. It
may be that contestations over official progress towards ‘universal access’ between the MoWR
and its external partners, discussed in Chapter 3, are related in part to the different
interpretation of ‘access’ among Ethiopian government staff and other, non-government,
stakeholders.
When prompted to reflect on the official definition of ‘access’ both NGO and donor
representatives, adhered mainly to the parameters in describing access. Specifically,
interviewees made reference to how different parameters can impact on the volume of water
consumed or the distance travelled. For example, local representatives from two international
NGOs highlight that the topography, for example, the presence of a gorge, may make it
impossible for users to walk to a scheme even if it is within 1.5km distance from their home
(Interviews #98, #183). In addition, representatives of several NGOs and donors pointed out
that users do not necessarily collect 15 l/p/d even if the source has sufficient yield to supply
this volume, and several highlighted, in this context, that it is difficult to increase water
consumption because this would require a behaviour change (Interviews #89, #112, #157,
#161, #187, #212). This was in the context of interviewees referring to using more water for
personal hygiene and other domestic uses.
55 Although, at global level, UNICEF is part of the JMP, UNICEF country programmes, referred to by my
interviewee, use the country’s guidelines as the yardstick for defining access to water supply.
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One point made clearly by representatives of UNICEF and the WB, both of whom rely on
government staff for reporting the progress related to their interventions, was their concern
over the accuracy of government reporting on access (Interviews #99, #149, #181, #216, #217).
I interpret this to indicate that, for these donor representatives, an important worry is not so
much which parameters are measured, but that the parameter in question is reliable. This
could be interpreted as donor representatives expressing an instrumental rationale, namely a
keenness to establish a reliable monitoring system to avoid accusations (from the donor
country’s taxpayers) that the performance of their interventions could not be assessed.
Overall, then, for donor and NGO representatives, the picture regarding the diversity of their
framings is similar to that for government stakeholders assessed above. Many of the
comments made by NGOs and donors focus on the parameters related to what they possibly
and, in this case, wrongly interpret as the official access definition in Ethiopia, namely the
‘volume distance’ parameters. Reference to the ‘volume-distance’ parameters related to
‘access’ was common among sector professionals inside and outside of government. The main
difference was that many government representatives referred directly to the UAP definition
not taking account of the volume-distance parameters, while donor and NGO representatives
commented more generally on the challenges related to fulfilling the ‘volume-distance’
parameters in reality. These findings point to the dominance of the WHO guidelines in framing
Ethiopian sector stakeholders’ notions of access. Furthermore, the circularity between the
desired outcome (access) and the methods used to assess the outcome (volume and distance
or infrastructure), again, is apparent. While, in theory, indicators are used to measure a
desired outcome, here, they actually define the outcome, which leads to a circularity between
the two. This point became particularly clear when I asked different sector stakeholders about
their understanding of ‘access’: most people responded by referring to a range of established
151
indicators for measuring ‘access’ such as volume, time taken to fetch water, distance to the
source and water quality standards.
Among the stakeholders interviewed, only woreda level staff provided more differentiated
views on access. Their framings range from governance issues related to scheme management,
to operation and maintenance, and to different perceptions about the value of protected
sources in the highland and lowland areas. In Section 6.3, I discuss notions of water access in a
highland and lowland kebele in my case study woreda.
6.3 Notions of access from those affected
In this section, I present and analyse notions of ‘access’ expressed by those people directly
affected by it, i.e. the women, men and children living in rural areas for whom ‘access’ to
water forms part of daily life. My intention is to capture, as comprehensively as possible,
diverse perspectives on ‘access’ in their roles of residents and water users, and from the
viewpoints of local officials and government staff members. In order to capture a variety of
situations, I present perspectives from an area with low water availability, a lowland kebele,
and from a relatively water abundant area, a highland kebele. In both cases, I complement the
findings from interviews and group discussions with my field observations to obtain a rich
representation of the diverse aspects that make up water ‘access’ in these two locations.
Both kebeles are situated in the same woreda, in the Southern Region, along the main road
between two zonal capitals, and along the shores of the lake, visible in Figure 6.1. According to
regional population projections (BoFED, 2009), the woreda had 74,901 inhabitants in 2010,
spread across 24 kebeles. Except for the woreda capital, all the woreda kebeles are classified as
rural. The woreda covers the three main agro-ecological zones of Ethiopia (lowlands, midlands
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and highlands) described in Chapter 2. Water is obtainable from a mix of groundwater, surface
water and springs, and, particularly in the lowland areas, rainfall variability within and between
years is high.
Figure 6.1 View of my case study woreda from the highlands
Source: Author
The woreda’s residents make their living through a combination of rainfed agriculture,
traditional, small-scale irrigation and livestock breeding. In the lowland areas of the woreda,
there are two cash crops, bananas and mangoes, and other crops that mainly are for
subsistence such as teff,56 maize, sweet potato, cassava and various vegetables; in the
highlands farmers also cultivate apples and eucalyptus for cash (Abebe et al., 2010). A study in
2009 identified three different wealth groups in the woreda. The fact that focus group
discussants characterised people who had no need to beg for food as belonging to the medium
wealth group is an indication that, overall, wealth levels are not much above the poverty line
56 Teff is an important grain in Ethiopia, used to make the national dish, injera.
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(Abebe et al., 2010). 57 The woreda is classified as food insecure and is covered by the PSNP
(Productive Safety-Net Programme).
Table 6.2 Access according to ‘scheme potential’ formula in lowland and highland kebele, July 2010
Source: MoWR (2005: 41), field observations of schemes and reports from kebele
administrators on CSA population projections for 2010.
Before discussing the different perspectives on water access in the two kebeles, I briefly
describe the ‘access’ situations in the two locations, according to the UAP’s ‘scheme potential’
parameters. Table 6.2 presents a summary of the number and type of schemes by kebele, the
total number of beneficiaries served according to the ‘scheme potential’ formula explained in
Section 6.1.3, and the resulting percentages. According to these calculations, in 2010, 70% of
the lowland and 50% of the highland kebele population had access to water. In the conclusion
to this section, I contrast these figures with the notions of access from the perspectives below.
6.3.1 Notions of access in the lowlands
The lowland kebele is situated on the main road between the woreda and the zonal capital.
According to the CSA’s 2010 population projection, 5,885 people reside in the kebele, a
substantial increase on the mid 1980s when the first few hundred people started settling there
57 People with a small or no land holdings, and those engaged as daily labourers, were described as
‘poor’, while people with at least 0.25 ha of landholding and who did not have to beg for food were
described as ‘medium’. Those with at least 1 cow, 0.5 ha of land or a house with a corrugated iron roof
were described as being in the ‘best off’ group.
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(Interview #133, #192).58 This figure is approximately 25% higher than recorded by local health
extension staff. Although classified as rural, the kebele has some municipal characteristics,
such as the settlement’s a grid-like structure (see map in Figure 6.2). Peoples’ dwellings are
concentrated along the main road, while their fields expand to east and west, away from the
road (top and bottom of map in Figure 6.2). Some of the kebele’s residents are classed as food
insecure and receive support from the PSNP, but staff from the WME office told us that some
farmers produce cash crops and have sufficient financial resources to afford private water
connections.
Figure 6.2 hand drawn map of the lowland kebele
Source: author’s photograph of a map in the kebele’s health post
Water availability in the kebele is mixed. The main (unprotected) water source in the kebele is
a perennial river that originates in the highlands. According the kebele’s agricultural extension
workers, the river and the small springs along its course are used for traditional irrigation and
for watering cattle (Interviews #218, #219), and according to the kebele’s health extension
staff, for domestic purposes such as washing clothes and domestic utensils (Interviews #85,
58 The start of this kebele’s settlement was part of the nation-wide Villagisation Campaign promoted by
the Derg regime with the intention to “simplify service provision, tax collection and control over the
population” (Pankhurst, 1992: 50).
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#214). Overall, the perception is that water is scarce, particularly during the dry season from
December to April; the last major drought had occurred just 18 months before my visit to the
area.
The kebele’s water supply infrastructure includes five protected water supply schemes: two
deep wells and three hand-dug wells. The scheme map in Figure 6.3 shows that all these
schemes are situated close to the main road. The main source of drinking water in the kebele is
a deep well, known locally as the ‘Chinese’ scheme because it was constructed with the
support of the Chinese Government in 1988. The scheme has two functional public water
points along the main road and one non-functional public water point in the neighbouring
kebele. A fourth, non-functional water point is located in the school compound. There are also
two private connections, one in the church compound and the second in the compound of the
retired priest. The recent repair to the Chinese scheme is used in Chapter 8 to analyse the
factors affecting specific access decisions.
Figure 6.3 improved water supply schemes in the lowland kebele, June 2010
Source: Author
DW 2, at the top of Figure 6.3, at the time of my visit, had yet to be connected to the electricity
grid to become operational. There are three hand-dug wells, of which two are functional.
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However, because of frequent periods of breakdown and disrepair at all schemes, the kebele’s
residents often have to travel 5km to fetch water from a distant woreda town. Next, I
summarise people’s experience of fetching and handling water in the kebele, based on
interviews mainly with women and girls.
An important issue was related to water quality at hand-dug wells. Most women and girls
dislike this water. One woman explained that the water “cannot be swallowed easily” and
gives her a stomach ache (Interview #86). Others described the water as tasting “salty” or
“soapy”, and as “similar to the water from Lake Abaya”, just a few kilometres east, which they
do not regard as a good source of drinking water (Interviews #136, #137). In addition, all the
women and girls told me that one of the hand-dug wells, captured in Figure 6.4, is infested
with worms and, therefore, is unsafe for drinking. Water from the hand-dug wells is seen also
as unsuitable for some household uses: several women explained that vegetables, such as
maize and cabbage, changed colour when boiled in the well water and that it left an oily film
on the skin if used to wash in. Staff members from the WME office are aware of the women’s
concerns over the taste of the water from hand-dug wells which tap the shallow aquifer.
However, at first, these issues were ignored in the decisions over increasing water supply
schemes in the kebele. This is discussed further in Chapter 8 where I analyse factors underlying
specific decisions.
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Figure 6.4 Hand-dug well in lowland kebele allegedly infested with worms (left) and running out of water at water
point 2, Chinese Scheme, at 9:45am
Source: Author
Because of the serious water quality issues related to hand-dug wells, the Chinese scheme,
when functional, is the kebele’s main water supply. However, there are problems related to
management of the scheme which negatively affect peoples’ access to water. The Chinese
scheme depends on fuel to run a submersible pump that transports water to a reservoir, which
feeds the various public and private connections depicted in Error! Reference source not
found.. However, because of the pump’s limited capacity, water is pumped only once or twice
a day to fill the reservoir. This supply does not match demand and the supply of water at public
stand posts often runs out between 9am and 11am. This results in women and girls enduring
long queuing times - from 45 minutes to several hours - and the daily uncertainty of whether
there will be water when they reach the head of the queue, captured in Figure 6.4, and
referred to in Chapter 1, when the topic of this thesis was introduced.
If there is no availability of water from the Chinese scheme after a woman or girl has queued in
the morning, there are three alternatives for collecting water: returning to the same post in
the afternoon, checking whether one of the hand-dug wells is open, or fetching water from the
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woreda town. Travelling on foot and including queuing time, a return journey to the town can
take up to three hours; travel by donkey cart involves a higher financial cost.
In addition to the daily uncertainty about supply at the Chinese scheme, some women
complained that the scheme’s opening hours are unpredictable, that people are allowed to
jump the queue, and that the supervisor of the WASH committee abuses his authority and may
close the scheme if there are quarrels over queuing. At the hand-dug wells, opening hours are
random, and queue jumping is a frequent problem. Several women commented that the hand-
dug wells are usually closed when the water points fed by the Chinese scheme are open.
None of the users I interviewed mentions the fees for water as a prohibitive factor related to
access. The price for filling a 20 litre jerry can at the Chinese scheme is 0.1 Ethiopian Birr (ETB),
and at the hand-dug well, is ETB0.05. However, if the water transported by donkey cart from
the woreda town the cost goes up to ETB1-2, which is a 10-20-fold increase. (For comparison,
under the PSNP, unskilled labourers receive a daily salary of ETB10.) As a result, households in
the low and, possibly, in the medium wealth category referred to above, are likely to find it
difficult to afford the cost of transporting water by donkey cart.
In addition to these daily uncertainties, the long-term availability of water services in the
kebele is not reliable. The services are strongly affected by the weak governance of the
kebele’s WASH committee, which is responsible for all the kebele’s improved water schemes.
Committee members explained that there is a high turnover of tap attendants.59 The WASH
committee accuses them of financial mismanagement, but, because of lack of written records
of income and expenditure, and no regular deposit to a savings account, the root of this
59 The tap attendant is the person hired by the WASH committee, responsible for opening and closing
the water point, managing the queue during water collection, and collecting fees. There are individual
tap attendants responsible for each of the water points of the Chinese scheme and one of the
functioning hand-dug wells; tap attendants earn a monthly salary of ETB60.
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mismanagement is unclear.60 As a consequence of the poor financial management, buying fuel
and paying salaried staff, namely tap attendants and the scheme operator, is a problem for the
WASH committee. Another irregularity is the abuse of roles by WASH committee members.
For example, the supervisor, a former kebele cabinet member, interferes in tap attendants’
decisions about opening and closing water points and imposes his authority on the (female)
cashier to get unauthorised withdrawal of funds; the scheme operator, on the other hand,
dissatisfied with his low and irregular salary, sells water illegally from an additional, non-public
tap at the pump house.61 As a result of weak financial management and internal governance
issues, continuity of service at all three schemes is at risk.
The following main points emerged in relation to access in the lowland kebele, The kebele
residents randomly use all the water schemes available to them, instead of agreeing some
division between individual schemes, as assumed in the ‘scheme potential’ formula in the UAP.
Even if all three schemes are operational, households face daily uncertainty about obtaining
water, which renders this task time- and energy-consuming. As a coping strategy, households
have diversified their strategies using water from improved and unimproved sources. Many
use the local river and irrigation channels for watering their animals and for other household
chores. According to the kebele’s health workers (Interviews #85, #214), 62% of all households
have corrugated iron sheet roofs, which they use to catch rainwater. Access to water is
particularly difficult during the dry season and in drought periods, when local, protected and
unprotected shallow sources dry up. The situation reflects findings from research on MUS
(Multiple Use Services) that challenges a black-and-white division between domestic and
productive uses for water (cf Van Koppen et al., 2012); and from Ethiopian studies researching
patterns of water availability and water needs, which indicate a great diversity of strategies to
60 Estimated daily income of ETB80-100 from all schemes combined, is a large sum of money in a context
where the basic daily salary of an unqualified labourer is ETB10. The tap attendants’ monthly income of
ETB60 seems low given the requirement to be present during scheme opening hours, every day.
61 I am grateful to Tariku Abebe, who highlighted the abuse of these roles among WASH committee
members.
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access water depending, inter alia, on seasonality, livelihoods, or wealth. These aspects were
discussed in Chapter 2.
Overall, households are dissatisfied with the situation. Women, in particular, resent the long
queuing times and the frequent running dry at the Chinese scheme, and the presence of
worms and bad taste of hand-dug well water. They want household connections, which would
save them time and energy, a point that men often raised at kebele meetings. This request
makes sense because the kebele is based on a similar settlement pattern to the woreda town
where many people have private connections, and also because there are already two private
connections in the kebele. However, because it is classified as a rural area, the kebele does not
qualify for household connections according to official guidelines. Local officials are aware of
this situation. In their descriptions of access, they tend to refer to the experience of local
residents, rather than the UAP framing. However, the kebele administration and the WME
office had yet fully to address the specific scheme management problems.
In light of the daily realities the official access statistics indicating that 70% of the population is
covered become rather meaningless. This is even more prominent in the disagreement over
the real population figure for the kebele. Using the figures collected by the health extension
workers rather than official population projections for the kebele, the calculation for access
stands at 94% based on the ‘scheme potential’ presented above.62 This highlights how the
notion of access can become a game of numbers that is removed from the real-life situation.
6.3.2 Notions of access in the highlands
The highland kebele I visited has a population of 2,028, living in 313 households. The kebele
has no access road; it can be reached via foot paths involving a journey of several hours from
the woreda town, or, in the dry season, by four-wheel drive or motorcycle. Its poor
62When asking about the reason for the difference between the official and the health extension
workers’ statistics, I was told that official statistics are sometimes manipulated in order to obtain more
resources under the PSNP.
161
accessibility hampers not only the kebele’s general economic development but also the WME
office’s communication with WASH committees in the highlands area. The kebele is subdivided
into five administrative groups: Agaya, Darara, Garo, Iyaho and Mogisa. Among these, Iyaho is
the political, administrative and religious centre of the kebele and, as discussed below, is
privileged in terms of its water supply infrastructure.
Its location in the highlands means the kebele is well endowed with springs and has a short dry
season lasting only from December to February. The picture in Figure 6.5 exemplifies the
abundance of spring water in the area.
Source: Author
Across the kebele, the Garo group, located higher up the mountain, has comparatively low
levels of water availability, with no major springs and a water table that is too deep to allow
shallow wells. There is a problem with insects in the springs in the surrounding area, which
have been the cause of cattle deaths in the past. Across the kebele, water availability is poorer
during the dry season when most of the small springs dry up and there are long queues at the
few perennial water sources.
Figure 6.5 Abundance of springs in the highland kebele
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The water supply infrastructure includes three protected springs feeding four water points in
the kebele. Table 6.3 presents the administrative groups where water points are located and
their functional status. Two of the administrative groups have no protected water scheme in
their area, two have one non-functional water point each, and the fifth, Iyaho, has one non-
functional water point and the only functional protected spring in the kebele.
Table 6.3 Improved water schemes in the highland kebele, May 2010
Source: Information from interviews and author’s observations in highland kebele
The functional protected spring serves 30-45 of the 313 households in the kebele (Interviews
#3, #33, #50, #146). In the rainy season, 10-15% of the kebele’s residents use water from a
protected scheme. This is considerably less than the 50% assumed under the ‘scheme
potential’ calculation for the kebele. From interviews with water users - mainly women, and
with WASH committee members and local officials - mainly men, the following issues emerged
with regard to access in the highland kebele.
Among the five administrative groups in the kebele, Iyaho is clearly favoured. It is the only
group with a functional improved scheme, and the only group with two schemes. Among the
85% of the kebele’s residents who fetch water from unprotected sources, the Garo group is
most disadvantaged. The round trip from Garo to collect water from unprotected sources, is
an hour on foot, according to health extension workers (Interviews #135, #196). The former
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and the current kebele chairmen (Interviews #125, #154), who are elected office holders, and
kebele staff members (Interviews #10, #38, #67, #135, #196), are acutely aware of the
disadvantaged situation of the Garo group in relation to water access. The chairman,
concerned about his re-election, expressed fear that people from the other four groups,
particularly from Garo, might feel cheated, particularly because households from all groups
contributed money and labour for the construction of the only functional protected spring
located in Iyaho. The chairman’s priority, therefore, is to secure more projects that will also
benefit the other groups. However, provision of a protected scheme for the Garogroup is
hampered by a lack of accessible springs in the area.
Among the 15% of the kebele population who use the protected spring, there was general
satisfaction with the quality of the water, the service and all the arrangements related to the
scheme. The monthly user fee of ETB0.25 was not seen as problematic by any of the users I
interviewed (Interviews #31, #33, #62, #143, #191, #220, #221). This sum is only a fraction of
the contribution required in lowland areas. In relation to daily water consumption, an
important difference emerged between the WHO and Ethiopian minimum standards, and
actual use. During the wet season, a household collects a total of 30 litres per day according to
health extension workers. This amounts to only 5 l/p/d per person based on the average size
of a kebele household of 6.5 persons. The small volume, only one-third of the consumption
target in the UAP and only a quarter of the volume recommended by the WHO, is explained by
the fact that households use this water only for drinking and cooking purposes. The women
and girls I interviewed explained that they wash clothes and water animals at small streams,
and use harvested rainwater, collected mostly in pots and pans, and unprotected nearby
springs, for other household activities. Figure 6.1 exemplifies this, depicting women cleaning
vegetables in an irrigation channel. In addition, according to the agricultural extension workers,
nearly a quarter of all households have dug their own wells. The water from these wells (which
are not classified as improved) is used for domestic purposes, watering animals and irrigating
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vegetable gardens. Some farmers with fields at lower levels in the kebele divert local springs to
provide small scale irrigation. Only beer brewers fetch substantial volumes of water: 80-100
litres per day.
Figure 6.6 Using unprotected water sources for cleaning vegetables in the highlands
Source: Author
Despite the impression of abundant water gained during my field visit, availability varies
according to the season. During the dry months, December to February, when water from
small springs and shallow wells depletes, fulfilling daily water needs is more cumbersome, and
all the kebele residents rely on few perennial sources for all domestic purposes including
watering animals.
Finally, weaknesses in scheme management have a major impact on access. Two of the
protected springs in the kebele fell into disrepair almost immediately after their construction,
several years prior my visit. According to the WME office, the two non-functional schemes
require only very minor repair works. Women living nearby the broken-down schemes were
very clear that they wanted them to be repaired, but complained that the WASH committee
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ignores their requests, despite one of the women being a committee member (Interviews #220,
#221). Their frustration at not being listened to elevates the gender dimension related to
access. The token female representative on the WASH committee was unable to convince her
male colleagues to take action. Similarly, the female cashier in the lowland WASH committee
was unable stand up against the chairman’s abuse of his power and the unauthorised
withdrawal of money from the committee account. These examples are illustrations indicative
of the deeply entrenched hierarchies and power relations in Ethiopian society, discussed in
Chapter 2, which limit efforts to address gender inequalities related to water. According to
WASH Programme guidelines, a percentage of WASH committee members and tap attendants
should be female (FDRE, 2008: 36). However, in the case I studied, female presence on the
committee was not sufficient to change the existing management culture.
In discussions with WASH committee members responsible for the non-functional schemes
(Interviews #120, #141, #178) and with kebele officials, I was told that the committee is
responsible for carrying out repairs. The kebele chairman, who admitted that he could bring
pressure to bear on the WASH committee, explained that he preferred not to because he
needed its political support. The committee members pointed out that they did not receive a
salary for their work. The WME office had sent out a technician when one of the schemes first
broke down. However, due to lack of support from the WASH committee he was unable to
carry out the necessary maintenance work (Interview #162). Again, similar to the problems
related to management in the lowland kebele, no party was willing to take responsibility for
scheme O&M. This is in line with the literature on governance issues, discussed in Chapter 2,
related to inadequate operationalisation of post-construction support, in Ethiopia and
elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. The unresolved issues related to keeping schemes
operational are reflected also in the framing of access as part of the ‘scheme potential’
parameters of the UAP, which exhibit a supply orientation because they do not take into
consideration scheme functionality status.
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6.4 Summary of framing related issues
At the international level, General Comment 15 sets a normative framework for access to
water supply that includes social, economic, cultural and inter-generational concerns. The
WHO provides minimum guidelines for access related to volume (20 l/p/d), distance (within
1km of the dwelling) and water quality. The MDG 7c target sets international benchmarks for
monitoring access to water supply, represented by the indicator of use of an ‘improved source’.
The JMP, responsible for global monitoring of progress towards the water and sanitation-
related MDG, measures access to an improved source on the basis of a list of scheme types
classified as ‘improved’. Because of the focus on technical parameters, namely access
described using the shorthand of an improved infrastructure scheme, I interpret the MDG and
JMP framings as representing a technical perspective and suggest that the WHO volumetric
and bio-chemical water quality standards also fall broadly within this framing.
In Ethiopia, rural water access standards are set by the UAP. The programme makes a
distinction between a long-term aspiration and an immediate target for achieving ‘universal
access’. The long-term aspiration is to provide 15 l/p/d, within 1.5km of the individual dwelling,
which I describe as ‘volume-distance’ parameters. These parameters relate directly to WHO
standards, but are a ‘watered down’ version, with the minimum volume reduced further and
the maximum distance to the dwelling much longer. However, the immediate target for
measuring progress towards ‘universal access’ in the country is based on an extrapolation of
average beneficiary numbers related to specific scheme types, regardless of their functionality
status. I called these the ‘scheme potential’ parameters. Although the data source in the
Ethiopian case differs from the JMP,63 the targets have a common focus on infrastructure.
Since both UAP access framings have strong similarities to the WHO guidelines and JMP
63 JMP estimates are based on household surveys whereas MoWR figures are based on reports of
scheme types classified as ‘improved’, a difference I discussed in Chapter 3.
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benchmarks, I interpret this as international standards exerting a strong influence on national
framings of access in Ethiopia.
In analysing the framings of sector government stakeholders, and donor and NGO
representatives in Ethiopia, it emerges that these framings are influenced strongly by national
and international framings. A major difference between Ethiopian government and other
stakeholders is the point of reference for the two definitions in the UAP. While all government
staff members refer to ‘access’ as the ‘scheme potential’ parameters closely related to the
indicators in the MDGs, NGO and donor representatives cite the UAP ‘volume-distance’
parameters derived from the WHO standards. When asked about potential shortcomings of
these parameters, all stakeholders criticise the official definitions for their shortfall in
capturing the situation on the ground. Government stakeholders mainly referred to the
inaccuracy of beneficiary estimates in the ‘scheme potential’ parameters. Donor and NGO
representatives, but also government staff, raised problems related to the distance and
volume parameters of the WHO-derived target. However, most interviewees did not refer to
problems beyond the parameters related to these two framings. The exceptions were staff at
woreda level who circumscribe access in close relation to their specific responsibilities and
professional backgrounds. These findings suggest that there is very little diversity in access
framings among sector professionals, and that diversity decreases the further removed are
people’s responsibilities from the daily realities experienced in rural areas.
A circularity was revealed between the setting of a target for ‘access’ and the parameters used
to measure this target. In the case of the WHO-related parameters, these are volume and
distance, under the JMP, parameters are set by the infrastructure schemes classified as
‘improved’. As a result, the setting and measuring of objectives in relation with water access
tend to be self-referential and, thus, even further removed from other parameters that might
be relevant. When comparing the parameters inherent in the two dominant framings with
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concrete situations in two specific locations situated in the lowlands and highlands, the
pictures that emerge do not correspond neatly with either of them.
The UAP’s ‘scheme-potential’ parameters related to the technical framing of the MDGs gives
an access figure of 70% in the lowland kebele, and 50% in the highland kebele. On closer
examination, it appears that despite the higher percentage for the lowland area, accessing
water is more difficult there compared to the highlands, where many unprotected sources are
available throughout much of the year. This indicates that water availability, from protected
and unprotected sources, matters significantly for achievement of access. People cannot be
categorised simply as those with and those without access. In reality, people use a mix of
improved and unimproved sources, from springs, surface water and groundwater depending
on availability and accessibility, whether protected or unprotected. People do not always, as
assumed in the technical framing, collect water from a single protected source. My findings
highlight that ‘access’ depends on the combined overall availability of water from the different
sources, which vary according to the agro-ecological zone,64 and demand for water, which
depends on livelihoods, wealth and settlement patterns, all issues that are highlighted in the
literature on Ethiopia (Calow et al., 2002, Coulter et al., 2010) and more widely (Calow et al.,
2010), as discussed in Chapter 2.
An interesting finding in relation to the term ‘improved’ to refer to the quality of water from
hand-dug wells in the lowland kebele is that it is used by the JMP as shorthand to indicate a
scheme that is likely to be ‘safe’, in the sense of being of an acceptable water quality standard.
However, in my case study, the women I interviewed did not find water from shallow sources
acceptable for drinking and had reservations about using it for other household purposes, a
point made in studies in other settings, e.g. Mehta (2005) for a case study in India.
64 This observation is in line with a growing body of literature on water for crop production (Falkenmark
and Rockstroem, 2004) and water in international crop trade (Aldaya et al., 2010), which recognises the
importance of green water (soil water originating from rainfall) for ensuring rainfed crop-production in
agriculture, for water-related food security.
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Taking the volume-distance parameter as a hallmark of ‘access’ raises further questions. The
most prominent is the low level of consumption of only 5 litres of water per person from
protected sources in the highlands area. This finding is linked to the reservations expressed by
sector professionals in relation to ‘access’, addressed in Section 6.2. However, in the context of
my case study, the consumption of such a small volume becomes understandable because of
the presence of unprotected springs that can be used for other purposes than drinking and
cooking. However, there is no doubt that during the dry season or in areas with lower overall
water availability, low consumption rates from an improved source will become an important
issue. With regard to the distance parameter, neither of my case study locations revealed
particular findings.
My cases highlighted some other factors affecting ‘access’. One was apparent to local
stakeholders, but does not emerge from the statistics; this is the unequal distribution of
schemes across the five administrative groups in the highland kebele. It is possible that there
are other examples of the inequities and exclusion that affect marginalised groups and
vulnerable individuals. For instance, old and sick people, people with disabilities and also
pregnant women, will be less able or unable to carry 20 litre jerry cans of water. These aspects
are related, inter alia, to the social and power relations inherent in community settings
(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999) and to the CBM (Community-based Management) model (Cleaver
and Toner, 2006) discussed in Chapter 2.
Another aspect related to ‘access’, not captured by the above framings, is scheme
management. In both kebeles, weak management had important repercussions for access. The
most obvious examples are broken down schemes that are never repaired thereby foreclosing
access. But the long queuing times and daily uncertainties experienced by mainly women and
girls collecting water at the Chinese scheme also affected the organisation of the day and
reduced access. In the lowland kebele, the nearest alternative scheme supplying good drinking
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water quality is at a distance of 5km and may not be affordable for poor households in the
kebele. These issues have been discussed by various authors in relation to CBM (Fonseca and
Njiru, 2003, Manor, 2004, Cleaver and Toner, 2006, Jones, 2011).
Although women are the main collectors, carriers and users of water, their views are not given
sufficient importance in WASH committees and official kebele meetings. My findings, though
only illustrative, indicate that a female membership in these committees is not sufficient for
women’s voices to be heard. The female cashier in the lowlands had no control over the
committee’s finances. She simply had to carry out the orders of the chairman although this
made her uncomfortable. In the highland kebele, the female WASH committee member could
not persuade her male colleagues to mobilise repair of the protected spring. My cases reflect
points made in the wider literature, discussed in Chapter 2, that gender relations in Ethiopia
are biased against women. Here, the prevalent culture is tilted towards male perspectives,
expressed in the fact that those at the top of a hierarchy in political and administrative
structures tend to be men, resulting in the male WASH committee chairman consulting the
male kebele chairman and male WME office head and taking no account of women’s
perspectives. This point resonates with findings in the literature that discuss the link between
water control, expertise and status in relation with masculinity in irrigation (Zwarteveen, 2008),
and with research that highlights the ‘tokenistic’ character of female representation on WASH
committees (Harvey and Reed, 2004) discussed in Chapter 2.
In summary, the contribution of this chapter to the large literature on diverse aspects of
‘access’, lies not so much in identifying aspects not discussed so far, but rather in highlighting
the significant dimensions of access discussed in the literature on CBM, of gender, and of
patterns of water availability and water needs, discussed in Chapter 2, which are almost
entirely ignored by international and Ethiopian framings used to monitor access. The access
story line represented by the two-tiered UAP definition of ‘scheme potential’ and ‘volume-
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distance’ is narrow and twists reality to accord with a technical perspective. The conclusion
from this first angle of my investigation is that the ways in which most sector stakeholders
frame ‘access’ do not capture the diverse notions of ‘access’ identified in my two case study
locations.
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7 Tracing the political and power dynamics in monitoring access
Chapter outline
This chapter examines the political and power dynamics involved in monitoring access to rural
water supply, specifically, the various actors’ rationales. Using process tracing, I explore the
rationales for the UAP ‘access’ frames, and discuss the power dynamics in monitoring processes,
that emphasise some framings while neglecting others. Section 7.1 traces the development of
the two-tiered definition of rural water access in the UAP, and documents alternative
interpretations of ‘access’ and related rationales among government officials at lower levels of
the administration. Section 7.2 examines the access calculation for the 2008 Southern Region
WRI (Water Resources Inventory). Detailed analysis of the inputs to and outputs of this
appraisal allows me to trace the power dynamics, represented by the intervention of a
powerful actor, the Minister for Water Resources, to impose his particular framing on the
results of the WRI analysis. Section 7.3 traces less formal monitoring practices at woreda level,
and explains that both, formalised and less formalised monitoring, contributes to the overall
understanding of local water sector officers related to rural water access in their location.
7.1 Rationales for calculating water access
Sections 7.1 and 7.2 focus on a crucial sub-process of PM, the calculation of access to rural
water supply in the UAP. Sector government staff at federal, regional, zonal and woreda levels,
are key actors in this sub-process, and are one of the focuses in this chapter. As discussed in
Chapter 6, the UAP has a two-level definition of ‘access’. ‘Water supply coverage’, which I refer
to as ‘volume-distance’, describes access to 15 l/p/d within 1.5km distance from users’
dwellings; ‘water supply access coverage’, which I call ‘scheme potential’, refers to potential
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access based on estimated beneficiary numbers per scheme type. The UAP’s two-tiered
definition allows space for interpretation, space that is exploited by sector government staff at
different administrative levels, when calculating access to rural water supply. I trace how the
MoWR arrived at this method of calculation, and then contrast its definition with the methods
of calculation and rationales of government representatives in the regional, zonal and woreda
sector offices.
7.1.1 MoWR’s rationale for its calculation to achieve ‘universal access’
The MoWR’s ambition to achieve ‘universal access to rural water supply’ in Ethiopia by 2012 is
crucial to the rationales for the UAP’s access framing. As already mentioned, both the original
version of the UAP (MoWR, 2005) and its revision (MoWR, 2009a), are aimed at increasing
access to rural water supply from 35% in 2004, to 98% in 2012. This is a much more ambitious
target than the MDGs for Ethiopia, which aim at increasing access to water supply to 66% by
2015 (MoWR, 2009a). When the UAP was established, the MoWR had a water sector
development programme in place, with the more conservative target of increasing access to
rural water supply to 71% by 2016 (MoWR, 2002). The UAP established a hugely ambitious
change in aims compared to the previous programme, and also to international targets. Below
I trace the developments that led to this shift in access goals.
The UAP was developed in 2004 as part of Ethiopia’s poverty reduction strategy, PASDEP,
which was formulated so that Ethiopia would qualify for debt relief under the HIPC initiative
(Interview #95) to reduce the external debt of poor countries. Development of the UAP,
therefore, is closely related to the global aid effectiveness agenda, outlined in Chapter 3.
According to a former senior official in the MoWR, who was an advisor to the Minister on the
area of the UAP, the idea of ‘universal access’ came from representatives from the
telecommunications sector, during a meeting held to discuss the role of infrastructure in
reducing poverty. This former advisor and his colleagues who participated in the meeting,
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were keen to attract more funding to the sector and also were inspired by the idea of
‘universal access’ (Interview #95). According to this former advisor, the access targets in the
previous sector development programme, a document developed by external consultants,
were quite conservative and were derived from past sector trends and future economic
prospects. He lobbied for a change to these targets, arguing that the right to water was
enshrined in the Ethiopian Constitution and that a more ambitious goal towards achievement
of this right was required.
In their investigation of the feasibility of achieving ‘universal access’, the MoWR experts,
according to the former advisor, focused on two aspects: first, based on the results of a study
indicating that actual per capita consumption of rural water supply in Ethiopia was as low as 5
l/p/d, they decided it would be legitimate to decrease volumetric minimum standards for
drinking water from 20 to 15 l/p/d for Ethiopia, and to increase the maximum distance
between source and dwelling from 1 to 1.5km; based on a successful implementation of a
‘low-cost’ technology programme in a major region of the country, Oromiya, it was suggested
that UAP implementation could rely substantially on low-cost technologies constructed by
residents, such as spring protection and hand-dug wells, which could later be fitted with rope
or hand pumps.65 In the case of the Southern Region, there had shown a significant increase in
latrine construction by residents in a short period of time.66 According to my informant, these
success stories indicated that increasing water access could follow a more positive trend than
the existing Sector Development Strategy estimates based on economic projections.
The former senior official’s account of how the access definition in the UAP was arrived at,
shows that access parameters were compromised in various ways to fit the instrumental
65 ‘Low-cost’ technologies refers to self-supply, the second service delivery model introduced in Chapter
2.
66 According to this ‘success story’ (Bibby, 2007) in the Southern Region, the proportion of latrines in
rural areas increased from 16% in 2003 to nearly 90% in 2006 based on a strategy of political campaigns
combined with outreach work by front-line health workers who persuaded the region’s population to
construct low-cost latrines without use of hardware subsidies (Terefe and Welle, 2008). As referred to in
Chapter 3, the validity of these figures has been the subject of debate in Ethiopia.
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rationale of ‘achieving universal access’ by 2012: the MoWR relaxed the WHO related’ volume-
distance’ standards and opted for reliance on a low-cost strategy. The 2009 revision to the UAP
reemphasised this strategy. When explaining his reasons for the low-cost strategy to me,
another senior official in the MoWR confirmed the importance of this instrumental rationale
within the Ministry. According to him,
If you mobilise the community, the number of schemes you can cover could be quite a
lot. Suppose, if you think of hand-dug wells, if you mobilise the community, they have
to dig hand-dug wells by themselves; then you save energy, money, and your
achievement grows also. (Interview #206)
In other words, this senior Ministry official saw the low-cost strategy as a way of achieving,
quickly and cheaply, the target of ‘universal access’. Yacob Arsano and colleagues who carried
out a political economy review of the Ethiopian water sector and make the point that the
promotion of low-cost infrastructure was seen by some as a “politically expedient measure for
cutting government expenditure and ‘boosting’ water coverage figures” (MoWR, 2002, Arsano
et al., 2010).
When the draft UAP was debated in the federal Council of Ministers, initially it did not achieve
consensus. Those defending the ambition of ‘universal access’ justified it on the grounds of
making it easier to achieve the MDGs (Interview #95). In interviews, several senior MoWR
officials made similar arguments. The senior official quoted above argued that ambitious
targets are good because they help to increase actual achievements, “even if the 100% mark is
not achieved” (Interview #206). His colleague, also in a senior position in the Ministry,
commented similarly that:
We were not sure whether we could achieve the MDG targets. But we exceeded them.
So, if we try, we may achieve 90%. Even if we achieve 80%, who says that this is not an
achievement? It is progress, so it’s better to go for higher targets. (Interview #84)
These interview extracts show that the ambitions are very high in the MoWR, but setting
ostensibly ambitious targets put the MoWR under pressure to realise them. This pressure is an
explanation for why the revised UAP uses the ‘water supply access coverage’ definition or
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‘scheme potential’ parameters to report progress towards ‘universal access’ with the already
relaxed WHO-guideline based ‘volume-distance’ parameters, referring to medium to long term
aspirations.
Soon after the UAP was ratified, it became clear that, even based on the relaxed ‘scheme
potential’ standards, the MoWR would not achieve its targets. In interview, a senior official
explained that, a consultant employed to calculate access based strictly on all the relevant
factors, produced an access figure of just 7.4% (Interview #206) compared with the official
MoWR figure of 34.5% access for the year 2004 (MoFED, 2006). This sudden and substantial
drop would have been politically unacceptable, and most certainly would have jeopardised the
Ministry’s aim of ‘achieving universal access’ within five years. In interview, the same official
hinted at the MoWR’s actions in the face of this problem:
the calculation method is that you don’t use the radius or the volume, but the average.
But when we are strict, when we use the km [distance parameter], then there is a
problem: the coverage would go down, definitely. But we urge everyone that we are
going towards that. (Interview #206)
So, in the revised UAP, the ‘volume-distance’ parameters became the long term goal towards
which the MoWR was working, but not the yardstick for measuring progress towards ‘universal
access’.
Also, the UAP’s ‘scheme potential’ parameters disregard the functionality status of schemes.
This parameter has a significant impact on access figures since it is estimated that
approximately one-third of all improved schemes in Ethiopia in 2010 were non-functional, as
highlighted in Chapter 2. In several interviews with MoWR officials it was explained that
functionality is not included in the ‘scheme potential’ calculation because, strictly speaking,
government is responsible only for the supply side. In the words, as one of the senior official
sources I quoted in relation to the calculation method, told me:
If a hand-dug well is completed and gives service to the community, if a washer is
spoiled and the community cannot repair it, it is their problem. … That is a
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management problem. The management problem should not be the burden of the
sector. (Interview #206)
This statement typifies the MoWR’s attitude to O&M as being the responsibility of the users, in
line with the CBM model discussed in Chapter 2. The focus of the MoWR on measuring the
supply side reinforces a technical framing that conceptualises water supply, first and foremost,
as the provision of infrastructure and not as an ongoing service. Again, there is a circularity
between the framing of the methods (here measuring only supply, that is infrastructure
regardless of its functionality status), and the framing of the desired outcomes (here access
viewed as the provision of water supply infrastructure). The attitude reflected in the above
quote can be seen in the lack of institutionalisation of post-construction support, discussed in
Chapter 2.
In summary, the UAP targets were set within the context of a general drive towards ostensibly
ambitious targets across infrastructure sectors in Ethiopia to make rapid progress towards
poverty reduction. Once these targets were in place, the MoWR was under pressure to report
progress. The instrumental rationale of adhering to the UAP targets, led the MoWR to
manipulate the way it appraised access: by relaxing service standards compared to WHO
guidelines, by employing a low-cost strategy, and by reporting access based on ‘scheme
potential’ parameters, which are not based on actual scheme users and take no account of
scheme functionality status.
However, there are several indications that the MoWRs’ instrumental rationale for achieving
UAP targets was not widely shared among sector staff below federal level. For instance, the
former advisor to the Minister I interviewed, told me he found it difficult to convince regional
BoWRs about these ambitious targets at the time of the UAP negotiations (Interview #95).
Another senior government official told me that the UAP was not well promoted below the
regional level until 2009 (Interview #84), something that is acknowledged in the second
revision to the UAP (MoWE, 2010) and in an MA thesis investigating UAP implementation in
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the Southern Region (Amberbir, 2007). Likewise, the low-cost strategy set out in the UAP was
not fully operationalised by October 2010 (Interview #206). Next, I explore rationales for
calculating rural water access figures at regional and zonal levels.
7.1.2 Clashing rationales over water access calculations
In the Ethiopian rural water sector, PM takes the form of regular reports provided by woreda
WME offices. BoWRs carry out quarterly review meetings ahead of the federal level meetings
to review sector progress. One of the agenda items for the regional sector review meetings is
progress reports on water supply access, from zonal WME departments and woreda WME
offices. The discussions at these meetings provide a context for an investigation of the political
dynamics related to calculating access.
The former head of a zonal WME department commented on the political nature of sector
review meetings and described how regional, zonal and woreda representatives use different
types of information as the basis for access figures that best represent their interests.
According to him, since sector offices at all administrative levels are bound to the UAP ‘scheme
potential’ calculation method, the biggest leeway for manipulating access figures is provided
by their choice of data. Responding to my question about problems related to calculating
access in these meetings, he commented that:
The problem is that it has been very subjective. The regional office calculates by
projecting water coverage using the 1993 [2000 in the Western Gregorian Calendar]
inventory. And we [the zonal office] were using the 1997 [2004 in the Western
Gregorian Calendar] inventory. The woredas are also using the 1997 [2004 in the
Western Gregorian Calendar] inventory but they use actual population figures from
their woredas. So, we were not using uniform information. (Interview # 211)
He told me that, in 2007, as a result of using different data sources, the regional BoWR
reported access for his zone as 69%, the zonal WME department reported it as 27%, while
WME woreda offices in the zone provided a figure of 12-15%. This former department head
also commented on the reasons for using different data sources:
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[T]he problem comes when, for the budget allocation, water coverage data is
important at the regional level. So, when the region asks for water coverage for a
woreda, the regional office reports some number. The zonal and woreda office will
oppose it because the coverage of the regional office is most of the time higher. And
this will not help the woreda to get a big budget. So the woredas and the zone oppose
the regional figure. There is always some quarrel in the meeting in this regard.
(Interview # 211)
His explanation indicates that the regional BoWR is under pressure from the federal MoWR to
report high figures that support a story of successful progress towards ‘universal access’. The
zonal WME departments, on the other hand, are more inclined to support the woreda WME
offices. However, there are also tensions within the BoWR between an ‘instrumental’ rationale
to report a positive trend towards ‘universal access’, and a ‘substantive’ rationale of providing
optimal results for budget allocations to woredas. An engineer in the BoWR commented that:
One thing we strongly defend is that, as we increase the [access] figure of the Bureau,
the figure of the budget will diminish. It is the main problem - because we should set
the coverage of the region so as to get the optimum benefit of the region. Yet,
sometimes, for the sake of not being blamed by the minister, they try to increase the
[access] data. This is what [pause], it is what I hate. We seriously defend but we can't
because it is the order of the Minister's office. (Interview #148)
The BoWR engineer highlights that he and his colleagues are interested in obtaining access
figures that will identify which woredas are in most need of budget allocations. He complains
that the BoWR sometimes manipulates data because of pressure from the MoWR to report
high levels of access regardless of the situation on the ground, a point that was confirmed by
several of his colleagues at the BoWR (Interviews #168, #169). The BoWR’s pressure to report
positive trends towards ‘universal access’ reflects similar pressure provided by upward
accountability to the MoWR.
The woreda WME offices, on their part, also have an ‘instrumental’ rationale, but towards a
different end. They are interested in reporting low figures in the expectation of increasing their
chances of receiving capital budget for water supply. Below, I explore their position in more
detail based on my findings from the WME office in my case study woreda. While the findings
from a single case are not representative, the extracts quoted above indicate that the rationale
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of attracting additional funding to their areas is shared more widely among woreda WME
offices.
7.1.3 A WME office’s rationale – calculating to obtain budget
In my case study woreda, the WME office had its choice of access calculation method
displayed on a poster on the office wall (see Figure 7.1). One of the water engineers in the
office had done the calculations in December 2009. The table in Figure 7.1 shows the numbers
(91) and types of schemes in the woreda and their status – whether functional (49 schemes),
non-functional (30 schemes) or abandoned (12 schemes). The poster also provides a ‘water
supply coverage’ (volume-distance) figure of 38.1% for the woreda. This should be compared
with the regional BoWR’s ‘scheme potential’ figure for the same woreda of 58.62%, based on
regional WRI data for 2008.67
Source: Author
When I enquired about his calculation method, the WME officer told me that he had
calculated ‘water supply coverage’, or the definition referring to the volume-distance
parameters, based on WASH committee estimates of users residing within 1.5km of a
(functional) scheme (Interview #96). In other words, not only does this WME office use
67 This figure was provided by experts in the regional BoWR.
Figure 7.1 WME representation of the water supply situation in its
woreda, December 2009
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different data (as explained by the representative of the zonal WME department in section
7.1.2) but also a different calculation method.
When I asked the same WME officer what the term ‘access’ meant to him, he highlighted that
the ‘scheme potential’ calculation is not indicative of the realities in his woreda, a point
frequently made by sector stakeholders and discussed in Chapter 6. He illustrated his view
with the example of a hand-dug well, explaining that, according to the UAP’s ‘scheme
potential’ calculation, a hand-dug well serves 270 people, but its actual yield may be
insufficient for this number or there may be fewer than 270 people living in the area (Interview
#96). I interpret his rationale for intentionally diverting from the MoWR calculation, displayed
on the WME office wall, as him wanting to capture, as accurately as possible, the real situation
in the woreda.
However, this WME officer was also focused on obtaining a budget allocation, as shown by the
following incident. I observed that, on one occasion, this officer had entered a lower number
of schemes in the woreda in a reporting format for the WASH Programme, one of the water
supply funding interventions in the woreda. When I asked his colleague about this lower
figure, he said that it might have been reduced in response to rumours that the WASH
Programme was soon to be diverted to some other woredas. In reducing the numbers for
water schemes, he hoped to be able to continue to secure funding in the next round.
7.1.4 Summary of the political dynamics inherent in calculating access
The findings in this section indicate that calculation of ‘access’ to rural water supply depends
on the intentionality of the actor framing the appraisal exercise, in this case the calculation
method. At federal level, the MoWR’s rationale is to demonstrate a success story and,
therefore, it uses its authority to manipulate the calculation method to derive a high access
figure. At woreda level, one important rationale underlying WME offices’s framings is
continuing to obtain budgets for water supply, resulting in their manipulating data to show less
182
good results. In my case study woreda, the WME office also explicitly deviated from the
MoWR’s calculation method set out in the table displayed on the office wall, which I
considered to be a political statement, since it is clearly visible to visitors. In the formal setting
of calculation of official access figures, the political dynamics are played out when both parties
act to manipulate the appraisal exercise to arrive at a result that furthers their interests and
views. Viewed from this perspective, the process of monitoring of access to rural water supply
takes on the character of a theatre stage, where different stakeholders enact performances
that present a situation that furthers their specific interests. This metaphor, first invoked by
Stephen Hilgartner (2000), draws particular attention to this political dynamic. I would
highlight here that the woreda WME office staff had decided not to follow the calculation rules
imposed by the Ministry’s directives and were demonstrating defiance to the incumbent, in
this case, the Ministry, by prominently displaying their interpretation of ‘access’ in their
woreda, visible to everyone entering its office. This small act of insubordination shows that the
power dynamics are not completely one-directional in Ethiopia, despite the generally
authoritarian character of the regime. In the next section I examine use of power to frame an
appraisal exercise, in more detail, based on the Southern Region’s 2008 WRI.
7.2 Exercising power by framing access calculations
As explained in Chapter 2, regular reporting on water supply is occasionally checked and
updated through inventories. Inventories are an opportunity to correct previous figures and,
therefore, are political in nature. Studying the calculation of ‘access’ under the Southern
Region’s WRI of 2008 in depth provides an opportunity to investigate the power dynamics in
appraisals. My analysis in this section focuses on two aspects related to the appraisal
processes discussed in Chapter 4 with reference to the STEPS Centre’s Working Paper 3
(Stirling et al., 2007) and Smith and Stirling (2007). First, I study the ‘breadth of inputs’ by
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tracing the different calculation methods used by the data analysis team to calculate ‘access’
based on the data available to them. Second, I analyse the ‘opening up’ or ‘closing down’ of
appraisal results as presented in wider governance, by tracing the process of interaction of
political stakeholders and the results from the data analysis and the ‘access’ result that ensued
from that process. Below, I outline the circumstances that led to the 2008 WRI.
7.2.1 Background to the regional Water Resources Inventory
From fiscal year 2000/1 to 2007/8, the Southern Region’s BoWR reported a continuous upward
trend in access to water supply from 31.2% to 64.4% (see Table 7.1). However, as discussed in
Section 7.1.2, at quarterly sector review meetings zonal and woreda sector government staffs
strongly contested this consistent annual increase in access.
Table 7.1 Water supply coverage in the Southern Region from 2000/1–2007/8
Source: BoWR (July 2009)
According to the former Head of BoWR, the debate escalated in 2007/8, a period when there
was very low rainfall, which the residents of the lowland kebele, discussed in Chapter 6,
referred to as a drought year. While rural and urban regional access figures combined were
officially reported as 64.4% (see Table 7.1), over 50% of the regional population were judged
to be in urgent need of water, and the BoWR implemented emergency operations to transport
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water to communities in tankers (Interview #144). In response to the precarious situation and
disputes over official access figures, the regional president requested a WRI to obtain a more
reliable picture of the water supply situation in the region. He allocated a separate budget to it
and he chaired the inventory process (Interviews #144, #168, #169). The president’s proactive
role in the WRI indicates that he took the matter seriously. I interpret it as related to a
‘substantive’ rationale for requesting the inventory in order to obtain a better understanding
of the water situation in his region which would help him to address current water supply
shortfalls.
The WRI is an inventory of existing improved water supply schemes in the Southern Region
and of potential areas and sources for future schemes. With regard to existing schemes, the
data collection form contains questions on 17 parameters related to the production and
consumption of water from improved sources, designed to calculate access based on the UAP
‘volume-distance’ and also the ‘scheme potential’ access definitions (BoWR, 2008). For
example, the questionnaire asks for information about how many users - from within and
beyond 1.5km - are registered at each scheme, what volume it yields, its functionality status
and various other factors. The WRI data collection format is organised around the UAP access
parameters and is related to water supply schemes and the technical reasons for scheme
failures; it does not ask for information on the experience of individual users or management
issues. Therefore, I consider the overall perspective of the WRI broadly as representing a
technical perspective, which is in line with my discussion of framings in Chapter 6.68 Within this
technical perspective, however, the WRI data cover a diverse set of aspects to analyse the UAP
access notions from different angles.
68 The WRI data collection format was developed in a regional workshop that included various
development partners. The format’s parameters are derived partly from baseline inventory formats
used by UNICEF.
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7.2.2 Breadth of WRI analysis
After aggregation of the WRI data, the BoWR set up a team of six regional experts from among
its staff members, to conduct data analysis. The immediate concern was to analyse
information responding to access questions, to inform the next regional budgeting round; thus,
only data deemed relevant for this calculation were entered on the excel sheet for data
analysis (Interview #168). Based on interviews with members of the team (Interviews #148,
#168, #169), in two draft versions of the WRI report, and a PowerPoint presentation by the
team to the Minister of Water Resources, I found that the data analysis team used four
different calculation methods, which, along with their results, are presented in Table 7.2.69
Table 7.2 calculation methods used by BoWR data analysis team and their results
Sources: 1BoWR (June 2009), 2BoWR (2009a)
The first of the team’s methods was based on principles developed in an earlier report
resulting from a consultancy with Ernst & Young, documented in the BoWR (2008) data
analysis guideline. This method takes into account a wide range of factors including how much
the scheme yields, population figures, and other factors affecting water consumption such as
differences in water availability in relation to Ethiopia’s agro-ecological zones measured via
temperature and altitude, and the scheme’s reliability, that is, its functionality. The ‘Ernst &
Young’ method resulted in a very low rural water ‘access’ figure for the region: 12.5% (BoWR,
69 I renamed the calculation methods to distinguish them more clearly and to highlight to which UAP
definitions they referred. In the original reports, these methods were called: method 1: total supply
coverage; method 2: total access coverage within 1.5km and 0.5km radius; method 3: total access
coverage; and method 4: access coverage.
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June 2009). This method was later dropped and is not used in the final draft versions of the
team’s report (BoWR, July 2009) or in a later presentation by the data analysis team to the
Minister of Water Resources that I discuss in Section 7.2.3.
The second method, which I call the ‘volume-distance’ method, intended to determine access,
as much as possible, along the ‘volume-distance’ parameters of the UAP. This method involved
the team adding up the numbers of users reported as residing within 1.5km of a functional
scheme. Data on the yields were not used by the team to calculate the ‘volume’ parameter.
Although I did not ask explicitly about why this was the case, there are strong indications that
it was because the results were not considered reliable:70 using the ‘volume-distance’ method,
rural ‘access’ increased to 21.5% (BoWR, June 2009).
In the third method, which I call ‘total users’, the data analysis team included scheme users
from beyond 1.5km in the method 2 calculation. This resulted in 31.8% access for rural areas in
the region (BoWR, June 2009).
In the fourth method, which I call ‘scheme potential’, the team calculated ‘access’ based on
the UAP’s ‘scheme potential’ formula, which estimates population served based on average
beneficiaries per scheme type, the official access calculation method of the UAP. According to
this method, access for the rural and urban population combined is 53.9% (BoWR, 2009a).71
In their report and their presentation to the Minister, which I discuss in more detail in section
7.2.3, the data analysis team elaborated on the advantages and disadvantages of each
calculation method. In particular, the data analysis team’s presentation highlighted that
Method 4, based on the UAP ‘scheme potential’ parameters, has a number of limitations: the
analysis is not based on actual user data, the standard population assumed to be served per
70Several interviewees noted that the data they obtained on yield of schemes was poor and the team
also noted this weakness in their report (BoWR, June 2009).
71 This figure was subsequently amended to 51.59% based on new scheme capacity estimates provided
by MoWR after the data analysis team had presented the inventory results to the Minister
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scheme is not based on the scheme’s actual capacity, and volumes consumed and user
distances from schemes are not verified (BoWR, 2009a). A key result in the report is that
scheme non-functionality, recorded as 27% in the region, is a major factor reducing regional
‘access’ (BoWR, June 2009: 13). The report also highlights inequalities between different
woredas and kebeles, an aspect not captured by regional aggregate figures, and that shallow
hand-dug wells and small protected springs, although low-cost, are not sufficient to satisfy
local demand (BoWR, June 2009). In their presentation to the Minister of Water Resources, the
team recommended Method 2, which refers to the ‘volume-distance’ notion of access in the
UAP. The reasons given for their recommendation were that this method is based on actual
user numbers, and because it most adequately satisfies the UAP’s minimum access to water
requirement of a distance of less than 1.5km of the household’s dwelling (BoWR, 2009a).
When analysing the access calculation process from the point of view of ‘breadth of inputs’ in
appraisals, the following factors emerge. Within the technical perspective, which characterises
the WRI, the regional data analysis team demonstrated strong agency in line with Michael
Lipsky’s (1980) work on street level bureaucrats. The team used the parameters available to
them to broaden the inputs into the analysis, by employing four different calculation methods.
Among these methods, the ‘Ernst & Young’ parameters go far beyond the typical indicators
used in the water sector to measure access. The team’s assessment of the advantages and
disadvantages of the different methods documented in their report, and in the presentation I
discuss below, indicates that they pursued a ‘substantive’ end; they were interested in
capturing, to as great an extent as possible, the water supply situation in the region. In their
report, the team concludes that non-functionality is a major factor impacting on access, a
result that responds directly to the original objective of the WRI to uncover why official sector
reports show a positive access trend while there continued to be reports of water scarcity in
the region.
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However, the omission of the ‘Ernst & Young’ calculation method from the team’s later draft
report also indicates that the team closed down their analysis. I interpret this in the sense of
Lukes’ (1974) second dimension of power, which holds that actors suppress their preferences
to conform to the status quo. In this case, the data analysis team probably dropped Method 1
from the later draft versions of its report and from its presentation to the Minister, in the
expectation that the 12.5% access number would not be politically acceptable.
A final point emerging from analysis of the breadth of inputs into appraisal, is related more
generally to the politics of knowledge production underlying PM. The wide disparity between
the highest and lowest access figures for water access, based on same data using four different
calculation methods (13% to 53.9%)72, suggests that a definitive picture of PM may be elusive.
The above emphasises again that the measuring of a phenomenon (in this case access)
depends crucially on the different framings of interpretations. This observation supports the
understanding of knowledge production as socially constructed rather than being a linear,
uniquely objective process. In this case, the four different methods used help to illustrate that
PM can be seen as representing an abridged story of access. The full stories told by each
method convey divergent pictures of rural water access in the Southern Region.
Next, I analyse the closing down and opening up of appraisal results to governance in relation
to the WRI.
7.2.3 Closing down WRI results to governance
When the federal MoWR was made aware of a drop in access from 64.4% to 35.5% for the
Southern Region, based on the results of the regional WRI, it reacted by rejecting these results.
A delegation, led by the Minister, travelled to the region to resolve the situation. The BoWR
data analysis team mounted a presentation to the Minister in which they described their
calculation methods as explained above (except for Method 1 which was based on ‘Ernst &
72 I am using the access figures for rural and urban water combined here as I did not obtain a
disaggregated figure for rural water access for Method 4.
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Young’ parameters). In line with their view of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each
method, the team recommended Method 2 relating to the ‘volume-distance’ parameters of
the UAP method (BoWR, 2009a). However, the Minister insisted on Method 4, the UAP’s
method to calculate ‘scheme potential’. According to one of the data analysts present at the
meeting, the Minister argued that Method 4 was simpler than the other methods (Interview
#168), while another data analyst present at the meeting, said that the Minister acknowledged
that:
scheme potential has vast limitations and does not directly address the exact coverage
of the area, rather it tells you what is the potential of the scheme whether there is a
beneficiary there or not. (Interview #148)
Despite this recognition, the Minister was not willing to accept other data analysis methods
proposed by the experts from the BoWR. Instead, he sent the BoWR an official letter
confirming the parameters of ‘scheme potential’ as the official method to be used in the future.
Despite the Minister having imposed his will on the BoWR, the MoWR continued to reject the
regional figures, possibly because a drop in access for the region from 64.4% to 51.59% (based
on the ‘scheme potential’ calculation method) was politically not acceptable. The MoWR
argued that this rejection was based on poor data collection. However, the regional Bureau
Head considered that data collection had been better than for previous inventories and
provided “more reliable and acceptable” figures (Interview #144), a view shared by other
regional, zonal and woreda staff and non-government representatives to whom I talked.
According to the regional experts involved in the data analysis, the official calculation method
was “forced on them” (Interview #148) by the MoWR and “not that much satisfactory”
because it counts “potential schemes” (Interview #169). The regional cabinet, which originally
had commissioned the WRI, did accept its results. According to the former head of the BoWR,
the main issues discussed in the regional government were related to sustainability, i.e.
keeping schemes functional (Interview #144).
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This analysis of the Minister’s intervention shows how a powerful actor, here the Minister, can
‘close down’ appraisal outputs in order to justify ‘instrumental rationales’. I interpret the
Minister’s insistence on the calculation method as reflecting an ‘instrumental rationale’ behind
the push for progress towards the sector goal of ‘universal access’, driven by a desire to show
evidence of positive developments in the sub-sector.73 The Minister used his positional power
to impose a particular – positive – calculation method, an indication that, in the case of this
formal PM exercise, the direction of accountability was upwards in the hierarchy, with the
form of calculation driven by political pressure from the Federal level. The process of ‘closing
down’ the WRI results to the ‘scheme potential’ parameters as a representation of access can
be interpreted as an act of stage management. In this particular act, the ‘scheme-potential’
notion of access is presented as ‘truth’. The interpretation of performance as being stage
managed, is reinforced by the Minister’s acknowledgement of the limitations related to the
‘scheme potential’ calculation method.
However, my findings suggest also that, despite pressure for closure to this particular result,
the same appraisal was also ‘closed down’ to alternative results reflecting more ‘substantive
rationales’. In the case of the WRI, the Southern Region Cabinet acted independently of the
Federal Minister, to use results to serve a more substantive imperative. Rather than simply
supporting prior political aims, the objective was to achieve a substantively improved
understanding of problems relating to rural water access in the region, indicated by an
important part of the discussion of the WRI in the regional cabinet, focused on the high non-
functionality rates across rural water schemes in the region.
Outputs from the same appraisal process can be used simultaneously to ‘close down’ different
results, presented within wider governance discourse. This is another signal that appraisal, i.e.
73 As discussed above, WME offices had a different purpose in their instrumental rationale: they were
interested to present a low access figure in order to have a stronger case for obtaining capital and
operational budgets.
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the WRI, was not a logical linear exercise, but was subject to political pressures that variously
accommodated the interests and perspectives of different actors. In order to understand the
degree and manner in which an appraisal exercise is closed down to wider governance
processes, my findings suggest that more attention should be given to the rationales and
actions of diverse individual actors. These may be separate from of the formally stated
rationale or imperatives driving the exercise as a whole. In the case of the WRI, it was
important for the closing down to alternative appraisal results, the emphasis on high non-
functionality rates, that the regional government was interested to find ways for improving
access across the region. In Chapter 8 I explore the factors affecting decisions about access and
discuss the use of the inventory results at the regional level in more depth. In Section 7.3 I
investigate informal monitoring activities in the sector.
7.3 ‘Tacit’ monitoring activities
As described in Chapter 1, by ‘formal’ monitoring activities I refer to monitoring procedures
aimed at measuring performance, which are codified, for example, in a manual or a data
collection format, and which follow procedures established at a higher level than individual
WME offices. In addition to fulfilling formally codified monitoring obligations, actors are
involved in monitoring activities with varying degrees of formality, such as through verbal
exchanges or adoption of procedures that have not been formally established. In this section, I
draw attention to parallel monitoring practices of a varying degree of formality, and how their
combination builds to form a body of knowledge that informs decisions. What becomes again
clear in this section is the high degree of agency of street level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980), here
WME officers, who, to a degree, ‘make’ policies rather than merely implementing orders.
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7.3.1 Additional aspects considered in the inventory exercise
In my case study woreda, four experts from the WME office were engaged in data collection
for the WRI, the subject of the discussion in Sections 7.1 and 7.2. In the course of the data
gathering in order to complete the inventory questionnaire, these experts collected other
information on water access, which was informative for their work. One of the junior team
members, an electro-mechanic, explained that, for her, the inventory was important because it
allowed her to familiarise herself with different types of engines, and some of the reasons for
their breakdown, and enabled personal contact with WASH committee members (Interview
#202). Her appreciation of the opportunity to visit different scheme sites was echoed by WME
officers involved in collecting data for the National Water WASH Inventory in 2010. These
WME officers saw the exercise as a valuable opportunity to study and assess a wide range of
aspects beyond those that were part of the inventory. One of the most important things for
them was being able to see which water points had WASH committees, how much these
committees were trusted by users, and how repairs were managed. They also used the
interaction with WASH committee over the scheme inventory as an opportunity to follow up
on some of the problems they observed, such as poor sanitary conditions at the water point,
or children being allowed to play with hand pumps.74
The comments made by the WME officers showed that other dimensions of access were
assessed and related feed-back was provided during the process of completing the inventory
questionnaires. These contacts and assessments serve also to establish relationships with
various stakeholders, including WASH committees and kebele officials and staff, but also water
scheme users. In Ethiopia, scheme inventories are the only budgeted opportunity for WME
officers to collect primary data on water supply schemes. However, these inventories are only
74 This information was offered by woreda WME officers at a workshop in Addis Ababa that assessed the
use of the National WASH Inventory in May 2011. Some of these points were captured in the workshop
report (Welle and Bostoen, 2011).
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a part of the monitoring activities carried out by WME officers. In Section 7.3.2, I explore the
day-to-day monitoring activities encountered during my fieldwork in the case study woreda.
7.3.2 Day–to-day monitoring practices by the WME office
In 2010, at the woreda level, there was a reporting format, but no specified procedure or
budget line for monitoring water supply access. As explained in Chapter 2, the reporting
format focuses on the progress of activities during the project implementation cycle, and on
scheme rehabilitation works carried out (BoWR, 2009b). A second format captures the
numbers of functional and non-functional schemes in the woreda. However, monitoring
activities to provide this information depends on the initiative of individual WME offices, and
monitoring practices likely differ across woredas. None of the monitoring activities I describe in
this section are supported by a dedicated regional budget or codified procedure for sector
monitoring.
During my visit to the woreda, I recorded a range of monitoring activities carried out by the
WME office. According to the WME technician, one of the WME office’s strategies was to
request updated information on scheme functionality and on WASH committees’ savings, by a
letter sent to kebele administrations and WASH committees. Another strategy was conducting
follow ups with WASH committees in kebeles, en route to a scheme that needed repair. He
also made enquiries among local artisans in the highland areas about scheme functionality in
these less accessible locations (Interview #162). The WME office’s community mobiliser,
checks WASH committees’ savings accounts and financial reports whenever he passes through
a kebele, using the rules and formats introduced by the WME office in 2009 (Interview #166).
The WME office may contact kebele administrations by phone, and during chance meetings
between WME staff members and WASH committee members, for instance on market days,
they discuss scheme-related issues (Interview #179). WASH committee members and kebele
officials visit the WME office, or call or write to report scheme failures or other problems. For
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example, officials from the lowland kebele I discussed in Chapter 6, regularly visited the WME
office to complain about the non-functionality of the Chinese scheme, the poor water quality
at hand-dug wells, and about the high costs incurred when buying water from the woreda
town (Focus Group Discussion #1, #2).
Based on data on scheme functionality obtained via the ways described above, the WME office
continuously updates its scheme records. These office records act as guidelines for weekly and
monthly maintenance schedules devised by the office technician and his colleagues on the
O&M team.75 The WME office was planning to conduct refresher courses for water committee
members to improve their financial management and technical maintenance skills, strengthen
ties with them, and provide incentives for good O&M practices (Focus Group Discussion #2).
The description of monitoring practices indicates that the WME office has developed a diverse
range of monitoring and feed-back channels regarding water supply in the woreda, which
involve kebele staff and officials, and WASH committee members. The key points of reference
for the WME’s monitoring activities are the woreda water supply schemes and the WASH
committees managing them. In particular, the WME office monitors functionality and manages
the financial management practices of the WASH committees. Other framings that relate to
experience of access among individual users, mainly women and girls, such as long queuing
times and queue jumping, are not monitored closely. The monitoring areas described by
individual WME officers are related closely to their individual roles and responsibilities. For
example, the technician was particularly concerned about technical maintenance of schemes,
while the community mobiliser was focused on financial management issues. The areas they
monitor correspond also to their individual framings of water access analysed in Chapter 6.
This confirms the observation made in Chapter 6 that there is a circularity between the
75 The former WME office head also explained that the recent introduction of O&M procedures within
BPR (Business Process Reengineering) had helped to clarify responsibility for maintenance between the
woreda, zonal and regional sector offices, and this was speeding up response times from the higher
administrative levels to reports of scheme breakdowns filed by the woreda WME office (Interview #179).
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framing of a problem, and the methods to assess that specific problem. It appears that WME
staff members assess access problems based on their experience and professional background.
The issues identified become part of their future monitoring activity, such that the problem
framing and monitoring cycles continue to follow similar patterns.
I complement the monitoring practices described above with an overview of the inventories
and studies carried out in the woreda since 2000, when responsibilities related to domestic
water supply started to be devolved to the woreda level. Based on interviews with sector
representatives in my case study woreda, I trace how, over the years, staff members have built
a substantial body of knowledge on local water supply access.
7.3.3 Building a local body of knowledge on water access
In the first years of the 21st century, when the first water sector representative was employed
in the woreda, the total number of water supply schemes was unknown (Interview #166). In
2004, when the number of water employees had reached three officers, the BoWR organised
its first Water Supply Survey.
Table 7.3 Water scheme inventories carried out in the case study woreda between 2004 and 2010
Sources: Interviews #96, #179, Abebe and Deneke (2008), Abebe et al. (2010)
Between 2004 and 2006, funding from various sources for water supply and sanitation
interventions started to arrive in the woreda, including an action research programme, called
RiPPLE, introduced in Chapter 5. Within this programme, a number of studies were conducted,
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including two water scheme inventories, a ‘sustainability study’ implemented in April 2007,
and an ‘equity study’ carried out in May 2008 (see Table 7.3). The sustainability study
investigated the causes of poor scheme functionality in the woreda (Deneke and Abebe, 2008).
Water sector staff members collected detailed information on every scheme and led focus
group discussions with WASH committees on issues affecting the sustainability of schemes.
According to the former WME head this study “woke up the office” (Interview #179).
According to him, the lack of sound financial management of WASH committees emerged as a
major factor negatively affecting scheme functionality, particularly at deep wells that required
fuel to operate, which required ongoing management of income and expenditure. With
support from RiPPLE, sector staff carried out training for all WASH committees in the woreda,
and introduced rules and formats for financial management (Interview #166). The
sustainability study revealed also that – contrary to the assumptions of sector staff members –
WASH committees often did not report scheme breakdowns to the WME office. As a result,
actual non functionality rates in the woreda were much higher than previously assumed by
sector staff (Interview #162).
The following two water scheme inventories, one an input into the RiPPLE equity study (Abebe
et al., 2010) carried out in May 200876, and the region-wide WRI carried out in June 2008, had
a less important impact in terms of increasing the WME office’s understanding of the water
supply situation in their woreda. However, both inventories allowed helped the WME office to
accumulate experience and build relations with WASH committees. For instance, as discussed
above, the inventories provided an opportunity for junior staff members to familiarise
themselves with the water supply situation in the woreda. Furthermore, as explained in
Section 7.2, the regionwide WRI involved a survey of unprotected springs that might be
developed into improved water supply schemes. This part of the inventory was as an
76 Although focusing on equity in the distribution of unprotected water resources for small scale
irrigation activities, the study also included a survey of improved water supply schemes.
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important reference for the WME office’s planning during the time of my visit in May/June
2010. In Chapter 8, I discuss how this accumulation of a detailed body of local knowledge on
water access supported the WME office’s related access decisions.
By collecting data for various scheme inventory studies, WME office staff gained an increased
understanding of the factors determining rural water access in their woreda. Among the many
insights gained by the WME office, I noted three aspects that represent particularly important
contributions to their body of knowledge on the local access situation. First, inventories
provided sector staff members with a bird’s eye view of the water supply infrastructure in their
woreda. Second, inventories gave the office an opportunity to renew relations with WASH
committees and other local stakeholders, which increased feed-back loops via the various
monitoring channels described in Section 7.3.2. Third, the sustainability study highlighted
some previously ignored factors related to maintaining access, i.e. the importance of good
financial management, particularly to enable schemes that operate on fuel.
Overall, this section has highlighted that WME officers gradually and continuously built up
their knowledge related to the rural water access situation in their woreda. The PM
information codified in sector reporting formats and collected during inventory studies
represents only a fraction of the body of knowledge explored in this section. Much of the
knowledge held by and acted on by WME officers (see more detail in Chapter 8) is tacit
knowledge, referred to in Chapter 4. The findings on the various monitoring activities at
woreda level confirm the notion prompted by the findings presented in Section 7.2, that
several monitoring processes of varying degrees of formality proceed in parallel. In other
words, monitoring is not, as presumed by the linear model of PM, based typically on a singular,
linear process.
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7.4 Power dynamics in monitoring, and the framings that dominate
In this chapter, I used process tracing to explore the political and power dynamics underlying
the calculation of rural water access, a central aspect of PM in Ethiopia. I showed that, in the
case of the MoWR and my case study woreda WME office, the calculation of access is driven
by an instrumental rationale to achieve a particular end. The MoWR changed the minimum
criteria determining access and the parameters for its calculation, to portray a positive trend
towards achieving ‘universal access’ to water supply in Ethiopia. The WME office deliberately
chose parameters for calculating access that portrayed less progress, in order to increase the
chances of further budget allocations for water supply interventions. These findings, that is,
the strategic choice over the data and methods for calculating access made by these actors,
demonstrate that PM is subject to political dynamics. It is not, as assumed in the linear PM
model, a neutral and uniquely objective exercise. My findings also confirm observations from
Michael Lipsky on street-level bureaucrats. He argues that street-level bureaucrats have a
considerable degree of agency in policy processes through their exercise of discretion in day-
to-day policy decision making (Lipsky, 1980).
When studying an appraisal process in depth, as I did in the case of the access calculations in
the 2008 WRI, it becomes clear that power relations play an important role in monitoring
dynamics. Powerful actors, the Minister in the case researched here, are able to impose their
framings on appraisal exercises; in the case study in this chapter, the Minister ‘closed down’
the WRI results by dictating the UAP calculation method as the official method of determining
access in Ethiopia. These findings highlight again that in the case of rural water access in
Ethiopia, PM does not represent a rational way to arrive at a robust result, but rather is subject
to framings that are driven, at least in part, by powerful actors’ rationales. When a powerful
actor manipulates an appraisal process to justify particular ends, PM takes on the character of
a ‘staged’ performance, displaying a subjective representation of reality manipulated by the
framings of powerful ‘actors’. At the same time, the regional cabinet, in accepting alternative
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outputs of the WRI, ‘closed down’ the inventory outputs to different results (highlighting the
high rate of non-functional schemes), which led to a related social commitment (a budget
increase for scheme maintenance in the region), an example of a ‘substantive’ rationale.
However, both results frame access based on a technical mindset.
Chapter 7 demonstrates also that monitoring dynamics are not limited to a singular, formal
exercise, but may involve multiple processes, with various degrees of formality, that proceed
in parallel. On the one hand, the same topic can be discussed in contrasting ways, and with
diverging conclusions, as shown in the case of the alternative outputs resulting from the WRI,
as presented to the Minister and in the discussion in the Southern Region’s Cabinet. On the
other hand, I have shown that codified monitoring activities, such as inventories, also involve
additional assessments, which, although not officially documented, contribute to a more
nuanced understanding of water supply access, particularly at the woreda level. A combination
of the various monitoring activities at the local level highlights alternative framing dimensions
in the UAP. In my case study woreda, one alternative is the aspect of financial management of
water WASH committees. However, here also, the focus is largely on the technical aspects of
O&M, where the main points of contact for the WME office are WASH committee chairmen
and kebele officials and staffs. In parallel, individual user perspectives, particularly those of
women and girls and vulnerable individuals and marginalised groups of people, are not well
represented in the alternative framing dimensions of the WME officers. Even when a scheme is
functional, people’s levels of access can vary widely, depending, for instance, on queuing times,
or uncertainties related to too high demand for water, as described in Chapter 6 in relation to
the Chinese scheme in the lowland kebele. These alternative perspectives continue to remain
largely hidden and excluded even from the more diverse framing dimensions of WME staff
members at woreda level.
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Chapter 8 examines the factors affecting decisions related to water supply access. I look
specifically at the role of PM results, namely UAP access figures, and other of the results
presented in Chapter 7, in decisions on water supply.
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8 Dynamics of rural water access decisions
Chapter outline
This chapter investigates the explanatory power of PM results in decisions on rural water
access in Ethiopia. I am interested, in particular, in the mechanisms that lead to access
decisions and understanding the specific role of PM results in this activity. Of course, ‘decisions’
on rural water ‘access’ encompasses a range of possibilities. The logic within RBM assumes that
PM informs sector budgeting and planning; hence, I investigate these two aspects in Sections
8.1 and 8.2. In Section 8.3, I examine the factors leading to two specific decisions: a water
supply budget shift from the lowlands to the highlands in my case study woreda; and repairs to
the Chinese scheme discussed in Chapter 6. In Section 8.3 the method of process tracing is
again central and is employed to examine whether the role of PM among the different factors
affecting two water-related decisions, was necessary, sufficient, or merely contributory.
8.1 Factors affecting budget allocations for rural water supply in
Ethiopia
A key assumption in relation to PM in RBM is that there is a single stranded feed-back loop
between PM results and decisions taken. This is referred to in OECD jargon as the ‘results
chain’. When applied to the rural water sector, the logic of the results chain holds that
monitoring results inform future budget allocations and strategic sector planning. In the
literature on RBM implementation, discussed in Chapter 3, even in OECD countries the relation
between results-based information and budget processes is characterised as weak (Sandahl,
1997). From this it follows that, in highly aid dependent countries with complex sector
financing arrangements, the link between monitoring results and budgeting decisions is likely
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to be even more fragile. Despite this, the link between results-based information and budget
allocations is emphasised by sector stakeholders.
Ethiopia is such a country. A report entitled Water Supply and Sanitation in Ethiopia. Turning
Finances into Services for 2015 and Beyond (WB, 2010b: 16), finds that “rural water supply in
particular is supported by almost every conceivable combination and permutation of
development assistance”. In this section I expose some of the most significant of these
‘permutations’ and demonstrate how they weaken the assumed results chain between
monitoring results and budget decisions in Ethiopia. Note that my discussion refers to the
situation in the Ethiopian financial year 2009/10, the time of my field visit. Since then, the
sector has harmonised some of the financial modalities I describe below.
8.1.1 Overview of financing modalities for rural water supply (2009/10)
An important and complicating aspect of water supply and sanitation related funding in
Ethiopia is the dependency on foreign assistance. According to a recent Joint Budget Aid
Review (MoWR, 2008a: 8), in 2006/7-2007/8 average Federal Treasury sources amounted to
less than 50% of the total sector budget for water supply and sanitation. Other sources of
funding for the sector are multilateral and bilateral donor assistance and NGO funding.77
The 2009 Public Finance Review of Ethiopia (WB, 2009) represents the most comprehensive
effort in Ethiopia to provide an overview of the different financing mechanisms for rural water.
The review identifies eight different ways that financial resources are allocated to rural water
supply interventions, under three financing ‘channels’ (WB, 2009: 55). These channels
(Channels 1, 2 and 3) are distinguished by their relation to the Ethiopian budgeting and
expenditure system. Channel 1 funding flows directly through the Ethiopian budgeting and
expenditure system via the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) and its
77 Prospective users also contribute up to 5% of the construction costs in cash or in kind, and are
expected to cover scheme O&M costs. However, their contributions are not captured consistently in
sector financial documentation and, therefore, are not differentiated here.
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representative offices at lower administrative levels. Channel 2 uses special accounts set up
within Ethiopian line ministries, and Channel 3 funding is made up of project aid flowing
directly from bilateral donors and NGOs to beneficiaries, with no Government of Ethiopia (GoE)
involvement (WB, 2009: 55). Based on available financial sector data in 2010, comparison of
the magnitude of different funding sources is very tentative. The above cited Public Finance
Review provides an overview of foreign funding sources organised by financing modality,
based on a minimum three year average of budget allocations (WB, 2009: 55). According to
these figures, Channel 1 funding included approximately 53% of foreign aid, Channel 2
accounted for just below 42% and project aid under Channel 3 was equivalent to
approximately 5%. It is important to note here that there is no overarching mechanism for
allocating budget to this sector, which is one indication of the complications inhibiting a clear
link between PM and budget allocations for rural water. Section 8.1.2 outlines the factors
affecting the budget allocations under each channel, and discusses the role especially of
monitoring results.
8.1.2 Factors affecting budget allocations under Channels 1, 2, and 3
Channel 1 financing is divided between Channel 1a, which is the financial resources controlled
by Ethiopian Treasury rules, and Channel 1b, which is financial allocations from donor
programmes to the sector that are earmarked for rural water supply.
Channel 1a refers to the government’s own budget allocation to rural water supply. However,
due to Ethiopia’s decentralised governance structure, the sector’s UAP is not supported by a
direct federal budget line. Channel 1a includes multi-sector intergovernmental transfers to
national regional states, zones and woredas via general and special purpose ‘block grants’, as
explained in Chapter 2. The rules for the distribution of block grants, specified in the ‘New
Budget Grant Distribution Formula’, do not specify allocations to particular sectors. This
budget formula, which was introduced in 2009, takes account of population size, relative
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revenue raising capacity, relative expenditure needs, and performance incentives (Arsano et
al., 2010: 13). So, rather than allocating funding directly against specific UAP targets, the
Ethiopian government allocates its financial resources according to this formula.78
A proportion of the ‘block grant’ funding is allocated to the regional government, the
remainder being channelled to lower levels - in the Southern Region to zonal and woreda
governments. Part of the regional block grant goes to the BoWR in line with the above budget
distribution formula, which, in the fiscal year 2008/9, amounted to ETB80 million (Interview
#4). As a result of the division of labour between regional and woreda sector offices outlined in
Chapter 2, the regional budget caters only for the construction of large, often multi-village
schemes, and major rehabilitations. Since the investment costs of a multi-village scheme can
range from ETB10-30 million, it can be seen that the contribution of the total regional capital
budget for water supply investment is rather small.
At woreda level, the bulk of block grant allocations in the past went on salaries and operational
budgets, not capital investment (Aboma, 2009: 9, Alemu and Thomas, 2009: 9). This has
significant repercussions for the water sector, where large capital investments are needed to
construct infrastructure, and does not compare with the other basic services of health,
education and agriculture, where a higher proportion of the budget is allocated to recurring
costs (Welle et al., 2009).
One reason for the lack of capital budget for rural water supply at the woreda level is that
woreda governments often have budget deficits and struggle to cover salaries (Interview #89),
a point emphasised by one of the sector officers in my case study woreda (Interview #179).
Also, woreda governments expect capital funding for water supply infrastructure to come from
78 At regional and woreda level, budget formula are supposed to be devised in line with this federal
budgeting formula (Arsano et al., 2010: 13). At the same time, the proportion of resources allocated to
different sectors also is subject to the priorities of regions and woredas (Keller and Smith, 2005: 274,
Alemu and Thomas, 2009: 8, 9). This indicates that there is ambiguity about the freedom for regional
and woreda governments to set their own priorities. Keller and Smith (2005: 274) comment that, in
practice, decisions at lower administrative levels generally conform to federal level priorities.
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donor programmes or NGOs (Amberbir, 2007: 83, Alemu et al., 2010: 21), confirmed by
interviews in my case study woreda (Interview #96). Another problem is that, before 2010,
WME offices were not part of the executive government body, the woreda cabinet, where
budget allocations to different sectors are decided (Alemu et al., 2010). This dynamic,
confirmed by interviewees in my case study woreda (Interview #96), reduced the sector’s
ability to obtain budget shares even for ongoing expenses such as fuel and per diems crucial
for regular duties.
The main dynamics of Channel 1a is the allocation of Federal treasury funding though block
grants to regional and woreda governments for all the basic services sectors rather than
allocation directly for the UAP. The budget distribution formula considers a number of factors
including investment requirements for rural water, which means that existing water access
levels are one among several factors taken into account in the allocation of funds for rural
water supply. An important inhibitor in the link between results-based information and budget
allocations under Channel 1a, is that treasury funding for capital investments is very limited at
the regional and woreda levels in the Southern Region. At woreda level, in particular, block
grants were mainly used to pay staff salaries and recurrent expenditures. Therefore, use of
monitoring results to inform future rural water supply investments under Channel 1a was a
largely theoretical exercise in 2010.
Channel 1b manages funding from donor programmes that flows through the GoE’s
expenditure system, but is managed via special accounts earmarked for water supply and
sanitation. In the Southern Region, in 2009/10, this channel was used by the AfDB, the WB
(which also administered additional funding from DFID), and UNICEF. Channel 1b funding
allocations follow a project type arrangement, each programme providing funding for use only
by specific woredas. Table 8.1 presents the number of woredas supported by the donor
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programmes in the region. Among the region’s 134 woredas (BoFED, 2008: 1), 80 received
regular support from one of the three donor programmes; the general rule being that a
woreda can receive funding from only one donor programme (Interview #4). Table 8.1 shows
that the three donor programmes have different start and end dates, and that funding periods
vary between five and eight years. In addition to regular funding, UNICEF provides significant
sums to the region for emergency support. This funding, which went to 25 woredas in 2009/10,
is subject to entirely different rules.79
Table 8.1 Funding periods and number of woredas funded under Channel 1b, for the Southern Region
Sources: 1BoFED unpublished list of water supply intervention woredas 2009/10, 2Interview #89;
3DAG (October 2007)
The decisions over which of the 134 woredas will receive donor support are taken by the
regional government in consultation with the individual donor programmes (Interview #89). In
the case of the Southern Region, there are several criteria influencing these decisions,
including existing water supply access figures for the woreda, achieving an equitable
distribution of funding across the 56 ethnic groups in the region (Interview #89), and the
nature of the donor programme. For example, the Dutch Government, which provided funding
for 8 of the 22 UNICEF funded programmes, requested the GoE to identify adjacent woredas in
different zones (Interview #89), presumably to facilitate programme support visits by UNICEF
79 Emergency funding is provided based on emergency reports usually related to incidences of flooding
or drought, or high levels of waterborne diseases such as ‘acute watery diarrhoea’ (the euphemistic
description of cholera in Ethiopia). Emergency funding us usually for one year and can be provided
regardless of whether the woreda is already receiving funding under another programme (Interview
#89).
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staff. For the first round of the WB and DFID funded WASH Programme, an important criterion
in the choice of intervention woredas and to ensure a fast uptake of activities was the woreda
government’s estimates of existing levels of capacity and demand (Interviews #8, #110, #179).
The amounts of funding allocated to individual programme woredas is subject to programme
specific criteria. For instance, the WASH Programme spreads its total funding evenly across its
programme woredas, resulting in a total budget of ETB3.5 million for each woreda across the
funding period (Interview #181). Although existing service levels are one of the criteria for
choosing programme woredas, they are not considered in the distribution of resources across
the 34 programme woredas.
The above factors illustrate that the existing level of access to water supply is one among many
aspects taken into account when choosing programme woredas for Channel 1b. Funding from
Channel 1b is allocated for funding periods of five to eight years, to specific woredas, which
does not necessarily align with government’s strategic planning. This means that the Southern
Region’s government cannot strategically use Channel 1b resources for its planning towards
the UAP.
Channel 2 represents multi-sector donor programme funding, the PBS (Protection of Basic
Services) and the PSNP (Productive Safety-Net Programme) outlined in Chapter 2. Funding for
these programmes is channelled outside the water sector, and is handled through special
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) accounts and by its lower
administrative level line offices (WB, 2009). I use the example of the PSNP, which was active in
my case study woreda, to illustrate decisions on budget allocations for rural water supply. The
criteria for qualifying for PSNP support do not include rural water access and are related
mainly to the level of food insecurity in the woreda (MoARD, 2010: 5). In the Southern Region,
this qualifies 78 out of 134 woredas to receive funding (Interview #204). Financial resources
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from the PSNP can be used only to fund the construction of labour intensive and low-cost
schemes, that is, hand-dug wells and protected on-spot springs; and for the rehabilitation of
existing schemes. Decisions about the allocation of capital funding under the public works
component of the PSNP are taken at woreda level (MoARD, 2010: 29). In theory, these
decisions are based on a participatory, bottom-up planning and budgeting process in each
kebele (MoARD, 2010: 35). In practice, when the annual woreda budget is negotiated in the
relevant woreda government task force, priorities established at higher levels have an
important influence on the distribution of capital resources. For example, one officer who had
been present at PSNP budget debates, explained that one already decided priority was the
construction of farmer training centres in every kebele (Interview #40). Some considerations
are political; for example, the woreda administrator’s place of birth was prioritised over other
kebeles (Interview #40, 129).
In summary, Channel 2 funding for rural water is beyond the control and even knowledge of
the water sector above the woreda level.80 At woreda level, under the PSNP, the rural water
sector competes for capital funding allocations with the other services sectors; and capital
funding for water is subjugate to higher administrative priorities and political considerations.
Channel 3 funding or project-based aid, comes from NGOs and some bilateral donors. The
dominant aspect of the budgets allocated via this channel is that they are independent of the
GoE. Allocations by donors to this channel were relatively small in 2009, but the amount of
NGO funding to the sector was estimated at around 12%. As suggested in Chapter 2, it is
probable that NGO contribution amounts are actually higher. For example, in the Southern
Region, only 17 of the 39 NGOs with rural water supply projects in 2009 provided information
80 Until the public finance review cited above, federal level sector stakeholders were not fully aware that
these programmes make a significant contribution to the construction of rural water supply
infrastructure in Ethiopia (WB, 2009).
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on their interventions; the Consortium of Christian Relief & Development Associations’ basis
for the 12% estimate (CCRDA, 2010).
The Southern Region government is closely involved in NGOs’ selections of intervention
woredas. According to a senior BoWR officer, existing levels of services and of support are
important criteria for identifying woredas (Interview #4). However, the Southern Region
BoWR’s internal list of NGO interventions does not show a particularly high level of NGO
activity in woredas not covered by donor programmes because there are multiple factors, in
addition to regional government preferences, that affect the choice of NGO intervention areas.
Every NGO, whether local or international, is bound by a number of factors that determine
where and how it intervenes.
For example, the work of World Vision in my case study woreda is child-focused and is multi
sectoral with the result that the BoWR is not the main point of contact and, therefore, is not
involved in the selection of NGO intervention areas. Also World Vision works through local
‘area programmes’ that tend to intervene in the same locations over extended periods
(Interview #77). In 2010, the NGO had been active for 25 years in my case study woreda and,
as I explain in more detail in Section 8.2, was by far its most important source of funding for
rural water supply, providing more than a third of all the woreda’s rural water supply schemes.
Another example is a local NGO ‘Acts of Compassion’, which works in my second case study
woreda and is particularly committed to the development of those living there (Interview
#185). The NGO has received funding for 2009-2012 to implement a hand-dug well programme.
The BoWR has no leeway to influence either the type of technology or the geographic area of
intervention of this NGO.
Based on this short overview of the dynamics of budget allocations for rural water within three
financing channels in Ethiopia, I would suggest that results-based information on rural water
access is one among many factors that influence related budget decisions. In relation to
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Channel 1a, the GoE’s funding channel for the UAP, the main issue is the general lack of budget
resources for capital funding. The bulk of capital investment for rural water comes from
Channels 1b, 2 and 3, each of which applies different criteria to budget allocation. Although
existing service levels are always a condition, budget allocations are subject to numerous
additional conditions and factors, which, together, limit the BoWR and WME offices’ control
over these funding sources. In the next section I discuss some repercussions of this situation.
8.1.3 Repercussions for the BoWR and WME offices’ control over funding
The BoWR directly controls the allocation of Channel 1a treasury resources for rural water
supply, and has a degree of authority over the distribution of Channel 1b funding, donor
funding earmarked for water supply, sanitation and hygiene, across the region’s 134 woredas.
However, in practice, donor preferences also play a role in the allocation of programme
woredas, and the fact that a fixed amount of finance is locked into specific woredas for periods
of five to eight years reduces the regional BoWR’s flexibility to use funding from this source to
respond to PM results. In relation to Channel 2 funding allocated to multi-sector programmes
such as the PSNP, the regional BoWR has little knowledge about and no influence over these
budget sources because the allocation of funding to specific sectors under these programmes
has been devolved (mostly) to woreda level. Furthermore, the BoWR has very limited control
over Channel 3 funding provided through NGOs. This means that the BoWR directly controls
only a small proportion of the capital funding for rural water supply in the region. In the
financial circumstances obtaining in 2010, the BoWR’s scope for strategic planning was likely to
be limited.
The WME offices have a higher level of control over financial allocations once funding reaches
their woreda. However, their level of control is limited by a number of factors. One contextual
factor is that, because of general budget deficits at woreda level, Channel 1a treasury funding
goes mostly to salaries and operational budgets. Channel 1b funding for water supply,
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sanitation and hygiene under the WASH programme is constrained by a universal budget
ceiling that takes no account of the woreda’s estimated access or infrastructure investment
requirements. Funding under Channel 2 is limited to low-cost schemes, which are not viable in
many lowland and dryland areas. NGO funding under Channel 3 is highly dependent on the
nature of the particular NGO intervention.
Overall, the findings in this section suggest that the complex mix of financing modalities for
rural water supply poses an obstacle to the creation of a direct link between monitoring results
and budget allocations in Ethiopia’s Southern Region. In Section 8.2, I explore the realities of
strategic planning for rural water supply at regional and woreda level, in more detail.
8.2 Strategic planning for rural water under the UAP
In this section, I analyse the theoretical relation between PM results and the setting of
strategic targets under the UAP at regional and woreda levels. My account of strategic
planning at the regional level builds on the MSc thesis of Tegegn Amberbir, a senior expert in
the BoWR, who, in 2007, carried out a detailed study of the Bureau’s 2006 five-year strategic
planning process.
8.2.1 The BoWR’s 2006-2010 strategic plan preparation
At the regional level, the subject of my analysis is the BoWR’s five-year strategic plan for 2006-
2010 (BoWR, 2007). In the area of rural water supply, the plan’s objective, derived from the
UAP, was to increase rural water supply access from 45% in 2006 to 73% in 2010 (BoWR, 2007:
17). Amberbir (2007) made a detailed study of the 2006-2010 strategic plan preparation,
through focus group discussions and individual interviews with experts involved in the process.
Amberbir highlights a number of factors that are indicative of a lack of strategic direction in
the preparation of the Bureau’s strategic plan.
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One factor identified by Amberbir was the arbitrary appointment of staff members to the
strategic planning team. According to Amberbir, the five experts selected by the BoWR to carry
out the strategic planning were not representative of the various departments and sections of
the BoWR, and they did not have appropriate educational backgrounds or work experience in
strategic planning (Amberbir, 2007: 50-51).81 In the interviews he conducted with members of
the strategic planning team, team members themselves stated that they were selected
“arbitrarily”(Amberbir, 2007: 50).
Another factor limiting the team’s strategic planning ability was the lack of time and resources
required for a thorough planning process. For example, the planning team did not receive
sufficient support for data collection and consultation with relevant partners such as donor
programmes and NGOs operating in the region (Amberbir, 2007: 54). The lack of data on
existing service levels, and on human, material and financial resources was a serious hindrance
to its strategic planning activity. Due to the lack of systematic information on water resources
potential in the region, and lack of detail about the status of schemes, the team was unable to
forecast amounts of financial resources and capacity needed to construct new schemes and
rehabilitate existing ones (Amberbir, 2007: 55). The team was not able to consult with
development partners in order to get information on their contribution to proposed
construction and rehabilitation activities. Instead, the strategic plan assumed that donor
programmes would cover 50% of estimated costs (Amberbir, 2007: 48).
Amberbir highlights also that the planning process followed a top-down approach that was out
of touch with the realities. The BoWR had to formulate its strategic plan in line with the “pre-
defined goals, objectives and strategies” of the MoWR some of which, in Amberbir’s view,
were “not practical to the [BoWR’s] local conditions” (Amberbir, 2007: 57). Amberbir
81 Of the five experts making up the team, four persons had a technical or engineering background.
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comments also that that the UAP goals and timelines were dictated onto the Bureau even
though “they cannot be achieved in the specific time period” (Amberbir, 2007: 57).
Amberbir’s analysis indicates that the BoWR’s preparation of the five-year plan to achieve the
UAP targets had the character of a ‘rubber stamping exercise’, particularly because it did not
build on sufficient results-based information and was not aligned to available budgetary
resources. The BoWR’s limited control over financial resources may explain the absence of a
clear strategy in the Bureau’s five-year plan. It might also have been exacerbated by the
Bureau’s lack of ownership of the ambitious targets handed down from the Federal MoWR
(see Chapter 6). Whatever the reason, the logic underlying the linear RBM model of PM
feeding into the revision of objectives and related allocation of budget resources, cannot be
confirmed for the 2006-10 strategic sector planning process.
8.2.2 Planning for rural water supply at woreda level
For woredas that receive capital funding from Channels 1b, 2 and 3, the fragmentation of
these funding sources, their lack of alignment with the GoE’s strategic planning periods, and
the mismatch between the necessary strategic planning exercises and capital funding to
implement individual plans, are all factors impeding the smooth flow between monitoring and
strategic planning for rural water supply. I explore these factors based on the situation in my
case study woreda.
In my case study woreda, the block grant (Channel 1a) provides funding for staff salaries and
operational budgets, but no capital funding. The three major sources for capital funding of
rural water supply infrastructure are the WB WASH Programme (Channel 1b), the PSNP
(Channel 2) and the NGO World Vision (Channel 3). As a result, strategic planning against the
UAP is not supported by a Channel 1a budget, and the funding provided by the WASH
Programme under Channel 1b and the PSNP under Channel 2 was subject to separate planning
processes.
214
Table 8.2 presents funding period durations, infrastructure built, and approximate capital
spending for the individual financing modalities present in my case study woreda.82 Comparing
these characteristics across the four funding sources, we see that the durations of all three
capital funding sources are unaligned with the BoWR’s strategic five-year plan for 2006-2010.
Comparison of capital estimates for scheme construction from the three funding sources
shows big differences in amounts. By far the largest source of capital funding comes from the
NGO World Vision; the second largest funding source, the WASH Programme, is less than one-
tenth of the capital funding provided by World Vision.
Table 8.2 Various characteristics related to individual financing modalities in my case study woreda, June 2010
Sources: World Vision project document, MoFED Water Supply and Sanitation fund utilisation
sheet, MoFED PSNP Fund Utilisation Sheets & report prepared by officer for me
Also, the schemes constructed and strategic planning requirements under the different
financing modality are at odds with each other. The majority of capital funding between 2005
and 2011 was provided by World Vision, which, under Channel 3, operates completely outside
the GoE’s financial system; the five-year strategic UAP plan has no capital budget under
Channel 1a. The WASH Programme, which provides less than a tenth of the sum allocated by
World Vision’s capital resources, works on a seven-year strategic plan that is constituted by
individual two-year plans, and funding under the PSNP is linked to separate yearly strategic
82 I was unable to obtain budget information that was comparable across the three programmes;
therefore, I use MoWR 2005 construction costs estimates by scheme type as a proxy for comparing
investments from the three budget sources for rural water.
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planning exercises. This means that strategic planning is far from the straightforward, textbook
exercise suggested under the RBM model for the WME office. Rather, the WME office is
obliged to ‘muddle its way through’ the dysfunctionality of parallel formal performance-based
planning exercises, without budget or budget sources outside the formal planning processes.
When I asked the WME officer in charge to explain his planning for rural water supply, he
differentiated between the formal requirements the office was required to adhere to, and an
overall planning exercise for the woreda council that was based on existing and potential
funding sources in the woreda. The notion of adherence to plans was expressed by a senior
WME officer as “if the WASH Programme asks us to prepare a plan, we forward it; if we are
asked by the PSNP, we will do the same; if the BoWR asks us, we will give it” (Interview #96).
According to this statement, the preparation of strategic plans for particular programmes has
connotations with complying to set rules rather than providing a basis for concrete, strategic
decisions. On the other hand, the same WME officer explained that, his office also prepares a
yearly action plan for the woreda council, which takes all the different funding sources into
consideration. He explained that this plan:
... is very flexible. Strategically, you may show that, if budget is available, this number
of schemes will be implemented. You plan like that. If the budget comes, you
implement, if the budget does not come through, it will be covered by another
programme. (Interview #96)
The officer’s explanation shows that the WME office acts strategically, but not according to a
specific programme-based plan. Rather, it is the budget resources available under different
programmes with their various conditionalities that determine the WME office strategy. For
example, to rehabilitate a specific scheme, the WME office would put in a budget request
under the WASH Programme and under the PSNP. In addition, WME experts would lobby for
funds with World Vision and enquire with the zonal WME department about sources of
funding from other NGOs active in the zone. Once funding materialises from one of these
sources, the WME office undertakes the rehabilitation works. Based on the various bottlenecks
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and opportunities under the different financing modalities available to the WME office, I
conclude that the notion of ‘muddling through’ more accurately describes planning for water
supply in my case study woreda than the RBM’s linear concept.
8.3 Factors affecting specific rural water access decisions
In this section, I trace processes leading to specific decisions related to rural water access: the
refocusing of WASH Programme funding from the lowland to the highland area in my case
study woreda, and the repair to the Chinese scheme in the lowland kebele discussed in
Chapter 6. I examine the factors affecting these decisions, and whether PM was a necessary,
sufficient or merely contributory factor in these decisions.
8.3.1 The reallocation of World Bank WASH funding
As discussed in Chapter 2, the WB WASH Programme was designed to support decentralisation
of the rural water supply services to woreda level by providing a model for performance-
related planning and implementation (MoWR, 2004a). This includes the WASH Programme’s
participatory, bottom up approach, which allows prospective users to choose their preferred
type of technology.83 However, in the woreda I studied, the WASH Programme initially funded
a number of low-cost schemes in the lowland kebeles where residents were dissatisfied with
the water quality from shallow water sources. Three years into this project, most of the WASH
Programme’s financial resources were reallocated to the construction of protected springs in
the woreda’s highland areas. Below, I trace the process that led to the first, unpopular decision
and its later abandonment.
8.3.1.1 Tracing the process of allocating WASH funding
In 2005, when the WASH Programme was launched in my case study woreda, it included a
substantial capacity building supporting component, consisting mainly of a Woreda Support
83 The users’ chosen technology is specified in a certificate signed by all expected users of the scheme.
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Group (WSG), a three-member consultant team that provided ongoing technical support
services to the woreda administration for a period of two years. Specifically, the WSG
supported the establishment of a Woreda WASH Team (WWT), a planning and coordination
body to include representatives from various government offices, mandated to provision of
water supply, sanitation and hygiene.84 The WSG would assist the work of the WWT in the
planning and implementing of water supply services in accordance with the WASH
Programme’s guidelines.
One of the first tasks in the WASH Programme was choosing priority intervention kebeles.
According to one of the WSG consultants (Interview #110), and the deputy woreda
administrator (Interview #8), a number of criteria, such as water supply and sanitation service
levels, willingness of kebele representatives to cooperate, and accessibility of the area
informed the choice of intervention kebeles. However, in reality, most weight was given to
those aspects that increased the likelihood of a speedy implementation process. The WASH
Programme operated by transferring budgets from low performing woredas to those receiving
more funding (Interview #110). So, in order to maximise WASH Programme resources, the
WSG consultant advised the WWT to prioritise the more accessible kebeles in the lowland
areas.
The consultant’s advice followed another of the WASH Programme’s guidelines, a preference
for low-cost technologies whenever they supported year-round water supply (WB, n.d.: 77). An
additional incentive for using low-cost technologies was the budget ceiling of ETB3.5 million
per woreda, which meant greater exploitation of cheaper technologies allowed more areas to
benefit from the available budget. However, low-cost technologies were contrary to the
preferences of lowland residents for deep wells and household connections. In interview the
WSG consultant acknowledged awareness of residents’ preferences, recounting their
84 The WWT consisted of members of the woreda’s executive body, the woreda cabinet, and
representatives of agriculture, education, finance, health, water, and women’s affairs offices.
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responses to his advice: “we don’t want hand-dug wells and shallow wells, we want a piped
scheme” (Interview #110). He sympathised with them, but continued to recommend low-cost
technologies based on the limited funding available:
They said so many things but we confronted them that, actually, your selection is good,
but the approach is that the allocated budget is a factor for deciding which types of
schemes will be implemented. (Interview #110)
According to one of the WME officers involved in the process at the time, kebele residents
were told that that their choice was between a low-cost scheme or no scheme (Interview
#179). He explained that the woreda cabinet members represented on the WWT also were
reluctant to provide low-cost technologies in lowland areas because they were aware of the
negative attitudes to these scheme types among residents (Interview #179). However, the
WWT ultimately accepted the WSG’s recommendation.
The WWT’s decision reveals a power dynamic similar to that discussed in Chapter 7. A
powerful actor, here the WSG, was able to impose its interpretation of what was best for the
woreda – namely starting with interventions in the more accessible lowland areas and
implementing low-cost technologies – despite the participatory procedure built into the WASH
Programme. Rather than users’ preferences, fast implementation of low-cost technology
became the main driving force for the allocation of financial resources. In theory, the WSG had
only an advisory role; the WWT was the official decision making body; in practice the WSG,
through its strategic positioning as a link between the woreda government and the WASH
Programme’s regional implementation unit, was able to shape decisions taken under the
WASH Programme.
8.3.1.2 Factors affecting the shift of WASH Programme budget to highland areas
Shortly after the unpopular decision to construct low-cost schemes in the lowlands, the WASH
Programme was halted temporarily because of procurement and financial reporting
bottlenecks at higher levels (see Chapter 2). When it resumed in 2008, some of the dynamics
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around rural water supply had changed in my case study woreda. In 2007, the NGO World
Vision had secured large capital funding for a five-year water and sanitation project. World
Vision wanted to use this funding to construct deep wells in the more accessible and more
densely populated lowland areas of the woreda (Interviews #77, #179), the area where the
WASH Programme was planning to implement low-cost technologies. When the WWT learned
about the new project, it decided to refocus the WASH Programme funding on the woreda’s
highland areas. Reallocating the WASH budget to the highlands enabled the office to use the
budget sources available to them more effectively, providing deep wells in the lowlands and
implementing protected springs in the highland areas (Interviews #8, #96, #179). The following
factors facilitated the WWT’s decision to make use of this ‘window of opportunity’.
Since the start of the WASH Programme in 2005, the capacity and skills of WME officers had
been increasing, boosting the confidence of the WME office. By 2008, the WME office was
upgraded to an independent office at woreda level with representation on the woreda cabinet.
Its staff numbers had grown from 3 experts in 2005 to 13 in 2008. Through its implementation
of a rural water supply inventory in 2007 under RiPPLE-related action research outlined in
Chapter 7, the WME office had a better understanding of the water-related needs across the
woreda (Interview #8, #179).
In 2008, the WWT was more conversant with the WASH Programme approach. Having trained
a number of local artisans with WASH Programme support, the WME office was confident that
it could implement the Programme in the less accessible highland areas of the woreda where
unprotected springs offered ample opportunities for low-cost technologies. At the same time,
the WASH Programme’s reputation had deteriorated in the lowland areas. Although residents
had contributed financial resources to a technology choice that was not their preferred one,
infrastructure construction had been delayed for more than 12 months. The WASH
Programme was nicknamed “wushet”, an Amharic word meaning ‘false’ or ‘liar’ (Interviews
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#77, #110). The WWT generally became more self-reliant after completion of the WSG
contract in 2007: this was emphasised by the former woreda administrator who remarked that
“the woreda became autonomous to take decisions” (Interview #8).
Tracing this process confirms that policy processes are not driven exclusively by a singular
rational model and also do not proceed in the strictly linear fashion suggested by the RBM
model. Instead, decisions are the outcome of diverse, ongoing negotiation, which is influenced
by changing power dynamics, as discussed in 4.3.2 on the politics of policy processes. In this
case, disruption to the WASH Programme, termination of WSG’s contract, and the WME
office’s greater capacity and understanding of local water needs across the woreda, all of
which enabled the WWT to act autonomously in deciding to reallocate WASH funding. This
example clearly highlights that it is multiple factors rather than results-based information
alone that shape rural water access decisions.
My analysis of the particular role of PM results (service levels across kebeles) in diverting the
WASH budget from the lowlands to the highlands demonstrates that the WME office’s
increased understanding of the different rural water supply needs across the woreda was a
necessary factor in this decision. At the same time, I would argue that this deeper knowledge
regarding the woreda’s water supply needs was not based only on PM results; the WME office
had accumulated a body of ‘tacit knowledge’ on the water supply situation in the woreda
based on its participation in action research undertaken by RiPPLE, day-to-day interaction with
WASH committees, kebele officials, and other factors.
8.3.2 Repairs to the Chinese scheme
The process of repairs to the Chinese scheme complements the above example. In addition to
drawing attention to the multi-causality in decision making related to rural water access, this
case focuses on the dynamics between users, the WASH committee, the kebele administration
and the WME office.
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8.3.2.1 Tracing the process leading to repair
The Chinese scheme, which is the deep well described in Chapter 6, had served the lowland
kebele’s residents since the late 1980s, when their number was only a few hundred living in
one small hamlet. The scheme was managed by the WASH committee, responsible also for the
two functional hand-dug wells in the kebele. The WASH committee employed three people: an
operator to service the pump and refill the reservoir twice daily, and two tap attendants to
manage the queues and collect fees at the two public water points.
Since 2006, the scheme had suffered a succession of breakdowns and cycles of attempted
repairs and was often out of operation for long periods, until its eventual successful repair in
May 2010. The original technical problem was a leak in the reservoir. An unsuccessful attempt
to repair it by the WASH committee resulted in damage to the pump motor which ceased to
work. BoWR staff repaired the pump motor, but not the reservoir leak, and within a month,
the problem recurred. The WASH committee had become disheartened and was reluctant to
mobilise more funding from users, with the result that the scheme remained non-functional
for over a year (Interviews #44, #28, #142, #36).
At that time, the kebele’s population counted several thousand residents, and demand for
water had increased substantially. During the drought year of 2008 (see WRI discussion in
Chapter 7), the situation became particularly precarious. Women were forced to travel, on
foot and at night, to the 5km distant woreda town, to collect water; a family might have to
spend up to ETB5 per day on water, equivalent to half the basic wage of a labourer (Interview
#209). As a result of the WRI in October 2008, the WME office again reported the Chinese
scheme. The WRI results, which were debated by the regional cabinet in summer 2009,
highlighted non-functionality of schemes as a major issue that was impacting negatively on
service levels. Regional government designated maintenance a priority action for the BoWR in
financial year 2009/10 (Interview #144).
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At the end of 2009, with the general elections scheduled for May 2010, fast approaching, the
kebele’s residents began to voice their dissatisfaction more loudly. According to the former
WME head, a consensus was forming among there was a saying across the lowland kebeles,
that “the regional president would not earn his seat” if their urgent water problems remained
unaddressed (Interview #179). This resulted in the woreda government putting political
pressure on the regional government to repair the major breakdowns of the motorised
schemes in the woreda, while the WME office continued to follow up with the BoWR. In
January 2010, a team from the regional BoWR repaired the scheme’s pump, but the problem
with the reservoir continued (Interview #179). Meanwhile, the WME office had negotiated
with World Vision for two new reservoirs, and had purchased a third using WASH Programme
funding (Interview #179).
There was a local resident, who was the priest’s son and had been headteacher of the kebele’s
school, who played a key role in pushing for the repair to the Chinese scheme. He highlighted
that kebele residents collectively, were spending some ETB5,000 a day to buy water from the
woreda town. He managed to convince the kebele residents to make a one-off contribution to
enable the WASH committee to pay for the labour and spare parts needed to install the new
reservoirs (Interview #209). However, in early 2010, the WASH committee experienced a
leadership crisis. The chairman who had been overseeing the management of the three
schemes since the late 1980s (the Chinese scheme and the two hand-dug wells), resigned as a
result of accusations of financial mismanagement (Interview #192). The kebele administration,
under pressure to demonstrate performance before the upcoming elections, intervened to
organise payment for the repair works and the purchase of various smaller spare parts
(Interview #124). The repair to the reservoir was finally completed two weeks before the
general elections in Ethiopia in May 2010.
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However, although the scheme was operational during my visit in 2010, there were various
signs that the service might experience more disruption. The operator was worried that one of
the main technical problems related to the pump motor’s failure was not completely resolved.
The WASH committee had been reluctant to spend money on replacing the part because it did
not want to deplete its financial savings, and the WME office had been unaware of the
problem. Over the years, there had been a series of financial management problems, including
lack of transparency in recording income and expenditure and failure to make regular deposits,
misuse of power resulting in the female cashier being made to release money to the
committee chairman and the kebele administration, and growing mistrust, abuse of roles, and
suspicions of cheating by the WASH committee and its employees (see discussion in Chapter 6).
These internal WASH committee dynamics indicate that scheme management and, thus,
scheme functionality were jeopardised.
8.3.2.2 Factors affecting the repair
The long and convoluted story of the repairs to the Chinese scheme highlights that even
decisions that, viewed from a distance, appear relatively straightforward, were subject to a
complex set of inhibiting and facilitating factors. In the following discussion, I distinguish
between factors that hampered and factors that facilitated the repairs.
Harvey and Reed (2004), referred to in Chapter 2, claim that the high non-functionality rates of
hand pumps in Sub-Saharan Africa is due to lack of attention to the wider context and the
specific local conditions under which CBM (Community-based Management) is practised. Both
these aspects apply to the case of the Chinese scheme repair. Concerning the wider context,
an inhibiting factor in the Southern Region is that the wider policy environment does not
provide the WASH committees with the necessary support structure, oversight, and direction.
As discussed in Chapter 2, WASH committees are not legal entities, training of their members
is not institutionalised, and there is no regulatory oversight of their financial management; in
224
2010, the BoWR’s community participation and training service had no dedicated budget or
work plan (Interview #111).
A problem specific to the Chinese scheme was lack of clarity over financial responsibility for
major repairs. Although responsibility for maintenance of the pump was assumed by the BoWR,
it did not take on the task of repairing or replacing the reservoir. In 2010, the cost of a
reservoir was ETB37,000, the representing the equivalent sum of constructing a hand-dug well,
which clearly was beyond the financial capacity of local users. In the case of the Chinese
scheme, the WME office tried to find another source of finance; it negotiated with World
Vision to donate two reservoirs and purchased a third using the WASH Programme budget.
The WASH committee promised to provide financing to cover local labour costs and tools.
There were also logistical and capacity problems related to the regional BoWR’s maintenance
team which added to delays in repairing the Chinese scheme. As discussed in Chapter 2, the
Bureau’s logistical capacity for carrying out major repairs in the region is limited. For instance,
in 2010, the BoWR had only one vehicle in good working condition, but was in need to carry
out major repairs in its 134 woredas (Interview #20), to service the 751 non-functional shallow
wells and 120 non-functional deep wells recorded in the 2008 WRI that potentially required
major repairs (BoWR, July 2009).
In addition, lack of capacity and professionalization of scheme management (Fonseca and Njiru,
2003) discussed in Chapter 2, contributed to delays to the repair of the Chinese scheme, and
increased the likelihood of subsequent breakdowns. The WASH committee struggled to
manage its income and expenditure to keep the scheme operational, and there was a growing
climate of distrust related to the handling of financial resources. Although the WME office
encouraged good financial management by WASH committees as a result of the RiPPLE action
research conducted in 2007, guidelines, authority and capacity were inadequate to address the
WASH committee’s financial management problems.
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Finally, the dominant engineering culture of “design and build” (Harvey and Reed, 2004),
highlighted in Chapter 2, had implications for how the MoWR conceptualised ‘access’. As
discussed in Chapter 6, senior officials in the MoWR described the notion of ‘scheme potential’
as shorthand for ‘access’, justifying this understanding as the government’s role in rural water
supply being that of a ‘supplier’ of infrastructure rather than facilitating a continuous service.
This lock-in to a ‘project-based mode’, a mode of working where attention is mostly on
completing a project cycle which ends with the scheme being handed over to the WASH
committee, has implications for monitoring and following up of non-functional schemes in
Ethiopia. Although the WME office had reported the broken-down Chinese scheme several
times, including during the WRI, it took time for the BoWR to respond, and the completion of
the repair required additional follow up from various actors.
A number of factors facilitated the repair of the Chinese scheme.
A combination of contextual factors put repairs to the Chinese scheme at the top of the local
political agenda. An important contextual event was the 2008 drought, which increased the
kebele residents’ hardship and led them to voice their discontent in political meetings. The
drought also triggered the WRI and, based on the results of this inventory, the regional BoWR
increased its efforts to carry out repairs across the region, including the Chinese scheme. It is
likely, also, that the Bureau’s maintenance team was helped by the relative accessibility of the
woreda, which is situated on the main road between two zonal towns. Another facilitator for
the regional repair team was the continuous follow up from the WME office with the regional
BoWR, and from the woreda administration with the regional government.
At the local level, the son of the retired priest worked to accomplish the scheme’s repair. He
was crucial for motivating and supporting the WASH committee, for example, by persuading
the kebele’s residents to contribute financially. Finally, the imminent elections created a
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‘window of opportunity’ to push for the remaining repair works to be finished. Several
interviews referred to the upcoming elections as a strong motivating factor prompting the
kebele administration to mobilise efforts and resources to finish the outstanding tasks, that is,
welding and mounting of the three new reservoirs. Finalisation of the work, just two weeks
before of the Ethiopian general elections, demonstrates the importance of this contextual
factor. It highlights also that, even though the Ethiopian Government can be characterised as
authoritarian, in this case government officials reacted to pressure from citizens.
Overall, PM results (here, the WRI) were not a sufficient factor to explain repair of the scheme.
However, the WRI results and the related commitment of the BoWR to achieve better
functionality of schemes across the region, played a part. Among the multiple inhibiting and
facilitating factors discussed above, monitoring results can be seen as a contributory factor.
They can also be considered a necessary factor since, without the WRI and increased regional
commitment to scheme maintenance, the Chinese well repairs might have been further
delayed. Compared to the RBM model, which assumes a linear link between appraisal results
and decisions, this detailed examination of the process related to a particular scheme
breakdown and its repair shows that, again, many other factors acted as intervening variables.
8.4 The role of performance monitoring in rural water access
decisions
The focus in this chapter has been the link between PM results and decisions within the single-
strand feedback loop of the RBM model’s ‘results chain’, investigated through scrutiny of
budgeting and strategic planning for rural water, and detailed analysis of the various factors
affecting two specific water-related decisions.
The analysis of budget decisions related to rural water supply in Ethiopia reveals the huge
complexity of the financing arrangements in the sector, and shows also that Channel 1a
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funding, which adheres to government rules to distribute budgets via block grants to regional
and woreda levels, provides very limited capital funding for rural water supply. Funding via all
other channels, that is, from sector donors under Channel 1b, from multi-sectoral programmes
including the PSNP under Channel 2, and from project aid under Channel 3, takes account of
service levels, but is subject to numerous other factors many of which are unrelated to water
supply. An example of these other factors affecting the distribution of funding across the
region is a donor’s request for its interventions to apply to two adjacent woredas. Also, the
criteria for selecting intervention woredas under the PSNP are related to food (in)security and
not the water supply situation in the area. In my case study woreda, the biggest source of
capital funding was World Vision, an NGO whose work is child-focused and not geared
primarily towards rural water supply.
The fragmentation of financing channels for rural water has negative repercussions for the
control of regional and woreda government’s over their budgets and, consequently, for their
ability to plan and implement rural water supply interventions strategically. The BoWR
preparation for the regional strategic sector plan for 2006-10 was tokenistic: it was rushed and
not based on information provided by woreda WME offices, or available budgets. A sector
expert who analysed the process characterises it as a pie-in-the-sky exercise, not based on the
conditions on the ground and, therefore, unrealistic. At woreda level, the WME office planning
was bound by various constraints and opportunities related to sector internal and external
funding sources. A comment from one of the WME officers (see above) highlights this
unrealistic planning - without a budget and then implementation whenever funding became
available. The dynamic between a forthcoming budget and a shift in the plan and its
subsequent implementation, is clearly demonstrated in the case of the budget reallocation
from the lowland to the highland areas. The WME office’s plans are based on monitoring
results, but these are informed by a wider set of informal monitoring activities described in
Chapter 7.
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Finally, detailed analysis of two specific rural water access decisions highlights the multi-
causality behind these decisions. In the case of the Chinese scheme repair, it is clear that the
maintenance process involves not a linear sequence of reporting of a breakdown which is
followed by repair, as assumed in the ‘results chain’. Rather, there were several factors that
worked in favour and against the repair process. Many of the inhibiting factors were linked to
the wider CBM model, in which PM is embedded, and which has a number of serious flaws, as
discussed in Chapter 2. The conclusion in relation to PM based on this case study is that the
failure being reported as part of the WRI contributed to the scheme’s repair and was probably
a necessary factor. However, this was not sufficient to make the repair happen. From this it
follows that PM, although it has a role, is not a panacea for improving the effectiveness of
public services, in this case, rural water supply.
229
9 Conclusions
Chapter outline
Chapter 9 summarises the argument and supporting findings presented in this thesis, and
draws overarching conclusions. Section 9.1 revisits the research questions, summarises the
related findings and explains how they address the main research question. I discuss my case
study findings in the context of the wider aid effectiveness agenda under which PM takes place
in Ethiopia. Section 9.2 highlights the contributions to knowledge of my thesis research and
discusses their generalisability. Section 9.3 discusses some implications of my findings for the
current global consultation on targets and indicators for monitoring water supply access after
2015.
9.1 Revisiting the research questions and related findings
I began this thesis by presenting Meselich’s experience of accessing water supply and drawing
attention to her related problems – her daily incertitude about whether, having queued, she
will be able to draw water when it comes to her turn, her mistrust of the WASH committee’s
ability to operate the scheme and to manage its finances, and her general desire for the
service to be upgraded to household connections. I juxtaposed this story, frequent in my
fieldwork kebele, with the access figure for her location, an abstract percentage that conveys
none of the problems related to this particular setting.
I explained that current approaches to monitoring access to water supply need to be seen
within the wider context of RBM, a model that focuses on achievement of measurable results
that is used extensively in the private and public sectors, including the aid sector. At the
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international level, global targets for improving rural water access are specified under the
MDGs. They form part of the overarching MDG to halve global poverty, and the aid
effectiveness agenda, which is a global architecture aimed at rendering aid more effective by
putting recipients in the driver’s seat of their development and poverty reduction strategies.
One of the items on this agenda is sector reforms in aid recipient countries to strengthen PM
of water access: Ethiopia is one of the countries where these reforms are underway.
A key proposition in my thesis is that, in the policy discourse and practice around aid
effectiveness, PM commonly is portrayed as providing an objective, rational basis for decisions.
This assumes that monitoring results can be assessed objectively, and that a linear causal
sequence can be established between setting objectives and achieving results. I substantiated
that the linear model underlying PM being the dominant agenda in aid-recipient relations by
showing that not only is the logic of a linear ‘results chain’ well established in OECD (2010)
jargon on RBM but also that this linear model has become central to the aid effectiveness
agenda, and is enshrined in one of its key principles ‘Managing for Development Results’. I also
highlighted that the linear RBM model is being operationalised in the water sector via new
global assessments, such as the UN’s Global Analysis and Assessment of Sanitation and
Drinking Water (GLAAS), which track the progress of national policy and institutional reforms
towards establishing results-based planning and budgeting processes (WHO, 2012d), and by
showing that related reform efforts are underway in the Ethiopian water sector. The
contribution of my thesis is to open a space for critical engagement with these assumptions
that commonly underlie PM, set out in my research question: What role does performance
monitoring play in shaping policy decisions on rural water access in Ethiopia?
In my thesis research I investigated PM primarily from the angle of the politics of knowledge
production. Within this, I conceptualised PM as a particular form of ‘social appraisal’ – the
process by which society informs itself of the implications of alternative policies. Appraisal
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generally is comprised of social processes that are subject to the exercise of various forms of
power (Stirling et al., 2007). The STEPS Centre’s approach to social appraisal focuses on how
powerful actors, through conceptual framings, influence the inputs into appraisals, for instance,
by influencing the agenda, objectives, indicators, and processes of data collection and analysis.
Stirling (2005, 2008, building on Fiorino, 1989), highlights also that such framings are subject to
the contrasting overall rationales or intentions of different actors to appraisal as a whole. For
instance, an actor may pursue an instrumental rationale, within which efforts are made to
influence appraisal processes and results towards a particular, privately-favoured end. This
contrasts with a ‘substantive’ rationale where appraisal is intended to satisfy publicly debated
criteria on the ‘best’ outcomes for society as a whole, or a ‘normative’ rationale where the
focus is primarily not on ‘outcomes’, but on the most appropriate processes for appraisal itself.
In addition to their framings of the inputs into appraisal, powerful actors influence the ways in
which the outputs of appraisal to governance are variously ‘closed down’ or ‘opened up’
(Smith and Stirling, 2007).
Viewed in this light, knowledge production does not proceed in the linear fashion commonly
associated with a positivist understanding of PM but instead, to a significant extent, is ‘socially
constructed’. Constructivist understandings help to clarify the understanding of PM by
showing that the apparently definitive orientation of the linearity in question can be
understood as socially contingent. This illuminates that the specific results obtained in PM can
be as much an artefact of subjective social context as of the ostensibly objective features of
performance highlighted under a positive view. Through a focus on actors’ framings and their
underlying rationales, borrowed from Stirling and Smith’s discussion of social appraisal, I
opened up a new perspective on PM. PM should be seen not as the conventionally-asserted
uniquely-rational appraisal of performance, but instead as being about ‘performativity’ – the
playing out on a ‘management’ stage of a certain politically-necessary performance (Hilgartner,
2000). From this perspective, the formal processes of appraisal may serve more to ‘justify’
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prior social commitments in instrumental political terms, rather than actually helping to form
them in substantive terms (Collingridge, 1980, Stirling, 2005, 2008), a point also raised by
authors criticising the rational model of policy making (Hajer, 1995, Hill, 1993, 1997, Lipsky,
1980, Smith and May, 1998)
I elaborated the concept of social appraisal in two ways. First, I highlighted a circularity in the
framings within ‘social appraisal’ such that the framing of the method influences the framing
of the problem. In other words, people define a problem by measuring it. For example, in their
definitions of access, several actors suggested volume and distance parameters, both
indicators for assessing access. This circularity between the framing of the method and framing
of the problem, can ultimately set appraisals at an even greater distance from other
dimensions that might inform the definition of the problem, with the result that monitoring
becomes a form of self-referential ‘image management’, as Michael Power proposed in the
context of auditing (Power, 1997).
I also deepened the STEPS Centre’s conceptualisation of ‘social appraisal’ by suggesting that a
number of different appraisal processes, of various degrees of formality, typically proceed in
parallel and relate to each other in complex ways. Among the appraisal processes that build to
a body of knowledge, formal – that is codified – appraisal processes may only be the tip of the
iceberg (of a body of knowledge). Not all of them necessarily conform to the same patterns in
forming or justifying social commitments. In this context, social appraisal becomes more a
process of ‘muddling through’ rather than a rational comprehensive set of procedures for
evaluating policy options (Lindblom, 1959), and a number of other factors than PM can be
seen to affect the forming of social commitments. These wider considerations illuminate the
possibility that the outcomes of appraisal and associated decisions also may be the result of
contingent forms of path dependency (David, 1985), involving contextual details, material
conditions, specific actor network constellations (Keeley and Scoones, 2003b), street-level
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bureaucrats exercising agency in exerting discretion on day-to-day policy decisions (Lipsky,
1980), a policy space that offers a ‘window of opportunity’ (Grindle and Thomas, 1991) and so
on. The dynamics of appraisal addressed here are just one of the factors at play (Stirling et al.,
2007).
To investigate these dynamics, I studied the case of PM of rural water access in Ethiopia. I used
‘process tracing’ as a method to analyse the political and power dynamics underlying
knowledge production in this particular context of social appraisal. I assessed PM through
three lines of investigation, each underpinned by a specific research sub-question. In what
follows, I summarise the findings from each of these lines of investigation.
9.1.1 Examining the inputs into performance monitoring
My first line of investigation involved examination of the underlying assumption that the
definition of rural water access used in PM for Ethiopia adequately represents the divergent
notions of access among the actors concerned, by addressing research sub-question 1a:
What are the specific ways in which different actors (those affected and those implementing)
at different levels (individual, kebele, woreda, zone, region, federal and international) frame
access to rural water in Ethiopia?
The findings that emerged from my research are set out below.
Access framings in international benchmarks and guidelines, and in the Ethiopian UAP, are
tilted towards a technical perspective. The normative framework provided by the General
Comment 15 on the human right to water acknowledges social, economic, cultural and inter-
generational concerns related to access. The WHO provides international guidelines on basic
access to water that are related to volume, distance and water quality. International
benchmarks on water supply set by MDG 7c, and the related global monitoring programme for
water supply and sanitation, the JMP, focus on measuring whether people collect water from
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an improved infrastructure. In the relevant Ethiopian policy document, the 2009 revision to
the UAP, the MoWR proposes a two-tier definition of access. In this thesis, I call the first
definition ‘volume-distance’, because it refers to the parameters of volume and distance
recommended by the WHO; the second definition I call ‘scheme potential’ because it measures
access based on estimated numbers of users who potentially can access a particular type of
infrastructure (e.g., a hand-dug well has the average capacity to serve 270 people), irrespective
of its functionality status.
Both international and Ethiopian rural water access goals and indicators focus on the
infrastructure in place rather than on the people collecting, handling and using water on a
daily basis. This focus on infrastructure reflects the organisation of the sub-sector around a
project cycle approach, which is geared to infrastructure construction and is less concerned
with outcomes once the project cycle has been completed. I describe this as a technical
perspective because its parameters are technical and refer to typical engineering tasks, such as
designing and building specific of types of infrastructure, and more specific undertakings such
as devising pipe sizes and lifting devices to deliver a certain volume of water to prospective
users within a specific proximity. This finding resonates heavily with sector professionals’
references to a “design and build” mindset (Harvey and Reed, 2004: xix), and the adoption of
“engineering and spending targets” (Carter et al., 1993: 650) in the water sector, to which I
referred in various chapters. A key issue in this perspective is that water access is framed in an
abstract, one-dimensional and static way compared to the multiple dimensions and dynamic
nature of access, which I discuss further below.
The framings of rural water access in the Ethiopian UAP represent a ‘watered-down’ version
of international framings. The UAP ‘volume-distance’ parameters for defining access draw
directly on WHO international guidelines, but relax them by decreasing the minimum volume
from 20 to 15 l/p/d, and by increasing the maximum distance to the source from 1 to 1.5km.
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The UAP ‘scheme potential’ parameters are similar to the JMP indicators which measure
access to an ‘improved’ source, with the difference that, in Ethiopia, measurements are based
on infrastructure inventories and not on data obtained from household surveys. For both cases
the UAP uses the same parameters as international guidelines and benchmarks, from which I
conclude that Ethiopian access framings are influenced strongly by international framings.
However, the UAP’s weaker standards have potentially negative consequences for those who
are accessing water every day. The ‘scheme potential’ definition, which guided sector
monitoring of access to rural water in 2010, for instance, is distinctive in putting forward a
supply perspective: the MoWR is concerned with the supply of hardware, regardless of the
distance to a water source or the volume of water collected, or the functionality status of the
water source, and any other perspectives not captured by this technical framing of access.
Access definitions provide abridged stories rather than objective assessments. The
definitions of access in international and Ethiopian guidelines and benchmarks are shorthand
for particular methods of measuring that focus on the parameters of type of infrastructure,
water volumes, and/or walking distance to the source. Rather than being entirely objective,
access measurement can be seen as the enactment of a metaphor, implying a specific storyline.
In this view, present framings of access in Ethiopia, expressed in the ‘scheme potential’
parameters, implicitly enforce an ‘abridged story’ in which ‘access’ is reduced to the
infrastructure in place. This narrow version of access does not represent the lived experience –
especially of women and girls – of daily fetching and handling of domestic water, nor does it
take account of the perspectives of marginalised populations and vulnerable individuals, or the
patterns of water availability and water needs related to livelihoods, individual wealth and
other criteria. What prevails is a presumed consensus that disproportionately represents the
perspectives of actors who are relatively removed from the realities on the ground. This
consensus is underpinned by abstractions from lived realities achieved through the use of
percentage figures for assessing access.
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There is a circularity between the framing of the objectives and inputs into appraisal. Whilst
access criteria are supposed to drive appraisal methods, the method determines the definition
of access. In the case of the WHO-derived framing, volume and distance shape the definition
of access, while in the JMP, parameters are based on infrastructure schemes classified as
‘improved’. The fact that the methods drive the definition of access further increases the self-
referential character of monitoring. PM becomes an act of ‘image management’, where
specific methods simultaneously define and assess ‘performance’ (Power, 1997) in the access
to water supply. A specific image of performance, here infrastructure, replaces truth (Lyotard,
1996).
Where there are alternative views, deviations from the framings of access codified in
international and national guidelines and benchmarks tend to be limited. Sector stakeholders
in Ethiopia tended initially to refer to a framing that supports the formal definition of access as
outlined in the UAP policy document. At the same time, they conceded that this framing of
access is not an accurate representation of the realities of access. Nevertheless, sector
specialists from government, donors and NGOs criticisms did not deviate much from the
framings of access codified in official policy documents and international standards. Their
critical comments related mainly to the established access parameters (volume, distance and
infrastructure) and did not include discussion of new dimensions of access. For example,
people commented that the topography made the definition of access on the basis of distance,
‘difficult’. It is only at the operational level that sector professionals’ framings of access
differed and were closer to the lived reality, that is, professional background and daily work.
This points to the power of formal framings for influencing peoples’ perceptions of reality,
particularly when their working realities are is removed from the operational level.
The current dominant service delivery model for rural water – a project cycle followed by
CBM (Community-based Management) – reinforces path dependencies in sector monitoring.
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The particular ways in which sector monitoring was organised in 2012 reaffirms the
predominant framings in mutually supporting ways – favouring one particular path of
development over another. Service delivery in the sector is dominated by project cycles that
close with the handing over of the infrastructure to the user community responsible for CBM.
Formal sector monitoring of development outputs consists of regular reports describing
completed infrastructure schemes and their functionality status, complemented by occasional
inventories of these schemes. The focus on hardware as a key development output in rural
water supply reinforces a framing of access that is shorthand for infrastructure in the sector.
This self-reinforcing dynamic between the material and discursive aspects promotes path-
dependence ‘lock in’, which tends to exclude alternative, potentially feasible, modes of
providing and monitoring rural water services.
The circular and self-referential character of access monitoring creates a disjuncture
between a one-dimensional, static framing of access and affected peoples’ experienced
realities. The technical perspective of formal access framings provides an overly static picture
of access based on the capacity of the infrastructure, and disregards wider patterns of water
availability and water needs. Water consumption patterns differ with the seasons and with the
availability and accessibility of protected and unprotected sources, and depend heavily on
peoples’ livelihood activities. For example, my case study of the highland kebele showed that
beer brewers collected relatively higher volumes of water, and the findings from the lowland
kebele highlighted that the satisfaction with drinking water sources depends on perceptions of
water quality that extended beyond bio-chemical standards. The realities of water access are
intertwined with peoples’ individual circumstances and capacities, on which bases they employ
various strategies to satisfy domestic and productive water needs, exploiting a combination of
protected and unprotected sources.
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In addition, access to improved sources depends on socio-economic factors and governance
issues such as management capacities, power relations, and affordability, which can lead to
inequities, and to the social exclusion of vulnerable groups and individuals. An example of
inequitable distribution was the disadvantaged Garo group in the highland kebele that had no
access to an improved water scheme in its area despite suffering most from a lack of water
supply. Also, scheme management related issues, such as opening hours, disputes over
queuing, and the predictability of supply, have negative repercussions for access. In the
absence of a good operational environment, for instance, the case of the Chinese scheme in
the lowland kebele, not all of the users queuing will be able to collect water. Not all
households have the same coping strategies to deal with this uncertainty: such strategies
depend on access to alternative sources or the financial resources available to these
households.
Women’s and girls’ perspectives, in particular, are neglected by the conventional technical
perspective. A well-documented and persistent problem is that women’s and girls’ voices
generally go unheard. Their perspectives tend to be ignored, and their views disregarded even
when they sit on WASH committees. In both the highland and lowland kebeles I observed
female committee members’ voices being ignored and their opinions overruled by the
decisions of male colleagues. Women’s needs and demands are not well captured by the
informal feed-back processes that often occur in parallel with formal monitoring processes.
The neglect of women’s perspectives is reinforced by a wider culture in which water sector
staff, predominantly men with a technical educational background, tend to consult the WASH
committee chairmen and kebele officials who also tend to be men (Zwarteveen, 2008).
9.1.2 Examining the political and power dynamics in performance monitoring
My second line of investigation is related to monitoring practices. The intention was to test
whether, in reality, monitoring processes conform to the linearity assumed by the feed-back
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function of PM within RBM. Research sub-question 1b addressed the political and power
dynamics involved in PM practices:
Which actors’ framings and rationales are represented in monitoring exercises and their
results, and the decisions taken concerning rural water access?
This question emphasises the particular dynamics related to framings (and their underlying
rationales). My interest was the power dynamics within these specific processes, which bring
the framings of some actors to the fore upstaging those of others.
The process tracing method guided my analysis and illuminated actors’ rationales in ways that
helped to explain their framings. For example, tracing the process of how the MoWR arrived at
the universal access goals for rural water supply helped to explain the instrumental rationales
behind the framings proposed by actors. At the federal level, government officials were under
pressure to achieve the ambitious ‘universal access’ goals, which goes some way to explaining
why a particular calculation method (based on scheme potential) was chosen to measure
access, and established a target such that even if schemes were not functional, was still seen
as contributing towards ‘universal access’. The choice of calculation method can be
understood as being based on an instrumental rationale that emphasised the reporting of
positive progress towards the ambitious water sector policy goal.
The findings from my research are set out below.
Reporting of access can be seen as an act of ‘stage performance’. The dynamics described
above, where actors support different framings based on their underlying rationales, indicates
that setting and measuring of performance targets is not the objective and linearly logical
process often assumed, but rather reflects various forms and degrees of social construction of
associated knowledge. The measuring of access to rural water supply depends on the
intentionality of the actor framing the appraisal exercise, in this case, the calculation method.
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At the federal level, the MoWR’s use of authority to manipulate the calculation method to
derive a high access figure was motivated by the rationale to present a success story. Water
sector officials at woreda level, in contrast, were interested in attracting more resources to
their areas and, therefore, tended to use data that showed less good results. Viewed from this
perspective, reporting of rural water access takes on the character of a theatre performance
where different actors, using different framings, offer presentations that further their
particular interests.
A WRI (Water Resources Inventory) carried out in 2008 in the Southern Region of Ethiopia
provided an opportunity to study the dynamics of a particular appraisal process in depth. My
interest here was in the data analysis stage of PM, because it provides a good entry point to
analyse how and to what degree the inputs to this form of social appraisal were ‘broadened
out’, for example by employing different calculation methods for access figures, and its
outputs to governance ‘closed down’, for example, by settling on a specific calculation method
as representing access.
The experts involved in the data analysis under the WRI, made efforts to broaden out the
calculation of access. The access calculation methods used by the WRI data analysis team
were generally bound by the UAP parameters. Therefore, their analysis is generally narrow
compared with the diversity of issues that actually govern access for the residents in the two
locations discussed above. However, efforts were made to broaden out the calculation of
access. The WRI used four different types of access notions, and associated data, to calculate
access. The WRI analysis resulted in divergent figures for water access – from a low of 13%, to
23%, 35.5% and 53.9%. The WRI analysis team also identified several factors, such as
functionality and inequality in the distribution of schemes of different kebeles, which were
directly relevant for regional government decisions.
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The precision suggested by specific percentage figures may be a misleading indication of
overall accuracy in PM. The disparity between the highest and lowest figures for access, based
on the four different calculation methods, suggests that a definitive picture of PM may be
elusive. What these figures emphasise again is that the measuring of a phenomenon (in this
case ‘access’) is to a crucial extent subject to divergent framings. This observation supports an
understanding of knowledge production as being socially constructed rather than as a linear,
uniquely objective process. Another example of divergent images of access are the 2010
figures reported by the JMP of 34% compared to the MoWR figure of 65.8%. In both cases, the
reader is presented with a particular picture of for access, whose representation in an abstract
percentage figure, is removed from the realities on the ground.
Actors can use their positions of power to ‘close down’ appraisal outputs in order to justify
instrumental rationales. My examination of the WRI shows that the Federal Minister of Water
Resources decided that the calculation method suggesting the greatest progress (53.9%)
towards the sector goal of universal access should be used. I interpret his decision as reflecting
an instrumental rationale, driven by the aim of claiming positive development in the sub-
sector. The minister used his position of power to impose this particular calculation method.
Imposition of the most positive calculation also indicates, in the case of this PM exercise, that
the direction of accountability ran strongly upwards, with the form of calculation in this case
driven by political pressures at the federal level. This process of ‘closing down’ is another
example of stage management in which the scheme potential notion of access is presented as
‘truth’ in order to maximise ‘performance’.
In the case of implementing low-cost technologies in my case study lowland kebele, a powerful
actor, the WSG (Woreda Support Group) representative, used his positional power to impose
the technology ‘choice’ of hand-dug wells in an ostensibly participatory planning process. The
imposition of this particular technology was driven by the imperative of quick budget
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utilisation (therefore a start in the accessible lowland kebeles) and a preference for a low-cost
technology. The closing down of ‘participatory’ choice of the technology towards an unwanted
option again highlights how instrumental rationales can counteract supposedly normative
processes such as participatory planning.
Despite pressures towards a particular closure, appraisal results may simultaneously be
closed down to alternative outcomes, reflecting more substantive rationales. In the case of
the WRI, the Southern Region cabinet acted independently of the Federal Minister, to use
results to serve a more substantive imperative. Rather than simply supporting prior political
aims, the objective was to achieve a substantively improved understanding of the problems
relating to rural water access in the region. An important aspect of the discussion of WRI in the
regional cabinet was the emphasis on the high (30%) non-functionality rate across rural water
schemes in the region. Although this was one of the findings of the WRI data analysis team, it
was ignored at the federal level. There are indications that this particular finding of the WRI
supported the forming of social commitments. The finding of high rates of non-functionality
helped make scheme maintenance a priority for the BoWR. The regional maintenance budget
for the water sector was increased and there was evidence of increased levels of maintenance
activities in my case study in 2010.
Outputs from the same appraisal process can be used to derive different conclusions, due to
political and other dynamics in appraisal. Formally, the Minister ‘closed down’ the WRI results,
and emphasised one result that portrayed a positive trend in patterns of access. At the same
time, the regional cabinet discussed other of the WRI data analysis team’s outputs, and acted
on them. Similarly, once the representative of the WSG had left my case study woreda, the
WWT (Woreda WASH Team) reversed the unpopular decision to use the WASH Programme
budget for low-cost technologies in the lowland areas. The budget was reallocated to the
highlands area for the construction of protected springs, and a new budget source was used to
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develop the more popular deep wells in the lowlands. These examples are further indications
that appraisal is not a linear logical exercise, but is subject to political pressures variously
accommodating the interests and perspectives of different actors. In order to understand the
how and how much an appraisal exercise opens up or closes down wider governance
processes, my findings suggest a focus on rationales and actions of diverse individual actors.
These may be independent of the formally stated rationales or imperatives driving the exercise.
In the case of the WRI, it was important for the elevation of the non-functionality rate results
under the WRI that the regional government was interested to find ways for improving access
across the region.
An appraisal exercise can comprise an array of processes of varying degrees of formality that
proceed on in parallel. During the WRI data collection process, woreda level WME office staff
members assessed additional aspects related to water access, such as whether WASH
committees were active, reasons for scheme breakdowns, and used the inventory as an
opportunity to renew contacts. In addition to the inventory parameters, I documented various
informal, ongoing monitoring and feed-back processes between the woreda WME office and
users and an absence of formally codified monitoring procedures. For example, kebele officials
reported breakdowns of water schemes to WME staff members; and WME staff carried out
routine checks on schemes en route to other duties. This again indicates that the notion of PM
as a single linear process does not hold; rather, it is a multiple parallel appraisal process whose
results contribute to constructing a body of knowledge. A selected subset of results is fed
upwards through formal PM-related channels. However, even in this informal monitoring, local
framings of access are narrow and do not reflect the concerns of women and girls who are
chiefly responsible for providing and managing water at home.
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9.1.3 Examining the relation between monitoring results and decisions on access
My third line of investigation addressed the assumption that there is an essentially linear
determining relationship between PM and associated decisions, represented in the RBM
model results chain. In order to test whether the validity of this assumption in the case of
monitoring rural water access in Ethiopia, I addressed research sub-question 1c):
What is the explanatory power of performance monitoring results for decisions taken on
access to rural water supply?
To answer this question, I investigated the mechanisms shaping specific decisions on rural
water access. To test the often-presumed linear relationship between monitoring results and
decisions taken, proposed by the RBM model, I paid particular attention to whether the role of
PM was a necessary, sufficient, or merely a contributory factor. Aspects of decision-making
related to rural water access that I investigated in particular in my case study were: (1) budget
allocations to rural water; (2) strategic planning for rural water; and (3) two specific examples
in my case study woreda that allowed me to study in detail different factors affecting decisions.
The first example was the WWT’s decision to reallocate existing sources of funding to
maximise benefit for all kebeles in the woreda. The second example concerns the repair of a
particular rural water scheme, the Chinese well in my case study lowland kebele.
The following findings emerge from my research.
The very complex mix of financing modalities for rural water in Ethiopia is an obstacle to
creating a direct link between monitoring results and budget allocations. The Ethiopian rural
water sector is highly aid dependent with more than 50% of its financial resources coming
from budget sources external to the Ethiopian government in 2008. In 2009, there were eight
parallel financing modalities with different rules attached, that locked financial resources for
rural water supply into specific arrangements. The various conditionalities imposed by external
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financing modalities had the effect of delinking performance-related information from budget
allocations for rural water access, particularly for capital funding, where the proportion of
external funding was even higher. For example, in the Southern Region, sector donor
programme funding was allocated in a project-type arrangement to specific intervention
woredas over periods of several years. Capital budget under multi-sectoral funding
programmes, such as the PSNP, was allocated based on criteria independent of water access,
namely chronic levels of food insecurity. Furthermore, capital budget under this source
catered only for low-cost technologies, which are not a viable infrastructure for all geographic
areas in the region. The location of NGO projects was subject to many different factors that
mediated and, at times, overruled existing water supply service levels as a criterion for funding.
The regional and woreda governments’ control over capital budget for rural water supply
was weak. Capital funding allocations for rural water by the Ethiopian Treasury were small for
the regional BoWR. Because of the way in which donor and NGO-related capital financial
resources were locked into specific woredas over different time frames, the region’s leeway
for strategic allocation of financial resources based on performance information was fairly
limited. Because of general budget deficits, woreda governments allocated virtually no capital
funding from treasury sources to rural water supply. Sector donor funding from the WB WASH
Programme was constrained by an across-the-board budget ceiling per woreda, and capital
funding allocations to rural water under the multi-sectoral PSNP were subject to a number of
administrative and political considerations independent of water supply service levels.
Allocation of NGO funding to rural water remained also largely outside the remit of woreda
governments. Overall, my findings indicate that neither the regional nor woreda governments
had fair control over capital budgets to rural water, which limited their scope for strategic
planning, as discussed below.
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The scope for strategic planning at regional and woreda level is very limited. A study of the
BoWR’s five-year strategic planning process 2006-2010 (Amberbir, 2007) found that this was
largely a token exercise. The strategic plan preparation could not rely on sufficient
performance-related information, was not backed up an appropriate budget, and was based
on centrally pre-defined targets that were out of touch with the rural water context of the
Southern Region. In my case study woreda, I identified three planning processes and four
funding channels for rural water. There was a mismatch between the levels of funding
provided and planning and reporting requirements related to each source. For instance, under
the woreda block grant for water supply, which came from the Treasury, there was no capital
funding allocation; World Vision, an NGO operating independently of the government’s
planning and budgeting cycle, was by far the largest source of funding to the sub-sector. The
WME office was required to submit three separate plans - one to the woreda government, one
to the WB WASH Programme, and one to the PSNP. While staff members were able to fulfil the
requirements related to specific programmes, these ‘strategic’ planning exercises were
piecemeal and had the character of meeting an obligation. The reality of ‘strategic’ planning in
my case study sites provides further evidence the linear model in RBM is not representative of
practice in the Ethiopian rural water sector.
‘Muddling through’ involving bottlenecks and ‘windows of opportunity’ related to different
financing modalities most accurately describes the policy model in my case study woreda.
The policy model that describes the situation in my case study woreda rather than the linear
concept in RBM is one of ‘muddling-through’ (Lindblom, 1959). The WME office navigated its
way past the bottlenecks, taking advantage of the opportunities provided by different funding
sources, in order to improve rural water access across the woreda. For example, the WME
office applied for funding from the PSNP and the WB WASH Programme for major repair works
across the woreda, and whichever source came through, it was used to do the repairs. The
budget reallocation across the woreda to provide a more popular technology option to the
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lowland kebeles is another example. Originally, a consultant to the WB WASH Programme had
pushed for provision of the unpopular hand-dug wells in the lowland kebeles. During a period
of inaction in this project, several changes took place. The consultant’s contract came to an
end, which changed the actor dynamics related to this decision; the capacity, skills and
confidence of the WME office increased; and funding by World Vision allowed for the
preferred technology choice of residents. The additional funding created a window of
opportunity for the WME office to reallocate WASH Programme funding. The results from my
tracing of this process confirm that policy processes are not driven exclusively by a uniquely
rational model and in this sense are not linear, but an outcome involving more diverse
continuous negotiation based on changing power dynamics. The tracing of the process leading
to the original decision and its reversal shows that decisions are influenced by multiple factors.
The decision to repair the Chinese scheme in the lowland case study kebele exemplifies the
multi-causality of decisions. A detailed study of the specific decision to repair the Chinese
scheme shows that multiple factors - some enabling and some constraining – interacted to
achieve eventual repair to the scheme in May 2010, after four years of non-functionality.
Constraining factors include lack of capacity to properly operate and maintain the scheme in
the local WASH committee. Abuse of roles and weak financial management were among the
internal dynamics that further jeopardised a sustainable water service from this facility. The
wider policy environment did not provide the necessary support structure, oversight or
direction to the WASH committee, in the form, for instance, of institutionalised training and
oversight of financial management. Factors enabling the repair included the agency of a local
resident who took various steps to support the WASH committee, for instance, raising funds to
pay for the repair work. The WME office, on its part, mobilised capital funding to purchase
three reservoirs and provided repeated follow up with the regional maintenance team at the
BoWR to do the repairs. The regional maintenance team received formal (WRI based) and
informal (phone calls from WME office to follow up) information about the breakdown of the
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scheme and undertook its part in the repair. The positive response of the BoWR was facilitated
also by the accessibility of the scheme (its location on the main road connecting the sub-
regional capitals) and the strong support of the WME office to enable the process. Finally, the
approaching federal elections led to residents being more vociferous about their discontent, in
official meetings. This was the motivation for additional repair works to render the Chinese
scheme operational, which were completed two weeks before the elections.
Appraisal results are a contributory factor and may be a necessary factor in decisions. Among
the constraining and enabling factors that influenced the repair, appraisal results (here the
WRI results), were not a sufficient factor to explain the repairs to the scheme. However, the
WRI results and the related BoWR commitment to increase the functionality of schemes across
the region, certainly facilitated the repair works, which characterises them as a contributory
factor. They can be interpreted as a necessary factor since, without the formal WRI results and
related budget increase, the BoWR might not have made its contribution to the repair works.
Compared to the RBM model, which assumes a linear link between appraisal results and
decisions, this detailed examination of the process related to a particular scheme breakdown
and repair shows that many other factors act as intervening variables.
Tackling the root causes of poor functionality is related to an understanding that goes
beyond performance monitoring and depends on reforms to sector-wide service delivery
models. The WME’s construction and rehabilitation of schemes and the WASH committee’s
planned capacity building activities were the result of a five-year process of building
knowledge about water access needs across the woreda. Regular results-based information
was at the tip of the woreda WME office’s overall broad knowledge base. However, despite
WME officers’ awareness of the many access problems related to poor governance of schemes,
their scope for taking action to tackle these issues was limited by the lack of dedicated funding
budget and sector-wide regulation and guidance. The WME office’s limited ability to address
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the root causes of scheme breakdowns reflects the wider problems related to the dominant
service delivery mode represented by a project-cycle and subsequent CBM (Community-based
Management) (Harvey and Reed, 2004, 2007, Lockwood and Smits, 2011).
9.1.4 Drawing together the findings from the three lines of investigation
So, what role does the linear model underlying PM play in shaping policy decisions on access to
rural water supply in Ethiopia? This thesis provides evidence, triangulated from three different
lines of investigation and based on case studies and documentation from international sources
and from national, regional, woreda, kebele and household levels in Ethiopia, to argue that the
role that PM plays in policy decisions is limited. First, the linear model only provides an
understanding of access that does not adequately represent peoples’ lived access realities in
my case study areas. Second, rather than following a linear process, PM is shaped by actors’
rationales. Subject to their instrumental or substantive rationales, actors frame inputs into
appraisals and close them down to different appraisal outputs. Third, the contribution of PM
to shaping policy decisions is limited in the sense that it interacts with other factors affecting
specific decisions in concrete policy settings. To explain how I arrive at this conclusion, I briefly
revisit my three lines of investigation and how they, in combination, support this finding.
The first line of investigation focused on setting objectives in PM. I investigated whether the
framings of access under PM reflect notions of water access based on peoples’ lived
experience. My findings show that both the JMP’s reference to ‘access’ as access to an
‘improved’ source, and the MoWR’s ‘scheme potential’ parameters focus on one-dimensional,
technical aspects of access, namely the infrastructure in place. I argued that these formal
framings reflect a technical mindset. I showed that the goal of PM in relation to achieving
access is driven by the methods used to measure it – whether the infrastructure or the WHO
volume and distance guidelines. This suggests a circularity between framings of the inputs to
and objectives of appraisal, which translate PM into a process of image management. In this
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self-referential process, a particular image of the world determines the meaning of
performance, which is used as a yardstick. The power of this dynamic was clear in Ethiopian
stakeholders’ characterisations of access, which, even when critical, revolved narrowly around
the dominant parameters of infrastructure, volume, distance and water quality. This one-
dimensional and technical framing of access, constantly reproduced in self-referential
monitoring circles, contrasts starkly with the multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of water
access experiences among local residents in Ethiopia. My observations in Ethiopia, which find
strong support in and are complemented by the wider literature on Ethiopia and other
countries, suggest that access is mediated by patterns of water availability, peoples’ water
needs, and governance factors. In Ethiopia, patterns of water availability vary widely -
geographically, along the country’s agro-ecological zones and within and between years.
Peoples’ demand for water spans the domestic and productive uses, and depends on their
livelihoods, wealth status and the coping strategies available to them. Therefore, depending
on settlement patterns and availability of alternative sources and livelihoods, the pressures on
an ‘improved’ scheme can vary greatly within the same location. In addition, governance
factors, including power relations, affect access to individual schemes and can lead to the
exclusion of vulnerable and marginalised groups and individuals. Therefore, the current
framing of access embedded in national and international monitoring routines, does not form
an adequate basis to understand peoples’ felt access experience.
The second line of investigation focused on the power and political dynamics of PM processes.
I highlighted that monitoring processes can involve contestations over data and calculation
methods – for example, the case of regular reporting in the Southern Region, the intervention
of the Minister to impose his interpretation on the WRI results, and rows over internationally
reported JMP figures versus national figures reported by MoWR. This emphasises the political
nature of monitoring processes and the wider governance debates surrounding them. My
focus on the – instrumental, normative and substantive – rationales behind the access
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framings of different individual actors shows that powerful actors can manipulate appraisals to
justify their private, favoured ends even when these are at odds with official appraisal
objectives. This is exemplified by the Minister’s closing down of WRI results to obtain a result
that portrayed positive progress towards ‘universal access’, and the actions of the consultant
who overruled residents’ preferences in favour of low-cost technologies implemented in the
accessible lowland areas, to provide that promised a good budget utilisation rate. These
examples show that PM can be understood as the ‘performing of monitoring’, on a stage
where different actors (stakeholders) perform according to their particular individual
objectives and interests. When actors pursue a substantive rationale of increasing their
understanding of a situation, then one can speak of ‘monitoring performance’. This was the
case for the regional WRI where the analysis team compared different analysis methods to
identify which most adequately represented the access situation on the ground. A substantive
rationale was also reflected in the regional cabinet’s decision to increase the sector’s
maintenance budget based on the finding that non-functionality was an important factor
affecting access in the region. At the same time, I highlighted that numerous less formalised
monitoring practices proceed in parallel with the formal PM process. These practices range
from enquiries made by sector professionals when completing formal questionnaires, to
informal, day to day interactions between sector staff, WASH committees and other
government stakeholders. The results of these informal monitoring activities combined with
wider learning builds to form body of largely ‘tacit’ knowledge that informs the WME office’s
work. It is this wider body of knowledge, rather than only formalised PM results, that informs
decisions, as I showed, for instance, in my description of the reallocation of WASH Programme
funding from the lowlands to the highland kebeles in my case study woreda. This means that
the role PM plays in taking policy decisions depends, at least in part, on actors’ rationales.
The third line of investigation concerned the role of PM results in decisions about access. To
understand whether results-based information provides an adequate basis for understanding
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decisions, I analysed whether they are a contributory, sufficient or necessary factor. I looked at
examples of budget allocations and strategic planning, and traced the intervening factors
pertaining to two specific decisions in my case study woreda. In my study of budget allocations
and strategic planning at regional and woreda level, I found, inter alia, that, to an extent, due
to the limited control over capital budget allocations for rural water supply at both levels, that
strategic planning at the regional level is often a rubber stamping exercise, while planning in
my case study woreda can be best characterised as a process of ‘muddling through’. These
findings refute the assumed linear relationship between PM results and decisions taken
proposed by the RBM model ‘results chain’. In the case of two specific decisions, my tracing
showed that PM results were a contributory factor. In the case of the Chinese scheme repairs,
PM in the form of the WRI results, was necessary for the regional BoWR maintenance team to
carry out its part of the repair, but was not sufficient to make the repair happen. A number of
other factors intervened in a repair process that extended over several years. The process was
affected by the wider policy context (lack of operationalisation of the CBM model), weak
management by the WASH committee (lack of capacity and misuse of power by committee
members), material conditions (lack of funding to replace the leaking reservoir), and windows
of opportunity (the approaching general elections). My findings from this third line of
investigation thus show that the relationship between monitoring results and decisions is
mediated by many factors.
9.1.5 Performance monitoring and public accountability
An important argument for the introduction of PM in the public sector is the expectation that
it increases accountability. In development cooperation, PM was introduced under Principle 5
‘MfR’ (Managing for Development Results) of the aid effectiveness agenda. In the Ethiopian
water sector, reform processes were aimed at increasing the PM focus in the development of a
common monitoring framework for WASH (water supply, sanitation and hygiene) stakeholders,
introduced as a result of the National WASH Inventory carried out in 2010-11. The micro and
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meso level case studies that informed this thesis research provide snapshots of the specific
dynamics that are part of this wider process towards streamlining monitoring across WASH.
PM allegedly contributes to increasing public accountability by providing development targets
and, in a seemingly objective fashion, measuring progress towards them. My research
highlights that the ostensibly objective and uniquely rational logic on which the pledge for
accountability is based, needs to be questioned. This is evident also in the latest developments
of the National WASH Inventory: at the time of writing, in mid-December 2012, some 1.5 years
after data collection was completed, the inventory results have not been published. The
MoWE gave a presentation of the preliminary results to development partners, but they are
strictly confidential and not to be shared or used. Confirmation of the figures based on an
internal validation process with regional governments was still pending.85 This shows that, far
from being neutral, the National WASH Inventory results are highly political and their
usefulness diminishes with the time lag between data collection and their publication. In
general terms, the emphasis on transparency and accountability has put monitoring on a
public stage, while power struggles and negotiations based on actors’ intentionalities, continue
behind the scenes. For development partners, particularly sector donors who align their
funding sources with the GoE’s budget, monitoring and planning procedures, the National
WASH Inventory provides ‘weak justification’ (see Stirling, 2008, discussed in Chapter 4) – it
demonstrates adherence to PM principles which drive public accountability in their home
constituencies enabling the bureaucrats to defend themselves against potential accusations of
misuse of funds. For citizens, whether givers or recipients of aid, increased adherence to
accountability via PM and RBM has had little immediate effect, and allows them scrutiny only
of abstract figures on access. According to the evaluation specialist, Roberto Picciotto (2003:
228), “[a]ll too often policy makers use statistics as drunken men use lamp posts – for support
rather than illumination”. So, why does the rational policy model persist? In the next section, I
85 Personal communication with a locally based sector specialist who I had interviewed previously during
the course of my field work (Interview #99)
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discuss a number of factors that contribute to the ‘stickiness’ of performance monitoring of
rural water supply.
9.1.6 Why does the rational policy model persist in my case study?
In answering this question, I return to Robert Gregory’s contribution to the policy process
literature. He highlights that the rational policy model is a normative framework rather than a
description of the real world (Gregory, 1998). His observation is in line with Herbert Simon
himself, who, in his later works, acknowledged that actors take decisions based on ‘bounded
rationality’, choosing policy options that are “good enough” (Hill, 1997: 101) rather than
uniquely rational. A key attraction of the rational policy model, here PM, and therefore one
possible reason for its persistence, is that it reduces complex reality to a manageable set of
objectives to be verified via measurable indicators, as I observed in Chapter 3 and Section 9.1.5.
In public sector reform processes such as the aid effectiveness agenda, a commonly stated role
of PM is to increase public accountability. Although real policy processes do not follow the
ideal, rational policy model, people are locked into these policy processes and face the
dilemma of having to demonstrate their performance. In my case study I interpreted the
concern of donor organisation representatives with the implementation of a PM process in
Ethiopia as an indication for this. Donor organisations, driven by their own accountability
agendas such as the public service agreements that DFID is subject to in the UK, pass on these
priorities to recipients of aid, here the MoWE. In Ethiopia, this is evidenced by the drawing up
of successive PM frameworks with the support of external consultants and the important
financial contributions by sector donors to the implementation of the National WASH
Inventory. The Ethiopian MoWE, for its part, was driven by the ambitious policy target of
achieving universal access to water supply to show positive development results. One role of
PM is thus to legitimise policy decisions, a point discussed also more broadly for aid policy and
practice (Mosse, 2004).
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At the same time, one could argue that there is also genuine concern among the development
community to make development cooperation more rational. An example in the Ethiopian
water sector is the effort to bring different planning, monitoring and funding streams together
under the unified ONE WASH Programme that I outlined in Chapter 3. An alternative
explanation of why the rational policy model persists despite evidence that it hard, if not
impossible to implement (Mosse, 2004) lies in the tension between the intention to act
rationally while, at the same time, facing a messy political reality.
Contributions from the politics of the policy process offer further explanations the ‘stickiness’
of the rational model in the case of PM of rural water access in Ethiopia. Following Maarten
Hajer’s (1995) argumentative turn, the RBM principle under the aid effectiveness agenda
provides a storyline that constructs a common understanding of how things should be. In the
water sector, this story line is represented in the policy documents and related studies at
international and national levels, quoted at the end of Chapter 3. The story line suggests that
water sector governments need to improve their PM practices to improve planning and
budgeting of rural water supply interventions. This story line is ‘reified’ through the way
people talk (Hajer, 1995: 57) at sector meetings such as the national Multi-Stakeholder Forums
in Ethiopia, or at regular government-internal sector review meetings where progress in
achieving universal access is discussed. The story line is further upheld through routinised
sector monitoring practices. These regular monitoring exercises, for their part, are linked to
administrative incentive structures and funding streams that are part of the hardware-based
project delivery cycle of rural water supply. Because of the delivery model of providing
hardware projects in rural water supply, monitoring practices have become locked into a
particular path (David, 1985), which focuses on the technical, hardware outputs. Aspects of
rural water supply access that are not measured by the technical indicators used in Ethiopian
sector monitoring processes, remain largely invisible, as shown in the dominance of formal
rural water access framings among sector stakeholders in Chapter 6. This dynamic reinforces
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the self-perpetuating character of PM, particularly at higher levels of the administration,
where access is mainly expressed in abstract percentage figures, relatively removed from lived
realities, also demonstrated in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 8, I provided evidence on the real constraints that compromise the ideal sequence
of basing planning and budgeting processes on monitoring results in the case of rural water
supply in the Southern Region. Nonetheless, street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980), here
woreda WME officers, are obliged to abide to the rational monitoring, budgeting and planning
rules to enhance their chances to receive budgets. When a budget is received, woreda WME
officers accommodate various interests and constraints in implementing water supply services
(Hill, 1997, Keeley and Scoones, 2003c). An example of accommodating these interests and
constraints is the shift of the WB budget from the lowland to the highland areas discussed in
Chapter 8. This budget shift happened because of the additional funding that became available
from a local NGO, and because of a change in the constellation of actor coalitions when the
influential WSG (Woreda Support Group) left the woreda. The priority given for implementing
water supply to the birth place of the woreda administrator in the highlands is another
example for an accommodation of interests in concrete policy settings.
9.2 Contribution to knowledge
My research contributes to three bodies of knowledge: the STEPS Centre’s research on ‘social
appraisal’, the sociology of water studies particularly the politics surrounding water access,
and the concept of PM with specific reference to the aid effectiveness agenda.
My findings advance the STEPS Centre’s research on ‘social appraisal’ by providing additional
evidence and deepening and refining some of the related concepts. The evidence in this thesis
strengthens and throws more light on the importance of actors’ rationales in appraisal
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processes and their results – independent of particular formal appraisal methods and results
(see Stirling et al., 2007: 45). My case study evidence deepens some of the aspects related to
the STEPS Centre’s concepts I employ.
I identified a circularity between objectives and methods in actors’ framings in definitions of
rural water access: the common framings based on ‘infrastructure’ and ‘volume- distance’
parameters enforce specific methods for assessing access. This circularity between setting
targets and measuring progress towards them creates a self-referential monitoring cycle that
is removed from the realities on the ground. This circularity can be seen as image management
(Power, 1997) in which indicators of performance replace truth (Lyotard, 1996), which enables
‘monitoring performance’. Formal appraisal, such as reporting of national access figures based
on the official calculation methods devised by the MoWR, serve mainly to portray Ethiopia’s
access situation in a specific way, in order to satisfy some abstract, upward accountability. I
refer to this dynamic as ‘performing monitoring’ (as opposed to ‘monitoring performance’)
because it can be likened to an act of stage management. In parallel, some aspects of appraisal
are driven by substantive rationales – such as the WRI in the Southern Region. These may
provide factors necessary to explain associated social commitments such as the regional
government’s rise of a maintenance budget for the BoWR and accelerated repair activities
based on the WRI results.
My findings highlight also that social appraisal processes, of various degrees of formality, occur
in parallel. Formal appraisals, such as the WRI or regular reporting, are at the tip of an iceberg
of local day-to-day monitoring activities forming a larger, mostly ‘tacit’ body of knowledge on
which actors draw in taking decisions. Decisions about access are informed by this wider body
of knowledge, not just formal appraisal results, and by other factors intervening in the forming
of social commitments. It is necessary to understand factors outside a given appraisal exercise
or method (such as PM), in order to understand the forms taken by social commitments. This
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applies especially if the aim is to respond substantively to local needs rather than to comply
instrumentally with other interests. For example, WME officers were able to allocate financial
resources to maximise the benefits for residents across the woreda, based on knowledge
accumulated over several years and a number of appraisal processes of various degrees of
formality.
My findings contribute also to the political sociology of water resources management in
relation to the framings and politics surrounding rural water access. I confirmed many issues
identified in the literature, such as people’s lack of differentiation between water for domestic
use and for productive uses, use of multiple, protected and unprotected sources to cover
water needs (Moriarty et al., 2004, Van Koppen et al., 2012), and a flawed dominant service
delivery model of CBM (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999, Harvey and Reed, 2004, Lockwood and
Smits, 2011) that takes account of affordability and cost recovery (Fonseca and Njiru, 2003,
Cleaver and Toner, 2006). I observed inequity and social exclusion (Cleaver and Toner, 2006),
token participation (Manor, 2004, Jones, 2011) and an attitude to gender relations that
disregards women’s and girls’ perspectives (Mehta, 2005, Wallace and Coles, 2005,
Zwarteveen, 2008). My contribution here is in highlighting the stark difference between
monitoring and inventorising water supply infrastructure, viewed through a one-dimensional
and technical lens, legitimised and reproduced through PM cycles, which contrasts to the
much more dynamic relationship between water availability and users’ needs.
The final contribution of this thesis research is that it opens up a space for discussion of the
politics underlying knowledge production in PM under the aid effectiveness agenda. In
particular, I questioned the adequacy of the ways that ‘access’ is framed in formal PM
interventions, and the conventionally presumed logic of PM as providing a single, definitively
rational basis for decisions. My study introduces the idea that interests and rationales
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embodied in the framings of powerful actors play a key role in appraisal processes,
conditioning their outputs and thus shaping resulting social commitments.
9.2.1 Generalisability of my research findings
James Scott (1998: 27) writing about the politics of measurement in early modern Europe said
that: “Every act of measurement was an act marked by the play of power relations. To
understand measurement practices ... one must relate them to the contending interests of the
major estates”.86 This historical reference highlights that measurement is always likely to be
political. Therefore, by questioning the commonly held assumption in RBM that PM provides
an objective, rational basis for policy decisions, my study results are applicable across the
public sectors where PM is applied in a seemingly neutral fashion. Although my study
addresses the particular case of PM of rural water supply in Ethiopia, it is concerned with the
wider practice of PM methods. The focus on this particular context opens space for debate on
the applicability of the findings and assumptions to other cases. My findings are generalisable
in the sense that the understandings provided in this thesis raise questions that potentially are
salient to rural water supply sectors more widely, and to the management of development
initiatives in other highly aid dependent countries, where PM methods are used.
9.3 Outlook
A global process of reflection is currently underway to develop a future sustainable
development framework that replaces the MDGs. With regard to water supply, sanitation and
hygiene, in May 2011, the JMP launched a global stakeholder consultation (WHO and UNICEF,
2012c). Within this consultation process, working groups have reviewed existing targets and
86 Scott (1998: 28) describes the following micropolitics of measurement using the example of basket
sizes as representing arbitrary changes in measurement units: “The local lord might, for example, lend
grain to peasants in smaller baskets and insist on repayment in larger baskets.”, and to the manipulation
of an existing measurement unit: Virtually everywhere in early modern Europe there were endless
micropolitics about how baskets might be adjusted through wear, bulging, tricks of weaving, moisture,
the thickness of the rim, and so on”.
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indicators, including those for water supply, and suggesting future monitoring options. The
consultation document concerning water supply recognises that many aspects concerning the
human right to water, namely drinking water quality and accessibility, reliability, affordability,
sustainability and equity in access to water supply and sanitation facilities, are currently
neglected (WHO and UNICEF, 2012c). In the review process, working groups are asked to
respond, to the extent possible, to the various aspects proposed by the normative criteria set
out in General Comment 15 on the human right to water. It suggests specific attention to
addressing inequality issues through the establishment of a cross-cutting working group on
this topic. Current proposals for future targets aim to set a ‘target ladder’ for progressive
advancement to achieving the human right to water, rather than the single target of this right.
There is also a noticeable change in the language used in the draft proposals, to highlight the
notion of ‘services’ compared to the previous focus on ‘infrastructure’ (WHO and UNICEF,
2012a).
The suggestions currently proposed within the JMP’s global review process are encouraging.
My findings related to Ethiopia regarding the circularity of framings indicate that global
standards and targets, in the past, have been highly influential for framing notions of access
among sector stakeholders. A global shift towards a broadening of the inputs to appraisal to
achieve a more nuanced understanding of access might encourage similar reflections at the
national level, thereby contributing to breaking break the self-referential monitoring cycles
documented in this thesis and bringing together perspectives on access from above and below.
In the short section on policy recommendations below, I provide suggestions related to my
findings in Chapters 6-8 on actors framings, the political and power dynamics of monitoring
processes and on the relation between monitoring and decisions taken.
9.3.1 Policy recommendations
My findings indicate that it will not be sufficient to set more nuanced and representative
global targets. Regardless of specific targets, actors with different rationales, will present
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different interpretations to fit with the access stories that reflect their privately-favoured ends.
Understanding the political and power dynamics underlying PM, in a concrete setting,
therefore, remains an important endeavour. In the context of this research, paying attention
to actors’ rationales and ways of manipulating the inputs into appraisal exercises may
illuminate some of the politics underlying the knowledge production processes in specific
settings. In addition to more inclusive global monitoring targets for rural water access, a critical
and reflexive engagement with monitoring processes in local settings is necessary.
One concrete activity to widen the inputs into appraisal would be a purposeful inclusion of the
perspectives of those who are living the daily reality of accessing water – women and girls,
boys and men drawing water from schemes for their livelihood purposes. Some aspects that
appear important based on my analysis of a very limited subset of daily water access situations
highlight the governance of rural water supply schemes and the representation of gender
therein. This includes attention to whether formal scheme management requirements such as
the election of a committee, are in place, the role of women therein, and to the actual
implementation of those rules and procedures, in particular of financial resources. My findings
also highlight the importance of processes that foster a mutual understanding and
collaboration between WASH committees and WME officers to support the smooth running of
scheme management. Providing very basic inputs such as sufficient fuel and per diems to
enable officers to visit WASH committees is an essential first step to enable such interactions
to unfold.
With regard to the politics and power dynamics in monitoring processes, my thesis’ findings
point to the importance of ‘tacit’ monitoring. In the sector monitoring processes investigated
in this thesis much emphasis is directed towards needs of aggregate data at the top of the
administrative hierarchy. In applying some of the lessons from the importance of tacit
monitoring processes, more attention could be given to the data needs of street level
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bureaucrats and their active involvement in data collection and analysis. For example, one
could explicitly rely on WME officers in inventories for data collection and analysis, which
would also provide opportunities for them to increase and update their knowledge about
water facilities and to refresh their links their constituencies in the course of conducting the
inventory exercises. In the National WASH Inventory, this aspect was not appreciated and, in
various locations, WME officers were not part of the data collection team (Welle et al., 2012).
Going one step further, sector actors could work with woreda WME officers to improve the
design of monitoring processes relating to data collection and analysis with the intention to
bring the perspectives of the main collectors and managers of water to the fore and to
encourage better appreciation of the interrelation between water for domestic and productive
uses by water supply and irrigation units. As a way of directing street level bureaucrats’
rationales in appraisal towards substantive ends, one could work at fostering a sense of
partnership between those who draw water from rural improved schemes, WASH committee
management structures and government representatives who are tasked to support the
sustainability of these services.
However, there are no easy solutions for making appraisal designs and practices more reflexive:
they are down to the agency of individuals in relation to how narrowly or broadly they frame
the inputs into appraisal and how they enable the ‘opening up’ or ‘closing down’ of results to
wider governance. A recent initiative by the NGO Daraja in Tanzania, was aimed at increasing
accountability of local government, by encouraging citizens to report water scheme
breakdowns via SMS. However, this initiative was not successful: Daraja attributes some of this
failure to technical issues, and also highlighted cultural barriers to a Western-inspired concept
of citizen engagement and empowerment (Taylor, 2012). Daraja’s normatively inspired design
of a feed-back mechanism to improve accountability clashed with local attitudes on how to (or
not to) criticise government under prevailing societal hierarchical structures. A complementary
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way of addressing these dynamics relates to addressing wider political economy questions that
touch on the relationship between rural water access monitoring results and decisions.
My findings of Chapter 8, which examined this relationship, clearly show the importance of
political economy factors, including how the sub-sector is organised, that hinder ‘access to
water supply’. In particular, the continued prevalence of a ‘design and build’ mindset, and the
path dependencies in the sector created by many decades of working in a project delivery
mode, have locked the sub-sector into a way of working that is proving to be unsustainable.87
The related self-referential and one-dimensional monitoring cycle is just one part of a much
larger picture. A focus only on monitoring and no questioning of the wider political economy in
which the process is embedded, will not be sufficient. In order to move away from the project
delivery mode, the mindset in the sector needs to change. There are some indications that this
is slowly happening, for instance indicated in the use of language in the JMP consultation
document referred to in the beginning of this section to ‘services’ and ‘sustainability’. However,
changing language does not yet translate into new actor coalitions and a different organisation
of the sector. Overcoming the path dependencies, particularly those embedded in existing
organisational incentive structures and funding streams may require a perception of crisis to
open up a new policy space, highlighted as a key input for sector reforms by Grindle and
Thomas (1991). As a starting point, I suggest improving the evidence base on the functionality
of water supply schemes and on access dimensions that go beyond the technical level.
Furthermore, very basic improvements of street level bureaucrats’ working conditions such as
filling the available staff positions, providing sufficient fuel and per diems and extending
government extension services to the kebele (sub-district) level are needed in combination
with the suggestions related to monitoring made above.
87 Current debates in the sector point to a shift in mindset towards a ‘service delivery’ approach.
However, whether this will lead to a fundamental overhaul of the currently dominant way in which the
sector is organised, remains to be seen.
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I conclude with the perspective from a woreda WME officer. Participants in a workshop in May
2011 entitled What next after the National WASH Inventory? Were asked to summarise, in one
word, what the inventory meant to them. Among the many expected answers such as
“information”, “WASH data”, “significant for UAP”, “coverage [access] clarification”, “water
equals 1.5km”, “knowing the coverage”, “useful for planning”, and so on, a woreda WME
officer wrote down the word “love”. When asked what he meant by this, he explained that
“we need to love the people in the rural areas so that we can do good work”.88 This officer’s
attitude, which reflects my personal experience of many other WME officers across Ethiopia, is
encouraging. It is a good entry point for working with stakeholders to put substantive
rationales at the centre of future appraisal exercises.
88 In his explanation, the officer referred to the tiring work of inventorising facilities and of assessing and
repairing broken-down schemes in areas that are difficult to reach and for communities that often do
not have sufficient resources to pay for spare parts.
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10 Annex 1 – Interview guide: framing and monitoring activities
Interviewees: government officers of Ministry of Water Resources at federal, regional, zonal,
woreda levels; if applicable, government officers of Ministry of Finance and Development; NGO
monitoring experts / directors; donor representatives responsible for water interventions,
water users
Introduction / general
 What is the interviewee’s professional background and employment history?
 How long has the organisation been active in Ethiopia?
 When was the water programme established?
 Where are they active (regions, woredas) and what is the scope of their interventions?
 What is the organisation’s approach to providing water supply and sanitation?
Framing
 How does the organisation / individual define access? How is access measured? How
does the individual explain his/her definition of access?
 Who is responsible for which tasks in rural water supply?
 What is the biggest problem with access to water supply (and sanitation and hygiene)?
How does the organisation deal with that? What do you need to take into
consideration to provide access to water supply?
Monitoring approaches
 What is their approach to monitoring & evaluation?
 What is the purpose of monitoring?
 Which indicators are used / what parameters / aspects are monitored?
 Who is involved in monitoring?
 What is the process of monitoring like?
 What is the biggest challenge in monitoring?
 What has the organisation changed based on monitoring?
Past decisions with regard to rural water supply
 Has the organisation taken any decisions based on monitoring results?
Recent issues in the water sector
 What is the organisation’s opinion towards self-supply?
 Does the organisation have an opinion on the national M&E strategy? Do they intend
to engage? How?
 Any other organisations that have interesting approaches to monitoring?
 Anything else the interviewee would like to add?
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11 Annex 2 – Interview guide: water sector monitoring history,
accountabilities and incentives
Interviewees: government officials, NGO representatives, donor representatives
Explore: reasons, feelings, opinions and beliefs – content mapping: widening: why? Perspective-
widening: are there any other aspects / factors etc; people talk a lot about... what is your
opinion? You were very positive about this but were there also any shortcomings? Content
mining: could you tell me why this was important? How did you respond when? Why? What
was it that made you decide...? Explain language further when there are any crucial terms
Introduction
 What is the interviewee’s professional and employment background?
 Since when in the ministry or what relation to the ministry? Which processes involved?
Institutional development of the water sector
 What are the main institutional developments in the water sector from the 1960s
onwards?
 What are the main policy documents with regard to water supply (and sanitation?) and
water resources management?
History of purpose of monitoring in the water sector
 What does monitoring mean? What is the purpose of monitoring? Why is it important?
Difference between financial and progress reporting and WASH monitoring?
Relationship between the two processes
 Definition of access – how has it changed over time?
 Development of indicators, policy debates around access
Wider governance issues with regard to monitoring access to rural water supply
 Challenges related to Universal Access Programme, how does monitoring respond?
 Business Process Re-engineering and motivations / ownership of employees with
regard to monitoring
 How does water fit within the wider development agenda (PASDEP)? Has that
relationship changed over time?
 Relationship between ministry / minister and prime minister?
Accountability structures
Government officials
 Who are you reporting to? How often?
 Can you explain the process [captured by monitoring activity]? Are there important
stakeholders for your report outside the ministry itself? Who are they? Why are they
important?
 Are there any sanctions or positive feed-back mechanisms based on monitoring results?
 Can you give me an example?
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NGO monitoring experts
 Who do you report to? How often?
 Are there important stakeholders for your report outside the ministry itself? Who are
they? Why are they important?
 Are there any sanctions or positive feed-back mechanisms based on monitoring results?
 Can you give me an example?
WASH Committees / Users
 Do you report to someone? What do you report and when?
 Have there been any issues with regard to the water supply scheme in the past?
 What have you done in order to solve this issue?
 Have you reported it to someone? Who? Why this person? What happened?
Decisions with regard to rural water supply
 What are the priorities of the organisation / office with regard to rural water supply
this year?
 How did these priorities come about?
 Do you have a plan for water supply & sanitation in this year? Can you show it to me?
How did this plan come about?
